CONCEPT OF
DHVANI
IN SANSKRIT POETICS

IN THE LIGHT OF
ĀNANDAVARDHAN'S
DHVANYĀLOKA
AND ITS COMMENTATOR
MADHUSUDAN MISRA'S
AVADHĀNA

Dr. P.K. PANDA

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(Indian Theory of Suggestion and Principles of Literary Criticism)

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AND
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AVADHĀNA COMMENTARY

Dr. P. K. PANDA

Foreword by
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DEDICATED
TO THE LOTUS FEET OF
LORD JAGANNATH

नीलाद्रौ शंखमध्ये शतदलकमले रत्नसिंहासनस्थ
सर्वालंकारयुक्तं नवघनरुचिरं संयुत चाग्रजेण ।
भद्रायावामभागे रथचरणद्युतिं ब्रह्म रुद्रेन्द्रसेव्यं
देवानांसारमीशं स्वजनपरिभृतं ब्रह्मदारुस्मरामि ॥

FOREWORD

I have great pleasure in writing these lines to introduce the work of Dr. P.K. Panda to the world of scholars in general and the students of Sanskrit poetics in particular. Dhvani theory of Sanskrit poetics is a multifaceted concept. As Ānandavardhana —the propounder of Dhvani theory—has himself expressed obligation towards Grammarians giving them credit for the derivation of his Concept of Dhvani, it clearly shows that his approach towards the interpretation of poetry is basically based on linguistic aspects. The scholars like Bholashankar Vyas have tried to analyse this concept in detail in their works. At the same time Ānandavardhana talks of aesthetic charm deriving from poetry. He compares the poetic sense 'Pratīyamānārtha' with the beauty of a lady and states that both of them are suggestive, but not denotative or indicative.

"Pratīyamānaṁ punaranyadeva vastvasti vāṇīṣu mahākavīnām,
yattatprasiddhāvayavātriktaṁ vibhātilāvaṇyamivāṅganāṣu."

Dhvanyāloka 1/4

S.K. De has analysed this aesthetic concept of Dhvani theory in *Sanskrit Poetics as a Study of Aesthetics*. Ānandavardhana calls Dhvani as the soul of poetry: Kāvyasyātmā dhvani......... Ātmā is a philosophical concept which has been elaborated by Abhinavagupta and its commentators.

Madhusudan Mishra Tarkavāchaspasti, an eminent Oriya scholar of twentieth century, has dared to write a new commentary AVADHĀNA on the *Dhvanyāloka* itself. After Abhinava-

gupta's *Locana* commentary, nobody has dared to write a commentary on the *Dhvanyāloka*, but good many sub-commentaries have been written on Abhinavagupta's *Locana*. That is why, to my mind, Madhusudan Mishra dared to write a commentary on *Dhvanyāloka*. His argument is that to understand a theme mere light and eyes are not sufficient. One should be necessarily attentive towards the theme. Unless a person is attentive, he cannot perceive a theme even in broad daylight. So is the case with Dhvani theory, which is not intelligible or worth grasping even through the Āloka Vṛtti by Ananda himself and the *Locana* (eye) commentary of Ācārya Abhinavagupta. Hence *Avadhāna* a new commentary was needed and therefore had been written by the author.

Madhusudan Mishra has so many things new to say. It is necessary to examine his concept of Dhvani along with the idea of Anandavardhana—the propounder of Dhvani theory. It is obvious to say that Abhinavagupta has twisted the text of *Dhvanyāloka* in many a place to derive the meaning he wanted. Abhinavagupta has very scholarly shifted the point of soul of poetry from Dhvani to Rasa explaining the text "Kāvyasyātmā sa evārtha..." Here, he prefers the context quoted and sets aside the reference arguing that the Rasa only, which is purely suggested, on the contrary in Vastu and Alaṁkāra Dhvani, are sometimes suggested and sometimes denotated or indicated. The purely suggested sense Rasa, therefore, has a claim before the soul of poetry. There are many other points also in the *Dhvanyāloka* which need new approach to be explained. *Avadhāna* claims to possess that new approach and has explained it.

Dr. Panda's task is very clear though tough examining the claim of Avadhāna in the light of Anandavardhana's views and throws a new light on the concept of Dhvani. I am happy to say that Dr. Panda has been successful in his mission. It is not enough for him to give a comparative analysis of the theory but he has many things to say. He has not merely collected and presented the facts from different works but has put forth his own views also and thus his work has a fresh approach towards the interpretation and analysis of facts.

I am sure that the present work will give a thorough satisfaction to the students and the scholars of Sanskrit poetics, and

would inspire young scholars to go in deeper while studying the theories of Sanskrit poetics. I would like to congratulate Dr. Panda for producing such a good and scholastic work, and hope that he will continue to produce more and more works on the field of Sanskrit poetics.

Guru Pūrṇimā
2045 Sāṁvat

Prof. B.M. CHATURVEDI
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PREFACE

Anandavardhana's *Dhvanyāloka* is a luminous jewel in the storehouse of Sanskrit literature. Though it is written in Sanskrit, the concept of Dhvani embodied therein not merely serves the Sanskrit literature but works as a guide to all the literature in the world. The field of kāvya literature is richly enlightened by the Dhvani theory of Ānanda and all the critics accept Dhvani as the principal element of poetic composition. Even today the very concept of Dhvani is a matter highly discussed by the modern scholars. The line "Kāvyāsyatmā dhvaniriti budheiyah samāmnātapūrvaḥ..." establishes the fact that Dhvani theory existed even before Ananda. However, it has been admitted that there was no work dealing with Dhvani theory until the emergence of Dhvanyāloka. That is why the Dhvanikāra is to be justifiably recognised as the founder of new era in the history of Sanskrit poetics and Indian aesthetics.

But in grammar there did exist the concept of Dhvani and the śrūyamāṇa śābda (the word which is palatable to ear) was considered to be Dhvani. Śrūyamāṇa śabda implies that when a person pronounces a word or something strikes or counter-strikes and it produces some sound which mingles in the air and the waves of sound enter into the ear. The sound which is audible in this manner is termed as śrūyamāṇa śabda. Similar to this process, grammarians also say that the audible word (śabda) is called as Dhvani. It is totally based on the maxim of vicitaraṅga nyāya. They also use a term 'Sphota' for the indivisible expression of word and that 'Sphota' is considered synonymous with the concept of Dhvani.

In poetry the mere expression of word is not called as Dhvani. It deals with the suggestive expression of both word and meaning. Specially in poetry the Pradhānībhūta vayṅgya (suggested), Vyañjaka śabdārthamaya (both word and meaning), and Vyañjanā Vṛtti is known as Dhvani. Virtually, regarding this concept there is a difference of opinions between the grammarians and literary critics. If we accept the views of grammarians, we will have to consider the vācaka, lākṣaṇika, vyañjaka śabda, the meaningless tone of drums etc. as Dhvani. But it is ridiculous to accept the above mentioned aspects in poetry while defining Dhvani because Dhvani theory is essentially based on the existence of suggestive sense (Vyañjanā Vyāpāra). Ānanda says :—

> "Yatrārtha śabdo vā tamarthamupasarjanīkṛtasvarthau
> Vyaṅkta Kāvyavisesaḥ sa dhvaniriti sūribhiḥkathitaḥ".
>
> —*Dhvanyāloka* 1/13

Thus the *Dhvanyāloka* of Ānandavardhana occupies a unique position in the field of Sanskrit poetics and Indian aesthetics. The great popularity and currency of this book is indicated not only by the first systematic expression of Dhvani theory, but also by the existence of a number of brilliant text-books on theories of poetry. Even by the fact that four Sanskrit commentaries ('Locana' by Abhinavagupta, 'Candrikā' by an unknown author, 'Didhīti' by Badrinatha and 'Avadhāna' by Madhusudan Mishra) and two sub-commentaries (Upalocana and Kaumudī) are known to be existing of which except 'Candrikā' all are available in print.

The AVADHĀNA commentary of Pundit Madhusudan Mishra Tarkavachaspati is one of them which was published by the Calcutta Sanskrit Series, Calcutta in July 1938. It is a modern and fascinating commentary of twentieth century which excells the ideas of Ānandavardhana in a greater extent.

The present study has been endeavoured with scholarly and thought provoking explanations and analyses of the most salient features of the concept of Dhvani in the light of Ānandavardhan's *Dhvanyāloka* and with special reference to the text of *Avadhāna* commentary. It presents the existence and develop-

ment of Dhvani theory in a comprehensive and precise chronological order up to its probable impact on modern creative talents. In explaining the statements of Avadhanākāra, there has been devoted more space to such aspects when it was necessary and so many points have been located which were not even touched by Locanakāra. The study is not only strictly based on the text of Avadhāna commentary, but also deals with all the speculative aspects of literary criticism. It aims to an evaluation of the position of great Dhvani theory with certain new outlook towards poetic art, especially based on the aestho-linguistical vision.

The present study contains thirteen chapters incorporating an introduction in the very beginning which deals with a brief history of the Sanskrit poetic traditions, the evolution process of the theories of Sanskrit poetics and the antiquity of the concept of Dhvani. In the second chapter the discussion has been made about the life and works of Madhusudan Mishra Tarkavachaspati—the author of the 'Avadhāna' commentary. The third chapter deals with the authorship of the Kārikās and Vrtti while in the fourth and sixth chapters an attempt has been made to establish the basic ideas of the concept of Dhvani and its definition. The fifth chapter contains the fundamental relations between the Dhvani (suggested sense) and Abhidhā (denotative sense); the Dhvani (suggested sense) and the Laksaṇā (indicative sense) etc. In the seventh chapter the discussion has been made regarding the various kinds of Dhvani, while the eighth chapter deals with the position of Rasa (sentiments) Rasadhvani and Rasavadālaṁkāra. The ninth and tenth chapters also witness the place and role of Guṇa and Alaṁkāra within the territorial range of Dhvani and the Padasaṁghatanā respectively. The eleventh chapter has been related to Saṁlakṣyakramavyaṅgya Dhvani. The twelfth chapter discusses certain unrevealed aspects of the Dhvani theory such as the importance of word 'iti' used in the first Kārikā, the correlation between Dhvani and Doṣa, Dhvani and Vṛtti, Dhvani and Rīti, Citra Kāvya, Guṇībhūtavyaṅgya Kāvya, and the difference between Dhvani and Anumāna etc. The last chapter of this work is very valuable where careful researches have been summed up about the importance of a particular

concept—the Dhvani—with a scholarly touch of Avadhanākāra, and witnesses the supremacy of the suggestive sense with a special devotion to classical, medieval and modern criticisms. Thus, it can be said that Ānandavardhana's *Dhvanyāloka* has been studied here, both in retrospect and prospect, with the special reference to Tarkavachaspati's *Avadhāna* commentary.

I warmly acknowledge the invaluable help and encouragement from my rev'd teacher Prof. B.M. Chaturvedi, Head, Deptt. of Sanskrit, University of Delhi under whose guidance this work could be successful one. I wish to thank Prof. G.K. Das, Deptt. of English, University of Delhi; Dr. (Mrs.) R. Nilakantan, K lindi College; Dr. J.P. Mishra, M.L. Nehru College; Dr. V.P. Tripathi, Delhi; Dr. M.K. Sahani, Lecturer, Itarasi Govt. College, M.P. and Shri J.B. Khanna, Assistant Librarian, Central Library, University of Delhi for their suggestions and guidance given to me from time to time.

I am indebted to Prof. N.K. Ray, Provost Gwyer Hall; Shri S. Nilakantan, Director, Presidential Secretariat; Prof. S S. Mohapatra, a distinguished educationist and parliamentarian and Justice Ranganathan Mishra, Supreme Court of India, for the constant inspirations and encouragements they extended to me. It is my sincere duty to remember here my parents who made me what I am. I heartly thank my good friend Shri. P.N. Shukla, Research Fellow (Sanskrit), Univ. of Delhi for his cooperation.

Words are insufficient to thank Dr. Neeraja, University of Delhi, and my younger sister Miss Prativa Panda who helped me a lot while completing the present study.

Lastly, I extend my gratitude to Shri J.L. Gupta, both publisher and academician, for his keen interest, cooperation and patience in bringing out a quality publication.

Rathayātrā, 2045 Samvat
University of Delhi

PRADIPTA KUMAR PANDA

CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Irresistible rapid advance and profound revolutionary changes in the spheres of life, literature and other aspects of society are characteristic features of the time we live in. The progressive development of literary history of India in the age of transition from vedic hymn to classical kāvya literature, the age of cosmic speeds, obviously cannot be denied. With the growing popularity of Sanskrit Kāvya and its artistic developments, it is necessary to study Sanskrit poetics (Śāhitya Śāstra) unique among the Śāstras of world, both ancient and modern, embracing the science of all poetic arts.

Unlike Sanskrit Kāvya the history of Kāvya-Śāstra (poetics) is very rich. Its study is very essential and of great importance. From centuries, ideas put forth and controversies were raised in an attempt to find out the criterion of good poetry and the nature of aesthetic delight. Right from Bharata's 'Nātyaśāstra', the first great contribution on theories of dramaturgy, till the composition of Punditraj Jagannatha's *Rasagaṅgādhara*, the history of Sanskrit poetics passed through a revolutionary period and culminated in many concepts mainly Rasa, Alaṁkāra, Guṇa, Rīti, Dhvani, Vakroktī, Anumiti and Aucitya etc.[1] On the basis of these concepts the intrinsic aspect of poetry socalled Kāvyatattva has been interpreted in various manners. This typical analysis of poetic concept (Kāvyatattva) marks the beginning of a great tradition in the history of Sanskrit poetics and it has taken different turns in its development. Each turn

does contribute specially a new idea, and gives a particular direction to some sort of theory. If we critically analyse a particular one, we find the other concepts exist within it just like limbs and sub-limbs of a body. Thus the origin and development of the concepts like Alaṁkāra, Guṇa, Rīti, Dhvani, Rasa, Vakrokti, Anumiti, Aucitya etc. contribute a great deal.

Though it is not very easy to give a concise definition of above mentioned concepts, yet by the discussion of their existence it is known that their surroundings are very wide; even they have the relation with beyond the Śāstras. They have a long history. In the course of their development, mainly they embrace two basic questions based on their subjects and ultimate purpose. Firstly, what is the soul (Ātman) of poetry. Secondly how and by what methods that concept of soul (Ātmatattva or Prāṇatattva) is revealed or acquired. Depending upon the basic solutions of these two questions the entire domain of Sanskrit poetics has flourished.

In the very beginning, Alaṁkāra, the figures of speech in the form of strikingness is considered as soul of poetry, conveying through word and meaning as its medium of expression. Bhāmaha, Dandin, Udbhaṭṭa etc. are the chief exponents of this theory.[2] They suggest that neither the grace and charm of sound nor the novelty or sublimity of sense constitutes real poetry. Poetry is that in which the sound effect unites with sublimity of thought and both co-jointly produce charm in the minds of refined readers. Alongwith the facts and feelings poetry has also a beautiful form. Certain modes of expression qualify this beauty as Alaṁkāra and make a piece of poetic composition charming. Even a fair complexioned lady does not look so charming without ornaments, such is the case with poetry.

Dandin as well as his predecessor Bhāmaha do not give a detail survey about the soul of poetry, rather presumably discuss a superficial idea of it. Their ideas deal with the combination of embellished sound and sense which is undoubtedly an essential element of poetry. Dandin defines Alaṁākra that property which beautifies poetry, implying the poetic figure as an instrument of embellishment to augment the charm of poetic tissue.[3] Though the importance of poetic figure is recog-

nised by him, yet like Bhāmaha he does not recognise it as the only essential quality of poetic creation. In this connection, the remarkable thing is that in pre-Bhāmaha-Dandin Era, the term 'Sauśabda' is understood as a nice use of Śabda (words)—which is the substratum of true embellishment. But these two exponents do not agree with it, rather give an equal prominence to Śabda (word) and Arth (sense).[4] This is the first turning point in the history of Sanskrit literary criticism.

Secondly, Vāmana appears with a new concept which deals with the inner essence of poetry. He says, the essence of poetry is the 'Rīti' or style, or diction; which is being essentially constituted by presence of Guṇas and ultimately constitutes the soul of a Kāvya.[5] For the first time he gives a clear conception of the relative importance of Guṇa and Alaṁkāra, and draws distinction between ordinary composition and poetic expression. He uses the term Alaṁkāra not in specific sense of poetic figure only, he takes it in a broader sense to mean poetic beauty. This poetic beauty can be acquired only by enhancement of this beauty. So, Vāmana says—the charm par excellence of Kāvya can be possible only by the beautification and that beauty is not conveyed by Alaṁkāras like Upamā (simile), Rūpaka (metaphor), Dipaka etc., but by Guṇas like Mādhurya etc. In poetry the existence of beauty can only be possible by Guṇa which is the natural phenomenon of it. Alaṁkāras like Upamā, Rūpaka etc. only improve the charm created by Guṇa. Thus the Alaṁkāras are termed as Vahiraṅgas (external expressions). In other words Guṇa known as Alaṅkṛti, is illuminating the manifestation of Alaṁkāras. So, the creation of Guṇa with Rīti makes jointly and also due to the external expressions Alaṁkāras are not considered as the soul of poetry.

From another standpoint, Ātman or soul is an internal concept. Like Ātman, Guṇa is also considered as the internal concept and Rīti is a substratum of its expression conveys the manifestation of Alaṁkāras. Vāmana is of opinion that Guṇas are essential qualities of poetic art, while Alaṁkāras are non-essential elements in their restricted sense. The Guṇas reside in poetry in Samavāya relation and Alaṁkāras in Saṁyōga relation. The former is the quality of the essence while the latter is an external embellishment. Thus, in the history of Sanskrit poetics

Vāmana gives a new idea, and declares in unequivocal terms that 'Rīti' is the soul of poetry, and he explains as a particular arrangement of words which comes due to Guṇa. In his opinion, Guṇa—a definite combination of difficult poetic excellence makes a particular diction (Rīti) palpable and this poetic diction constitutes the essence of poetry.

The third turning point on the highway of Sanskrit literary criticism is Dhvani theory or 'the doctrine of tone'—enjoying as the soul of poetry and its medium of expression is vyañjanā (suggestion). Founder Ācārya Ānandavardhana develops the ideas of the essence of poetry and condemns the viewpoints of Vāmana. He says Dhvani is the soul of poetry in the form of Vyāpārya-Vyaṅgya not as Vyāpāra.[6]

The origin and development of the Dhvani theory is an outstanding contribution, mainly deals with the major problems like essence of poetry etc. It keeps the internal vision of the exponents away from Alaṁkāra and Alaṅkṛti (Guṇa and Rīti), embraces the Alaṁkārya. They mark that both Alaṁkāra and Alaṅkṛti can't be entitled as the soul of poetry. Because Alaṁkāra is the external dimension of both Śabda-citra (figure of words) and Artha-citra (figure of sense) Kāvya. And Alaṅkṛti is a form of Padasaṁghatanātmaka Vyāpāra (functions of Padasaṁghatanā). If the Alaṁkāra which relates the bodily peculiarity of 'Śabdārtha' (words and senses) are not considered as the soul of poetry, then how can it be possibe that the Gamanāgamanarūpa Vyāpāras (the functions of intending figures become the soul of poetry? It is impossible. The soul of poetry is such a concept as it is the purport of Guṇa and must be Alaṁkārya by Alaṁkāra. The concept is called 'Dhvani' and Vyañjanā-Vyāpāra (functions of suggestion) is its only medium of expression.

Before Ānandavardhana (hereinafter called AV) though the use of term 'Dhvani' and 'Vyañjanā' appear many times in Bhāmaha's *Kāvyālaṅkāra*,[7] but these are the mere application of terms only. And these terms neither convey the Vyañjanā (suggested sense), nor Pratīyamānārtha. So, the origin of Dhvani theory or the theory of suggestion has a great importance and the principles of Indian Literary Criticism reached its zenith with the promulgation of this theory of AV. It is a novel desire for

the systematization and coordination of the diverse concepts in a unique manner. Ācārya Ānandavardhana reforms the ideas of predecessors and says Dhvani is 'prasidhaprasthānavyatireki' (distinct from the known traditions) and 'Anūnmīlitapūrva' (not even speculated so far).[8]

The speciality of Dhvani theory is marked by its comprehensiveness and extensiveness. Implication of the basic concepts of poetry like Guṇa, Alaṁkāra, Rīti, Rasa etc. have been made within it in such a novel manner as is rare in other theories. So there is no confusion that the Dhvani theory is a well completed and well acknowledged theory. It is not a part of any theories like Guṇa and Alaṁkāra. Though it is newly propounded by AV, yet it has the limitless power to assimilate all other concepts. Dhvanikāra declares it as 'Mahāviṣaya'—'a great subject' and proves that the other concepts like Guṇa, Alaṁkāra are its Aṅgas (constituents).[9] Remarkable feature is that even the concept of Rasa also appears as an Aṅga (part and parcel) of it and assigns a place sub-ordinate to Dhvani.

Besides the above mentioned qualities, the richness of Dhvani theory is marked by Vyañjanā Vṛtti which is borrowed from grammar and philosophy and becomes a debateable subject for Ācāryas of all the branches of literature. For explaining the nature of words and their meanings AV introduces a new function, called Vyañjanā (suggestion) in addition to the Abhidhā (Denotation) and Lakṣaṇā (Indication) of the earlier theorists. Dhvani theory believes that Dhvani cannot be explained in terms of either denotation or indication and hence a new function of words i.e. suggestion should be admitted. Denotation expresses its own meaning, but suggestion conveys a meaning beyond that of denotation. Thus Vyañjanā is such a concept for which the proudness comes to Indian literary criticism. By the discussions of it the Śāhityaśāstrins (poeticians) consider themselves as free from the vicious traditions of grammar and philosophy. Even the grammarians like Nageśhabhaṭṭa also accept the concept of Vyañjanā to a great extent.[10]

Dhvani theory is only a subject of Vyañjanā-Vyāpāra and so wide as it associates with the three categories of Vyaṅgyārtha viz. Vasṭumātrā (mere matter of fact), Alaṁkāra (figures of speech) and Rasādi (Rasa and other such mental state) etc.

Among these, the Rasādi type is considered to be the best and the very propriety of the Guṇas and Alaṁkāras and other such elements depends on this assistance to suggest the Rasādi variety of the suggested sense. This theory has attributed a new meaning to the Guṇa, Rīti and Alaṁkāra like Rasavat of the earlier theorists. Ānanda by laying greater emphasis on the suggested sense and particularly on the Rasādi variety tries to rejuvinate the decaying genius of the days of Vālmīki and Kalidāsa and gives a new fillip to the creative impulse of the Indian poets.

With the doctrine of Dhvani or Suggestion there appears a new and interesting theory about aesthetical ideas. There is an existence of psychological element. The listeners or spectators are considered not as mere passive participants but as active participants, since they are men of taste 'Rasikas' or Sahṛdayas' or as Plato observes: "persons who identify themselves with the hero and suffer themselves in sympathy with the Hero."[11] So, 'Dhvani' conveys a statement which the poet does not wish to express directly; it conveys it by means of suggestion. Mammata, when he affirms that this is best poem when the suggested meaning far excess the expressed sense or the best poem is that in which the suggested sense is more charming than the expressed. It is called Dhvani by the wisemen.[12] Thus, the Dhvani theory and 'Dhvanyāloka' of AV is universally acknowledged as an epoch making work in the history of Sanskrit literary criticism. It is true that AV—the Dhvanikāra is known as the greatest exponent of a new school of literary criticism i.e. the Dhvani School is distinct from the traditional schools, but in reality he is the staunchest advocate of the Rasa theory expounded by Bharata.[13] He includes Bharata's doctrine of Rasa within the purview of the comprehensive scheme of suggestion and gives it a new shape. Bharata is completely silent as regards the functions need for conveying the rasa which is the central theme in poetry, while Dhvanikāra establishes Rasa as 'Dhvani as excellent as distinct from the two other categories viz. Vastu, and Alaṁkāra which convey through Denotation (Abhidhā) as well.[14] Having thus established Rasa as Vyaṅgya par excellence and as the very quintessence of poetic art, the Dhvanikāra proceeds to re-appraisal of various traditional concepts of

poetics by bringing them into proper relation with Rasa. So, the values of various figures of speech like upamā, rūpaka, etc. are taken into consideration when they serve to heighten the emotional effect of poetry. By failing they degraded their position and appear like decorative elements without any emotional appeal as in Citra kāvya which should not be considered trully as a species of poetry at all. Thus AV establishes the concept of Dhvani as the soul of poetry and his work 'Dhvanyāloka' remains outstanding.

The distinguished Ācāryas like Abhinavagupta, Ruyyaka, Mammata, Hemachandra, Viswanātha and Punditrāj Jagannātha are overwhelmed with the pervasiveness and fullfledgedness of Dhvani theory.[15] Not only they simply support it, but also discuss elaborately in their works for the solutions of timely raised divergent views. Consequently this theory has enjoyed an universal truth. As a renowned philosopher of Saivism, an expert in tantra literature, a great rhetorician and critic of extraordinary acumen Abhinavagupta preserves this theory by the creation of a supercommentary 'Locana'. Besides, his 'Abhinavabhāratī' on Bharata's *Nātyaśāstra* is also another contribution which deals with the brilliant advocasy of Rasa and Dhvani theory. Though both the works appear as the commentary on certain text, yet for their erudition, tersensess, dignity of style and the views expounded therein, they deserve to be ranked among the most original works on this subject; and later writers regard them to be so. In fact it is the 'Locana' that furnishes the reader with the true insight into the many initricate problems which are raised in the theories of Rasa and Dhvani formulated by Ānanda.[16] Abhinavagupta admits that due to the Vyaṅgya Vyañjaka bhāva Saṁbandha (relation of vyaṅgya vyañjakabhāva) of Vibhāvas (determinants) and other Sthāyibhāvas (permanent state) Rasa is Vyaṅgya (suggested) and a subject of Vyañjanā-Vyāpāra. He also gives five kinds of derivations of the term Dhvani[17] and exhibits a clear meaning of it. Thanks to the skill with which Mammata and other rhetoricians have commented on it and the consequent development of the semiotic methods of studying art—the "Dhvani" theory has firmly established itself among the world of literary critics. In the second 'Ullasa' of 'Kāvyaprakāśa' Mammata

expounds this theory in a masterly way, and declares that concept of 'Dhvani' constitutes the essence of Poetry.[18] Next to Mammata, even Punditrāj Jagannātha, the last towering personality in the field of Sanskrit poetics strongly supports this theory and remarks that the principles which are discussed in *Dhvanyāloka* have great importance.[19]

Inspite of strong supporting viewpoints of Dhvanivādins, this theory faces vehement criticisms from various quarters. Even Dhvanikāra himself anticipates some contention against theory and refutes them for which he furnishes an elaborate exposition of the very opening Kārikā of *Dhvanyāloka*.[20] Besides, a few other stern criticisms are raised by certain reactionary critics like Mukulabhaṭṭa, Bhaṭṭanāyaka, Mahimabhaṭṭa, Kuntaka, Rajśekhar, Bhōja, Kshemendra, Pratihārenduraj, Dhanika, Dhanañjaya[21] etc. These critics uphold the views of 'Alaṅkāravādins' in an original way and by honest efforts they try to reconcile some new ideas with the old.

Mukulabhaṭṭa denies the separate existence of Dhvani. He says it comes under the function of Indication.[22] Then we find Bhattanāyaka's *Hṛdayadarpaṇa*, a work which is exclusively written for the demolition of Dhvani theory. But Abhinavagupta fully exploits both of them and strongly marks the depth of the Dhvani theory.[23] The another powerful opponent is Mahimabhaṭṭa, the author of 'Vyaktiviveka' and his Anumāna theory deserves a special attention. He says Dhvani or suggestion is nothing but a variety of inference[24]. Though Mahimabhaṭṭa tries his utmost to demolish the Dhvani theory, yet his endeavours cannot be appreciated by the successors. Consequently the Anumāna theory gradually fell into an unmerited oblivion only due to anti-viewpoints on AV and Abhinavagupta. And also the commentator of the Vyaktiviveka —Ruyyaka too criticises the views of Mahimabhaṭṭa.[25] Ruyyaka is a less leconic, but it is he who saves the Dhvani theory from the sledge-hammer blow of Mahimabhaṭṭa. Then Jayaratha also brings a bold relief from utter improbability of the views of Vyaktivivekakāra, while commenting the 'Alaṁkāra sarvasva' of Ruyyaka.[26] Thus in spite of the ingenuity of vyaktivivekakāra, his novel proposition is failed to gain much ground in the teeth of the increasing popularity of the Dhvani theory.

Next to the Anumiti theory, we find the vakrokti theory of Kuntaka. He says vakrokti is the soul of a poetic creation.[27] He also follows the primitive statements of Bhāmaha[28]. His genius is more literary than critical. His logical thinking is not in a high order. So, it creates only a furore in the literary circle, but fails to establish permanently. Another critic of this theory is Kshemendra. He is pupil of Abhinavagupta and composed a work named *Aucityavicāracarcā*.[29] He says Aucitya (observance of propriety) is the essential constituent of poetry.[30] Neither Dhvani nor Rasa has the superior status to it. But it is not a new concept. AV stresses upon the strict observance of propriety as the condition of literary beauty and Rasa.[31] Abhinavagupta also dismisses the viewpoints of Kshemendra with a little opposite remarks. Above views of prominent anti-Dhvani theorists are enough to reveal what an enormus impression is made by AV and his famous scholist Abhinavagupta in the field of literary criticism. It must be noted that however the rival theorists have denounced the position of Dhvani theorists, they cannot but only admit the presence of a sense, conveyed by the denotation or primary power of words. This is an axiomatic truth which they can't deny but concur with. And the credit of Dhvani theorists lay in this that Abhāvavādins are the first and foremost to reveal the truth—Vyañjanā or suggestion as the most logical and convenient way of revealing that sense.

If we look to the predominative bulk of the speculative thought of AV's 'Dhvanyāloka', we find that it occupies a unique position in the field of Sanskrit poetics. This monumental work has always maintained a great authority throughout India as introducing the doctrine of Dhvani or suggestion. The reason for its great authority lies in the fact that it is strongly supported by the Kāvyaprakāśakāra. It is a strinkingly original work. It combines the merit of fulness with that of conciseness; it sums up and explains almost all the previous speculations in the subject and becomes the starting point of a number of text books and commentaries on theories of poetry.

The Kārikās are called the Dhvani, the Vṛtti or the prose portions enunciating the Kārikās is known 'Āloka' of AV and the richest commentary 'Locana' of Abhinavagupta has come down to us.[32] The commentary 'Candrikā'[33] as mentioned by

Abhinavagupta is not yet available. The original text is a very difficult one and the Locana is far more difficult to grasp. Hence, there is a keen desideratum for an easy commentary on it. In the first half of twentieth century, two new commentaries came into existence by the great inspiration of Bihar-Utkal Sanskrit Samiti : (i) The 'Didhiti' commentary by Pandit Badrinath Sukla (ii) The 'Avadhāna' commentary by Pundit Madhusudan Mishra Tarkavāchaspati[34]. Both of these commentiaries, excell the ideas of Ānandavardhana to a greater extent.

AVADHĀNA of Madhusudan Mishra is virtually a commentary on the text Dhvanyāloka—that evaluates and reassesses the views of predecessors as laid in their respective works. It appears to be quite successful in the systematic and lucid working out of the already recognised stock of ideas in the light of the new scheme put forward in Dhvanyāloka.[35] It is a fascinating comment and Adhyāpaka Tarkavāchaspati supplied to the Sanskrit scholars with a very stimulating work which deals with the most difficult problem of the doctrine of Vyañjanā. This work not a very small one, raises quite a host of debatable questions and the labour which the author has brought to bear upon its pages must have been great when we find that the author has not indulged in mere speculations but worked hard on the old records and used them to a good purpose and very cautiously put together with great skill what he has found therein. The wealth of informations the author has ferreted out is amazing, most of which have been explored from reliable sources and all very admirably executed. The work includes interesting details and contains ample guidance for those who desire to reach a correct conclusion about the theories of Sanskrit poetry. It is a scholar's work and we are very glad that Tarkavāchaspati's first hand interpretation of Dhvanyāloka has a great importance.

A remarkable thing is that, in the way of expression, AK does not imitate always the path of Locana. But sometimes by way of chapterwise expositions and sometimes by comprehensive elucidation he paves a new avenue in the realm of Indians literary criticism. Even he illustrates many a thing which is not touched by Abhinavagupta. He does not totally ignore the Locana. Regarding the purposes of this commentary, the

commentator himself remarks that although a thing is enlighted by Āloka (light) and clearly visible by Locana (eye), yet the thorough knowledge of that thing can't be made or observed without Avadhāna (concentration or attention). So, the commentator gives the title of his work as 'AVADHĀNA'[36] which hits the exact idea of the Dhvanyāloka of AV.

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CHAPTER 2

MADHUSUDAN MISHRA : THE AUTHOR OF AVADHĀNA COMMENTARY

LIFE AND WORKS

The pre-independence era in the history of Sanskrit literature in Orissa (1568 A.D.-1948 A.D.) produced a galaxy of Sanskrit scholars and 'Pundits' to whom the wealth of Indian wisdom owes a great deal. Mahāmahopādhyaya Pundit Madhusudana Mishra Tarkavāchaspati—one of the outstanding and original thinker adorned the court of Basudeva Suddhala Deva, the then chief of ex-Bamanda state (modern Sambalpur). Considered as a front ranking pundit, he flourished in the first half of the twentieth century (1872 A.D.-1944 A.D.), during the reign of the British Empire.[1] His creative career resonated with the glorious Sanskrit revolution in Orissa (1893-1905 A.D.) and persisted with all its freshness and vigour till his death in 1944 A.D.

During this period the face of the earth has undergone transformations. With the annexation of entire Orissa to the British Empire, the course of Sanskrit culture that was surviving with much constraints during the Muslim and Marhatta periods, practically dried up in the sānds of the cultural conquest of British Imperialism. The introduction of English as the only medium of instructions in almost all educational institutions, even at the higher education level under the full patronage of the then ruling British governor, put the Sanskrit pundits back and gave a death blow to its culture. During this stress and strain Orissa was undergoing changes both ideologically and institutionally in a revolutionary manner. Being a fortunate

product of this revolutionary period Tarkavāchaspati sped up this process of change in true spirit. In this adverse circumstances he was the brightest luminary, the spirit of our Indian culture, the greatest personage of memory and one of the greatest heir of fame.[2] He devoted himself to the field of Sanskrit with great zeal and sincerity in order to put Orissa's Sanskrit culture in an unequal footing with other Indian cultures. If Orissa is today literally developed and if the orient and occident is better and more reasonable understanding than before, it has come today to partly due to the persistent intellectual activities and cultural propaganda of Madhusudana Mishra.

Tarkavāchaspati was born in a typical Oriya brahmin family of Kautsa gotra[3], on the day of Śukla Dwādaśi, Mārgaśira 1922 Saṁvat (1872 A.D.) at Vira-Balabhadrapur near Puri town in Orissa.[4] His father Pundit Ramakrishna Mishra was a renowned Pundit. He was also greatly influenced by his mother Lakshmi Devi. The genealogy of Tarkavāchaspati's family portrays the name of his forefathers beginning from Pundit Dasarathi Mishra either as court poets or priest of the Gangā royal family in Orissa. His genealogy may be drawn as follows.[5]

Born in a poor family, Madhusudana did not get ample opportunity to receive a good education. But he had an insatiable thirst for knowledge and with indefatigable energy he received his early education and studied the various branches of literature under the guidance of his father and maternal grandfather who were distinguished authorities of the time. The name of Madhusudana was also associated with a reputed Sanskrit Pundit Basudeva Sarangi from whom he studied all the Kāvyas and the Vyākaraṇas.[6] At childhood his family was under heavy financial constraint. Instances show that he even faced the situation not to be able to purchase oil to lit a lamp for study. Consequently, he tried to finish up his studies in day time. In exceptional cases for night he used to collect the dry leaves from nearby forests and put some leaves at a time in the sacrificial altar to study at least one stanza.[7]

One day Madhusudana was punished by his father of stern temperament for mischanting a Sanskrit line from Mahābhāśya.[8] He left for maternal uncle's place accompanied by nis maternal

GENEALOGY

Pandit Dasarathi Mishra

Pandit Narasimha Mishra

Pandit Ramkrishna Mishra

(Wife—Lakshmi Devi)

Pandit Madhusudan Mishra — Pandit Sudarshana Mishra — Pandit Anand Mishra (Smrti Tirtha and Sahitya Tirtha)

(Wife—Sulakhana Devi)—Tarkavachaspati (1872—1904)

(Sons)—Damodar Mishra — Narayana Mishra — Gopinath Mishra — Pundit Narasimha Mishra (Wife—Siva Priya Devi)

(Daughters)—Chandramani Devi — Haramani Devi — Nisamani Devi — Janki Devi

Dasarathi Mishra — Divyasingha Mishra
(Both the sons now alive)

grandfather, and returned to his parents after eleven months only getting a deep knowledge of Mahābhāśya's sūtras and Aṣṭādhyāyī etc.[9] But the creative mind of Madhusudana was not saturated with this little knowledge. He left home for higher study with seventeen paisa, some dry rice and some ripe bananas. He helplessly reached at the house of Praharāj Zamindar in Balasore at midnight where he found all asleep. Hopeless and helpless Madhusudana chanted some beautiful stanzas from 'Naiṣadha' and 'Kirātārjunīyam' sitting in front of Zamindar's house. Praharāj Zamindar heard the ślokas and was really surprised and came out from his room. He was much pleased with Madhusudana[10]. He arranged lodging as well as a scholarship for Madhusudana and gave admission in his Sanskrit tole where he studied śāhitya and vedanta. Impressed by the wisdom of Madhusudana he appointed him as a teacher in his Sanskrit tole.[11] Madhusudana's enthusiastic and curious mind was always searching more and more. He left for Navadwipa[12] to learn Nyāya and Darshana and within fourteen months he was established as an efficient Sanskrit pundit. Veteran pundits of that time recognised him a potential intellectual of Sanskrit literature in future. At Navadwipa Madhusudan too engaged himself in tantrasādhanā and got the blessings of mother Goddess.[13]

He also visited Kāsi from Navadwipa and came in contact with Pundit Siva Kumar Sastri, Pundit Srikar Sastri and other eminent Sanskrit scholars.[14] In a pundita sabha at Kasi, he gave his own statement regarding the traditional use of 'Dakṣhine mātuli Kanyā' in Dharmśāstra.[15] He also visited Hardwar and participated in Gītā pravacana. He returned to Navadwipa and participated in a 'Pundit Mahāsabhā' for twenty five days based on Tarka and Nyāya Śāstra where he received the title of 'Tarkavāchaspati'—master of Logic by the 'pundit Mahāsabha' at the age of 18 years only.[16]

By sheer determination he returned to his native land as a top ranking Pundita in Sanskrit literature and got invitation from the Gajapati of Puri as a royal poet. But firstly, he adorned the court of Kripamaya Deva, the chief of Badakhemundi state in 1889 A.D.[17] where he spent 14 years as a court poet. Later he left the court of Kripamaya Deva and

joined at Bamanda as a royal poet in 1903 A.D.[18] where he spent 14 years. During this period he had a victory in a 'Tarka Sabhā' by defeating some Madras Pundit.[19] After the death of Basudeva Suddhala Deva he also enjoyed the royal patronage of Balabhadra Deva, the worthy son of Suddhala Deva.[20]

Later he joined as a teacher in Sanskrit tole, namely Govinda Ramanuja tole located within the premises of Uttaraparswa matha near Jagannatha temple at Puri. By his benevolent performance, he adorned the chair of head pundit Parama Prathama Adhyāpaka at the age of 45.[21] In recognition of his selfless and devoted contributions to Sanskrit literature, the Bihar, Orissa Sanskrit Parishad awarded him the title "Mahāmahopādhyāya"—"the great great teacher" in the presence of the eminent Pundits like Ramavatar Sharma, Pundit Hari Chand Shastri and Pundit Balakrishna Jha etc.[22]

He spent last phase of his life at his native place where he led simple life and engaged himself with religious rites, attended the Pundit sabhas and participated in Śāstrārthas, etc. He breathed his last on Śukla Dwādaśī, Mārgaśirsa, 1994 Samvat (Friday 3rd November, 1144 A.D).[23] The press in Orissa was unanimous in its chorus of appreciation of his genius. One of the most influential newspaper of that day "The Samāja" wrote—"By the death of Tarkavāchaspati, Sanskrit literature as well as Oriya literature has suffered an irreparable loss. Not only his works exercise a healthy influence on the literary tastes of his countrymen, but what is better they instilled a high moral tone into the Pundit classes of native community.[24] Condolence meetings were held at Puri, Bhubaneswar, Balasore, Sambalpur, Bhawanipatna to mourn his demise. Pundit Neelkantha said—so long as the Sanskrit language remains the name of Tarkavāchaspati will be remembered, honoured and respected.[25]

We are fortunate to get some useful information from his son Pundit Ramkrishna Mishra. As a royal Pundit he always used both the royal and the general dresses. His early character was moulded mainly by hands of his pious and affectionate parents as well as his maternal grandfather and great Acharya Basudeva Sarangi. He got married to a devoted lady Sulakshana Devi at the age of eleven. He had eight children[26] (four daugh-

ters and four sons). Unfortunately he lost his three elder sons while he was at Barakhemundi. At the age of fiftytwo, he lost his father and after one year and two months he lost his mother too. Another mournful event in his life was the death of his devoted wife Sulakshana when he was of fifty and his eldest son Ramkrishna was of thirteen years.[27] Poor financial condition always depressed him but due to his strong determination and vigorous thinking he achieved great success in life. It can be summed up as "noble was his birth, loving and gentle his temper, honest and rigorous his life, strong and admirable his character, brilliant and highly useful his career, memorable and lasting his contribution".

He was a devotee of Lord Śiva and Goddess Durga.[28] His family had an ancestral rights in the management and regular worship of Śiva, a temple located in his village. He was also a devotee of Lord Jagannatha. During his stay at Puri, he used to visit the temple of Lord Jagnnatha and participated in the 'Pundit-Sabhā' arranged by Muktimandapa Pundita Mandali.[29] As a brahmin of tantra yoga, he always worshipped Goddess Durgā. His literary contributions like 'Gaja Śatakam', Lakshmi Śatakam', 'Viṣadbhanjana Jaṇāṇa' and 'Mukteswar Jaṇāṇa' (Prayer) etc. mark the religious sanctity of his life.

Tarkavāchaspati's period of literary activity covered about four decades, falling roughly between 1900-1944 A.D. He weilded his pen to various subjects, and his literary output has a great value. His poetic craftmanship was started from Navadwipa and ended at Puri. Pandita Nilakantha said that Tarkavāchaspati's literary career began under the patronage of Suddhala Deva; it prolonged and came to an end under his son Balabhadra Deva.[30] When he was a youngman of twenty he was a master craftsman of literature and later in life, ripe with age and wisdom, he established himself as an authority in Sahitya. He was exceptionally successful both as a teacher and versatile scholar. He wrote both lyrical and devotional poems and treatise on poetics and several other subjects. He was a royal poet by profession and a critic by choice. The polymath Tarkavāchaspati is attributed to the authorship of about ten Sanskrit works : such as 'Hanumat Sandeśam', 'Tārāśaśāṅkam' (Tārā vali), 'Mayāśvari Vilāsa', 'Gaja-Śatakam', 'Lakshmī Śatakam'

(Śri Laharī), 'Somanātha Śatakam', 'Nirguṇa Stava', 'Utsava Champu', 'Naukā Tīkā' on Sāhityaratnākar', and 'Avadhāna Tikā' on Dhvanyāloka etc.[31] He also composed certain 'Samasyapuraṇa' collectively known as 'Mānmatī Kīrtīreṣā' which recognised his outstanding knowledge of Sanskrit language.[32]

Hanumat Śandesam : This Khanda Kāvya was written by Tarkavāchaspati at the age of fifteen with the imitation of the famous 'Meghadūtam'.[33] It was his first contribution to literature that deals with Hanuman, son of Vāyu, who served as a messenger to Sita. Linguistically it is as sound as Meghadūtam.[34]

Tārāśaśāṅkam : This is a Khanda Kāvya containing 245 stanzas. It is an astrological work with full imitation of Kalidasa's Meghadūtam.[35] Here the hero is Indu (moon) and heroine is Tārā—the wife of Brihaspati. The main feature is that among the twelve 'Rāśis', Tārā proceeded from Dhanu Rāśi (Sagiterious) to Karkaṭa Rāśi (Cancer) just like a Abhisārikā (maiden). According to astronomy Dhanu Rāśi (Sagiterious) is the home of Brihaspati, and Karkata Rāśi (Cancer) is the 'Līlāsadana' of Kumudinī Nāyaka (Playground of moon). Here Tarkavāchaspati nicely described the movement of Tārā, the wife of Brihaspati from his husband's house to moon's abode just like a maiden.[36] Besides he has given a clear picture of Grahas (Planets), ūpagrahas (sub-planets), Nakṣatras (Stars), Dhūmaketus (Comet), Ulkāpindas (Meteoroids) etc. and their movements. He also translated this Khanda Kāvya in Oriya[37] language.

Gaja Śatakam or Hasti Śatakam : This is also a lyrical poem mainly based on Aprasṭuta Praśaṅsā Alaṅkāra.[38]

Māyāśvari Vilāsa : It is a Nāṭaka (Play).[39]

Naukā Tīkā : At the age of thirty, he composed this commentary of Sāhityaratnākara of Dharmasuri. Its a work on Alaṁkāra. The publication of this work was done by Prince Sachidananda Deva in 1901 A.D. The inspiration behind this creation was King Suddhala Deva, but the commentary itself suffices that it might be completed on the patronage of king Balabhadra Deva.[40] This work consists ten Taraṅgas.

Avadhāna Tīkā : At the age of fifty two, Tarkavachāspati wrote this commentary on Dhvanyāloka which is fully based

on Tarka, Nyāya and Vedanta philosophy. He was greatly inspired by the Bihar Orissa Sanskrit Parishad for the composition of this work and was awarded with the degree 'Mahāmahopādhyāya', the great honour of that time. Actually it is a new and modern commentary[41] which can be easily grasped by reader keeping in mind Abhinavagupta's Locana commentary. This valuable work was published by Calcutta Sanskrit Series, July 1938 A.D. by the financial help of King Brajamohan Singh of Bhavanipatna.[42]

The younger brother of Tarkavāchaspati, Pundit Ananda Mishra also helped a lot for the correction of the commentary.[43]

Nirguṇa Stava : It is an unpublished work with a full imitation of Gāyatrī mantras and the vedic Śiva Saṁkalpa Sūkta.[44]

Laxmi Śatakam and Somanātha Śatakam : Both are devotional poems which are still unpublished.[45] Besides he also contributed a great deal to Oriya literature, i.e. Viṣādabhanjana Janāna, Mukteśwar Jaṇāṇa, Oriya translation of Tārāśasāṅkam and Kādaṁbarī etc.[46]

Tarkavāchaspati's achievement as a rhetorician and poet that exercised his poem in various avenues of original literary activities is highly commendable. In all his works the literary techniques are marvelously lucid.[47] He had a mastery over vast vocabulary of both Sanskrit and Oriya language.[48] He was one of the few pioneers whose writings gave an unprecedented impetus to the development of both Sanskrit and Oriya literature.

We come across the name of some eminent Sanskrit Pundits and Oriya poets like Pundit Gapabandhu Das, Pundit Kalicharan Dwivedi Vidyābhusan, Balabhadra Pattayat, Radhanatha Roy, Madhusudan Rao, Fakirmohan Senapati, Gangadhar Meher, Nanda Kishore etc. as his contemporarists. He was also closely associated with his pupil Ganeswar Ratha Vāchaspati and his younger brother Pundit Ananda Mishra.[49]

He used Bhoja leaves and palm leaves as writing materials. But later on he used paper and ink for writing the manuscripts i.e. Somanath Śatakam, Nirguna Stava, Śrīlaharī, Gajaśatakam and all Oriya works.[50]

Thus it can be concluded that Pundit Madhusudana Mishra completely opened a new chapter in the history of Sanskrit

culture of Orissa. With the evolution of cultural heritage of Orissa his poetic fragrance touched everybody. He was perpetual writer in the sphere of Sanskrit studies, and always lighting for the truth of language and its use. One significant thing is that his works represent everywhere things the Oriya Sanskrit tradition. Perhaps no philosopher or commentator other than he accorded much importance particularly to this two rhetoric works. The reason behind this belief was his own life. His whole life was a splendid saga of ceaseless confrontation against the wrong theme. His logical approach in communicating with the mass made him one of the greatest Pundit of first half of the twentieth century. Tarkavāchaspati adopted the logical approach to young pupils through Tarka and Nyāyaśāśtra and mobilised millions of pupils for the Sanskrit studies.

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10. Sources received from his son.
11. The records of the Praharāj Zamindar's family at Balasore.
12. Navadwipa—recent name is Nadia district, East-West Bengal confluence of Bhagirathi and Jalangi river. There was a noted Sanskrit school. It is a pilgrimage centre and birth place of Chaitanya, p. 1273. The Columbia Lippincott Gazetteer of the World—Edited by Leon E. Sheltzer, 1961, Columbia University Press. This place is also famous for Nyaya and Darshan.
13. *Ibid.*
14. *Ibid.*
15. *Ibid.*
16. Information received from his son.
17. *Introduction to Oriya Translation*, 'Tārāśaśāṅkam' and also information from his son.
18. *Balabhadra Granthāvalī* written by Balabhadra Deva, pp. 1098-99 (in the poem Sunāmundā). And all the colophon and benediction stanza of his works.
19. *Balabhadra Granthāvalī in Oriya.*
20. *Ibid.* And also *History of Sanskrit Literature* by M. Krishnamachariar, p. 799—See Introduction Chapter of Oriya Translation of Tārāśaśāṅkam.
21. Sources collected from the records of Uttarapārśwa mātha at Puri. And also from the Oriya daily Newspaper 'Samāja' dated 10th November, 1944 A.D. article written by Pundit Nilakantha, the founder of 'Samāja'.
22. *Dhvanyāloka* Upodghāta, written by Madusudan Mishra himself in the beginning of the commentary. "Dvitiyōdyotāntaṁ dhvanyālōkasyārthabodhanāya navinā vyākhyā-āvasyakiti Bihārotkala-Samskṛtavibhāgīya — 'Kanvokesana parishadā—titasaptaviṁsamite (1927) Kṛhistavde prastāvitam, Mayātu avasistōdyotayorapi sa viracitā tadātanapaṅditairālocya saṁbhāvitā, tatpranta ca tat saṅsadā puraskrito 'ahamityalam'.
23. Information from his son and from 'Manoramā' a Sanskrit magazine published by Pundit A.T. Sharma, December 1966 from Berhampur in Ganjam district in Orissa.

24. The daily Oriya Newspaper "the Samāja" of 10th November 1944, articles written by Pundit Nilakantha Das.
25. *Ibid.*
26. See genealogy of Madhusudan Mishra.
27. Sources given by his son.
28. Vide maṅgalācaraṇa of his works.
29. Records of the Muktimaṇḍapa Sabhā in Jagannātha temple, Puri, Orissa.
30. Introduction chapter of Oriya translation Tārāśaśāṅka. And also Introduction chapter of *Balabhadra Grantāhvalī* written and edited by Balabhadra Deva. Besides *History of Sanskrit Literature* by M. Krishnamachariar, p. 799 and p. 1030.
31. The Samarpaṇapatna of Sāhityaratnākara written by Madhusudan Mishra Tarkavāchaspati and *History of Sanskrit Literature* by M. Krishnamachariar, p. 799 and *A Descriptive Catalogue of Sanskrit* MSS of Orissa, Volume IInd by Kedarnath Mohapatra P.CC. III, and Manoramā, dvādaśa saṅchikā, 1966, published by A.T. Sharma, Seromani Press, Berhampur, Ganjam, Orissa.
32. *Balabhadra Granthāvalī* in Oriya and Tārāśaśāṅka also.
33. *A Descriptive Catalogue of Sanskrit MSS of Orissa* by Kedarnath Mohapatra P.CC.II and Manorma' a Sanskrit Magazine from December to March 1966. Hanumat Sandeśam is fully published in this Patrika.
34. 'Bhitabhrātādnuja vanitā tarjanābhartsanābhiḥ,
    Sādvhigeya Janakatanayā Kṣhiṇakāyā Kadācit,
    Aśrauśitam giramatihitām Sviya hṛdyeyaca-kre,
    Snigdhaccāyataruṣu vasatim rāmagiryā śrameṣu'

    Hanumat Saṅdeśam, 1st śloka
35. *A Descriptive Catalogue of Sanskrit MSS of Orissa*, Volume II, p. CC-III. And also Introduction chapter of Oriya translation of Tārāśaśāṅkam.
36. See the text of Tārāśaśāṅkam.
37. Oriya translation of Tārāśaśāṅkam which was published on 10th May 1903 A.D.
38. *History of Sanskrit Literature* by M. Krishnamachariar and *A Descriptive Catalogue of Sanskrit MSS.* of Orissa, Vol. II, p. C-III.

39. *Ibid.*
40. The beginning and the colophon line of the Naukā commentary written by Tarkavāchaspati himself and also see the Samarpaṇapatra of this Tīkā.
41. The beginning and the colophon line of Avadhāna commentary of Dhvanyāloka.
42. The last paragraph of 'Kṛtanjñatāṅgīkaraṇa' of Avadhāna commentary...written by commentator himself.
43. 'Nivedanam' of Naukā commentary written by the commentator himself.
44. Oṁ Bhūrbhuvah Svah Savitāramekaṁ Jyōtirvareṇyaṁ tadupādhisūnyaṁ Bhargaṁ cidānaṅdamayaṁ dhimaṁ nah Pracōda-kaṁ dhi mahi Sōmanāthaṁ. Jajyāgrato duramudeti daivaṁ prapañca mucyetā tatheitasupte. Duraṅgamāṁ Jyotir'pindriyāṇām tanmemanah Shaṅkarakiṅkarastāt. *Nirguṅastava*
45. *A Descriptive Cata. of Sanskrit MSS* of Orissa, Vol. II, p. CC-III.
46. Introduction chapter of the Oriya translation of Tārāśaśāṅkam and also the '*Balabhadra Granthāvalī*' etc.
47. *Tārāśaśāṅkam.*
48. It is not a black spot (Kalaṅka) on the moon. Madhusudana Mishra writes in Oriya—*Balabhadra Granthavali*, p. 1219.
49. *Balabhadra Granthāvalī's* acknowledgement written by Gauri Kumar Brahma, the ex-Secretary, Orissa Sahitya Academy, published on 15th Feb. 1903 at Deograh, Dist. Bamanda.
50. Sources got from his son.

CHAPTER 3

THE KĀRIKĀS AND THE VṚTTI : AUTHORSHIP

The Dhvanyāloka like other Sanskrit texts (Śāstras) has been divided into two distinct parts—the kārikā (main verses which are serially numbered) and a running vṛtti (enunciation). The numbering verses which deal with scientific treatises of Dhvani theory are known as kārikā, and the counter prose portion which illustrates the kārikās is called the vṛtti. Besides, some more verses exist in the vṛtti which are neither numbered like kārikās nor explained by the prose vṛtti nor meant for illustration but for summarisation of the deliberations of the vṛtti or for supplementing the view expressed in a kārikā. These are called Parikaraślokas or Saṁgraha-ślokas or Saṁkṣepaślokas. Thus, the whole Dhvanyāloka basically consists of two parts, i.e., kārikā and the vṛtti.

As regards the authorship of the kārikā and the vṛtti text, there is a great controversy which goes on unabated even to this day and which shows no sign of being set at rest till some definite and unassail testimony is available. For the solution of this controversial problem a lot of treatment has been made by eminent scholars, but that has not been satisfactorily explained. An attempt has been made here to faithfully record the various evidences cited by the Avadhānakāra and to examine them dispassionately.

The treatment of the Avadhānakāra (hereinafter called 'AK') is very particular about the identity of authorship, in the same

way, he frequently seems to draw our attention that there is no distinction between the kārikākāra and the vṛttikāra. The author of both of the texts is AV himself. In the preface of his commentary he also lays great stress on this fact and observes that "in order to make easier the lesson or for better understanding the author AV himself illustrates the Vṛtti, so called 'Āloka' after the original text—Dhvani Kārikā".[1] According to him, the kārikā is called Dhvani, the Vṛtti or the prose portions enunciating the Kārikā is called 'Āloka' of AV. It implies that AV is the author of both the kārikā and vṛtti; and the term 'Āloka' is an essential part of the compound name which stands for both the parts.

The most fascinating problems related with the authorship of Dhvanyāloka are as follows:—

(i) Why the vṛtti begins first in the form of prayer like Sveccākeśariṇa......etc. before the kārikās?

(ii) Why the author of kārikā has not performed any maṅgala before the beginning of its first kārikā 'Kāvyasyātmā Dhvaniriti'......etc.

(iii) If this maṅgalaśloka is written by the vṛttikāra, it should come under the vṛttigrantha, but here why it comes in the original kārikāgrantha?

(iv) By the use of maṅgalaśloka in the beginning and at the end of this work if AV is attributed as the author of the vṛtti-grantha, then who is the author of kārikā ?

(v) Are the Dhvanikāra and Ānandavardhana considered as same person?

(vi) If AV is attributed to the authorship of the kārikā and the vṛtti text who is the author of Parikaraśloka?

(vii) Is the authorship of kārikā attributed to Sahṛdaya?

Besides above mentioned problems, we also come across so many instances which discriminate the two works as the separate and independent texts and keep the minds of the scholars in uncertainty. Now it is very useful to examine closely the viewpoints of AK, who firmly claims the identity of the authorship of both the texts.

The use of benedictory verse (maṅgalācaraṇa) in the very beginning is meant for vṛtti work and the kārikā texts contain

no maṅgalācaraṇa. It causes much confusion regarding the authorship of the kārikā and the vṛtti text. Because the line sveccākeśariṇa...etc. are the benedictory verse of vṛtti work and the first kārikā 'Kāvyasyātmā Dhvaniriti...etc. has no sign of maṅgala in it. As a result so many questions are striking in our mind about the distinction between kārikākāra and the vṛttikāra.

To solve these problems, Avadhānakāra follows a tactful way and uses the term "Turīya—tattvaparyālocanayā avicchinnamaṅgalatvāt"[2] which denotes that the Dhvani is called as 'Turīyatattva'[3] or Ātman. According to him the work which deals with the Dhvani itself enjoys the status of maṅgala through the 'Turīyatattva' because Turīyatattva is ultimately known as Dhvani. That is why no separate maṅgala verse is necessary for the vṛttigrantha, and the maṇgalaśloka is meant for those who want to study or learn it only for the removal of their obstacles. Avadhānakāra firmly declares that the maṅgala is vastunirdeśātmaka maṅgala. He also observes the ideas of Ānandavardhana who does not follow the convention to get the ultimate desire by the use of maṅgalaśloka. But for the readers and listeners he (the author) uses the maṅgalaśloka only to remove the obstacles. Again by the use of line maṅgalādayō maṅgalamadhye maṅgalāntaśca...etc[4], Avadhānakāra indicates that Ānandavardhana follows the great tradition of the use of maṅgalaśloka only for the better end of his work as well as for the readers and listeners. He also uses a maṅgalaśloka at the end of his own vṛttigrantha. It supposes that the kārikākāra is the author of the vṛttigrantha. In this context the commentator also observes that Ānandavardhana the author of the original dhvani text is convinced himself to compose the vṛtti portion only to create heavenly pleasure in the mind of the Sahṛdayas.[5] Here the forms like 'Svakṛtavṛttigranthasya' and 'Tadvṛttigranthasya' clearly mark that the Dhvanikāra Ānandavardhana is the author of the vṛttigrantha, and the maṅgalācaraṇa differentiates the authorship is a baseless question. It implies from the statement of Avadhānakāra that the kārikā and the vṛtti is made by Ānandavardhana himself. He also points out that the vṛtti in form of prayer is like introduction or seems as critical appreciation which focusses the ideas about the Dhvani—the

central theme of the kārikā text.[6] So, the vṛtti in form of prayer comes first before the kārikā and connotes that the vṛttikāra and the kārikākāra are to be identical.

Again, if the author of both kārikā and vṛtti is considered as same, the author will not relegate the saṅgrah-ślokas or parikarślokas to a subordinate position in the vrtti, but will give them a place in kārikā. So, some scholars believe that the parikaraślokas and saṁgrahaślokas etc. are composed by a scholastic tradition earlier to Ānanda, and later simply incorporated them into his own work. Regarding this problem Avadhānakāra states that those ślokas are a sort of recapitulation—stanzas which are adduced by the vṛittikāra from unknown sources sometimes to explain the meaning of kārikās, but more often to amplify and supplement them. The main contention of Avadhānakāra is that the so-called memorial verses are also quoted by Ānanda and bears the unquestionable authorship of the vṛtti himself. So, he is not silent about the authorship of the prose vṛtti and the memorial verses. According to him, when occasion arises, Ānanda does not fail to name the predecessors. Thus for example he quotes the names of Bhāmaha, Udbhaṭṭa,[7] etc. Even he simply refers to a predecessor by using term 'anya' like "tathā cānyena kṛta-evātra ślokaḥ—yasminnāsti na vastu" etc.[8] Avadhānakāra is also prompt enough to identify the predecessor and says: Anyena pakṣhapratipaksḥato bhinnena manmathanāmnā kavinā.[9] Here one thing is remarkable that Avadhānakāra uses the name 'manmatha' instead of manoratha, which is used by Locankāra and all the scholars. Perhaps it happened due to the fail of his memory or any printer's devil. Again when Ānanda says "tadayamātra saṁkṣepaḥ" and introduces three saṁkṣepaślokas. Avadhānakāra comments on it and says that "tam nirasitam sādhāraṇamuttaramupakṛamate—tadayamātra saṁkṣepa ityādinā", which rather implies an identity in Authorship. From these comments it seems to be clear that parikaraśloka and saṁgrahaśloka etc. are given by the vṛttikāra to tell something with the force of a kārikā, and for the systematic recapitulation of the views expressed in prose vṛtti. The saṁgrahaślokas, or saṁkṣepaślokas or even the Parikarślokas need not necessarily imply an author different from the vṛttikāra, and in as much as

we have the instances that the vṛttikāra himself composes the saṁgrahaślokas elsewhere. The verses occuring in the text of the Vyaktiviveka by Mahimabhaṭṭa, who belonged to middle of the 11th century A.D. mostly uses the antaraślokas which are like Sangrahaślokas. Should we suppose the Vyaktiviveka also to have been composed by more than one author ? If not, what is propriety in taking a different stand in case of the Dhvanyāloka ?

The only apparent reason which led the learned person to imagine author other than the vṛttikāra for saṁgrahaśloka etc. is a hypothesis that the kārikās were composed by a fictitious kārikākāra who is supposed to have flourished two generations earlier than Ānanda. A scholastic tradition in the form of the composition of the samgraha-ślokas by several unknown writers is supposed to have been there to fill up the gap of two generations. But it will appear that the said hypothesis is not secure and the consequent theory of unknown authorship for the samgrahaśloka etc. also fails along with the theory of a different kārikākāra. Moreover, a careful study of the Parikaraślokas etc., would show that a good number of the vital aspects of the dhvani theory are revealed by them. Under such circumstances Ānanda claims the entire credit of revealing the theory for the first time.

Some scholars further argue that in course of time the kārikākāra receded to the background, and completely overshadowed by the more important figure of his formidable expounder, and people considered as the Dhvanikāra not the author of the few memorial verses, but why should Ānanda himself has forgotten his entity? As the definition of a parikaraśloka given by Avadhāna (discussed above) would reveal that these verses have been taken by Ānanda from unknown sources even before the composition of kārikās. It is simply unbelievable that the name of the kārikākāra and the names of the supposed unknown author of the Parikaraślokas etc. are all forgotten by or unknown to Ānanda.

Again then same 'Sahṛdaya' is attributed as the author of Dhvanikārikā by some scholars is simply fictitious. Because the term 'Sahṛdaya' is usually considered a common noun. This brilliant summing up of Avadhānakāra's stand about the author-

ship of the Dhvanyāloka is strongest one, whose mind is unprejudiced by the controversies of modern scholars. Categorically he states that the word sahṛdaya is general in its connotation which is applied for the perceptive critics of poetry. Besides Ānandavardhana also frequently states in the vṛtti that the element of Dhvani was already recognised as the only essential factor in poetic composition in the circle of true literary connoisseurs (sahṛdayas). Thus the authorship of the kārikā is not attributed to the name of sahṛdaya but to Ānandavardhana.

In the first kārikā Ānandavardhana uses a term i.e. 'Samāmnātapūrvam' and while in the expression of vṛtti he uses the term 'Anūnmīlitapūrvam'—which confused the mind of the scholars about the authorship. Because the term 'Samāmnātapūrvam' has been explained in the vṛtti as: 'Vuddheiḥ kāvyatattvavidbhiḥ kāvyasyātmā dhvanirīti Samjitaḥ, Paramparḥāyā yaḥ samāmnātapūrvḥ', the plural in 'vuddheiḥ' is significant in so far as it hints at the existence of a long tradition of teachers who recognised the concept of Dhvani as the soul of Poetry which itself is a guarantee that the theory is not to be lightly discarded by one. As Avadhānakāra points out: "yo dhvaniḥ kāvyasya sabdārthacāruṇaḥ sandarbha viśesasya ātmetivuddheiḥ kāvyatattvavidbhiḥ. Atra vudhānām vahutvena dhvaneh kāvyātmatā pramāṅikiti vudhyate. Purvam madudyamāt Prāk Samyak aviccinnatayā āmnātabatsagauravamāmnāyavat pariśīlitaḥ etena nedampurvakata dhvaneriti dyotyate.[10]

This subsequent expression 'Samāmnātapūrvaḥ' in the kārikā, which has been rendered all the more explicit in the vṛtti by prefixing 'paramparāyā' has also been interpreted by Avadhānakāra.[11]

Under the vṛtti text the term "Anūnmīlitapūrvam' clearly suggests that the Dhvani theory is unknown or even not discussed by teachers before the Dhvanikāra. On this point Avadhānkāra comments that 'Anālocitapūrvam Kāvyalakshṇavidhāyinām vākyamevamvidha cet kāvyam bhavati' iti paropādidikshayālamkara sandarbhasṛjam Etena tesām kāvyalocanapravṛta vapi tattvanavavodho mahadāndhyam dradhayati".[12]

In this context some scholars suggest that the term "vuddheiḥ" implies such as 'vuddheih vayākaraṇeiḥ and 'Vuddheiḥ kāvyatattvavidhih'. Here the first one is appropriate

for samāmnātapūrvam in kārikā and the second one is for 'anūnmīlitapūrvam' in vṛtti. As a result all the arising problems may be similarly solved. But Avadhānakāra's treatment on it is justfiable which is already noted above. Thus, there is no difference in the opinion regarding the authorship of both the text with the use of these two different terms in different places.

Tradition records the name of Ānanda alone as the author of the Dhvanyāloka. It is a matter of historical truth that so far as Indian tradition is concerned there is a perfect unanimity among writers on Sanskrit poetics beginning with Mahimabhaṭṭa and down to the latest writers that the author of the kārikā and the author of its vṛtti are self identical person. Mahimabhaṭṭa writes the Vyaktiviveka a product of extraordinary learning and ingenuity, with the purpose of refuting the position of Ānandavardhana. Even he criticises Abhinavagupta's exposition also. But he refers that the author of the kārikā and the vṛtti is identical and expressly states that the author himself explains the text in the vṛtti. So also Kṣemendra says that these texts are the composition of Ānandavardhana, the accepted writer of the vṛtti. Kuntaka, the author of the 'Vakroktijīvita', a reactionary work written for the confutation of the Dhvanyāloka, refers that Ānandavardhana is the author of the entire text, including the kārikā and the vṛtti. These above mentioned writers belong to Kashmir, the homeland of Ānandavardhana, and Kuntaka was the predecessor of Abhinavagupta. It is highly improbable that these writers who are pre-eminently noted for their acumen and accuracy and who are the compatriots of our author and are separated by a short interval from the latter should all be guilty of regarding a wrong tradition.[13] Regarding this Avadhānakāra clearly states in his introduction and conveys that according to the propriety of the tradition, Ānandavardhana is called the author of the whole of the Dhvanyāloka.[14]

In the first chapter of Dhvanyāloka, the classification of Dhvani into Avivakṣitavācya and Vivaksitānyaparavācya has been given in vṛtti and not in the kārikā. In the first kārikā of the second chapter the first type has been sub-divided into two kinds. This idea confuses the mind of the scholars about the authorship. In connection with the classification given in the

vṛtti in the first chapter Avadhānakāra observes that the author of the vṛtti propounds this classification in presence of the implicit reference which will be made to it in the second chapter.

Regarding the purpose of vṛttigrantha, the Avadhānakāra explains that the vṛtti is a element which is used for the better understanding of the original text which is full of 'tattvas'. It needs certain helping entity to make easier for the readers or listeners. So, the commentator uses two terms such as "Tattvanirṇayamātra phalaka" and "Paraprabodhanārthaka" for explaining the excellency of the vṛtti work. According to him there is a close relation existing between both the parts and the vṛtti is simple understanding device for the readers. The object of the vṛtti is to make explicit what is already implicit in the kārikā text. Not only it contains the clear illustrations of the kārikā text, but also solves the problems which arise in kārika. So, the kārikā appears as a 'sūtragrantha' and the vṛtti as a 'vākhyāgrantha". Avadhānakāra also marks that, in certain places kārikākāra extracts that the vṛttikāra keeps a close relation with kārikā grantha by enunciating all the genuine ideas.[15] The role of the vṛtti is explained what is implicitly contained in the original kārikā text. In this connection it is remarkable that the Avadhānakāra never uses the words like 'Kārikākāra', 'Mulagranthakṛt', or 'granthakāra' or 'Kārikāgrantha', etc. Although in certain places the commentator uses the terms like'Vṛttikṛt', Vṛttigrantha, 'Vṛttikāra' etc.,[16] yet he never uses the term kārikākāra. The omission of the term kārikākāra by Avadhānakāra is proof of the fact that there is no difference between the author of the two texts. A mere use of words like vṛttikāra etc. cannot deserve such high praise. Even according to Avadhānakāra, the vṛtti only makes explicit what is already contained in the kārikās. The title vṛttikāra will significantly apply to the vṛttis and hence Ānandavardhana himself is the author of kārikā and the vṛtti. Here the intention of the commentator is not to differentiate the both of the texts.

Besides these implications Avadhānakāra establishes the identity of the authorship in so many places. Thus, the author of the vṛttigrantha is Ānandavardhana himself. It should not be taken in other way and both of the terms like kārikākāra and vṛttikāra entitled to it. The vṛtti is a exposition of the kārikā

text, on which the whole Dhvani theory is based on.

The AK also states certain viewpoints regarding the question whether the Dhvanikāra and Ānandavardhana is same person or different persons. By commenting on the colophon line of the Dhvanyāloka, he indicates the identity of the Ānandavardhana with the author of the Dhvanikārikā.[17] This clearly makes us to conclude that the Avadhānakāra entertains the viewpoints that the same author Ānandavardhana has expanded the Dhvani theory through the kārikā as well as the vṛtti texts.

Now it is but natural to conclude by reviewing the above facts that the author of the two texts viz. the kārikā and the vṛtti are not different. Not only the functions of the vṛtti is confined within the framework of basic kārikā text, but also it is illuminating the whole study of the Dhvani theory. The above concept is a novel idea of Avadhānakāra and he is taking his stand on the rules of the Nyāya (exegesis). He draws our attention that Ānandavardhana is not only the author of the kārikā, but also the author of the vṛtti. He is not only an interpreter (vṛttikāra), but also the author of the whole text entitled Dhvanyāloka. Actually Avadhānakāra's testimony is considered to be of greater weight than others in settling this question. If we compare the statements of Avadhānakāra with Locankāra, we find that the views of Locanakāra seem to lack of real or concrete ideas about the authorship of the two texts. Because in some places he supports the dual authorship which is confusing. But the AK is always aware of the virtual identity of the kārikākāra and the vṛttikāra which marks his competency. He tries to solve the problems with a fair degree of certainity. There is not a simple piece of evidence in his commentary to support firmly the theory of dual authorship. All the evidences, external and internal, point to the conclusion that Ānandavardhana himself composed the entire work 'Dhvanyāloka' consisting of kārikās and vṛtti.

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1. Praṇetā pāthasaulabhāya Dhvanināmānammulabhāgam vivṛtya vṛttim tamāloka saṁketena samaketayat.
Avadhāna Tikā, Upodghāta, p. 5.

2. Iha tatra-bhavān shreemadānaṅdavardhanācāryh turīyatattvaparyālocanayā—'aviccinnamaṅgalatvāt tattvanirṇaya-mātraphalaka—' svadhvanigraṅthekṛta maṅgalāntaranivandhanopi vṛttigraṅthasya parapravodhanārthakatayā tadvubhutsupravṛtinām nispratyuhamabhiṣṭasiddhaye Samucitāsih prakaṭanena sāmukhyamādhate—svecceti..... *Avadhāna*, p. 22

3. The Ātman is known as Turīya. Because it is the forth one. (1st—Deheṅdrīya, 2nd—Manas, 3rd—Buddhi, 4th—Ātman). The Gitā says—Indriyāṇi Parāmyāhu...etc. So, in this way 'Ātman' called as Turīya is. According to the Philosophy of grammar there are four stages of vāk, such as (i) Parā, (ii) Paśyanti, (iii) Madhyamā, (iv) Vaikharī etc. The fourth one is called Dhvani. As it is said 'Turīya vācam manusyā vadanti, catvāra vāk Parimitā Padāni. Tāmste vidhuh brahmaṇyā maniṣiṇah, tebhyā striṇī guhā neṅgayanti...So Dhvani is Turīya vāk.
Mahābhāśya,

4. Maṅgalādayo maṅgalamadhya maṅglāṇtaśca sandarbhah kartavya iti Siṣṭamahākavisaraṇīmanusṛtya svakṛta vṛttigranthasya samāptimasih purvikam prakāśayati ...Pratayaṇtamiti. *Avadhāna*, p. 337, IV *Uddyōta*

5. *Avadhāna*, p. 3.

6. Dhvanyāloka, Avadhāna, Cal. Sanskrit Series, pp. 2-3.

7. Dhvanyāloka, K.S.S. Edn., p. 119.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 12.

9. *Ibid.*

10. *Avadhāna*, p. 4.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 8.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 15.

13. K. Krishnamurthy's *Dhvanyāloka and Its Critics*, Chapter III.

14. Introduction of 'Avadhāna Tikā' written by the commentator himself.
15. *Avadhāna Tikā*, pp. 8, 9, 14, 16, 19, 28, 31, 39, 40, 47, 55, 85, 96, 97, 98, 100, 101, 103, 110, 113, 129, 133, 150, 158, 167, 158, 182, 185, 221, 234-235, 246, 193, 196, 208, 211, and II Uddyota/verse of *Dhvanyāloka*.
16. (i) Rasanirvāhapareṇāvasare...Pākṣikatayā Vṛttikāro rasanirvahaṇaikatānhṛdayaśceti Prakṛtamavatārayan ca kārena Prakārantarāṇi Samocinoti—Kopāditi—
    Avadhāna, p. 110

    (ii) Atra Praudhokti-nispannatva...Tridhātvam vṛttikṛt kārikāgatāpiśabda-mahimnāvyācaṣṭe
    (Avadhāna, p. 129)

    (iii) Agrimakārikāyām tatśabdanirdeśād vṛttikārastatsaṁvadham yatā nirdiśati—yataśceti (Avadhāna, p. 150)

    (iv) Atrahityādinā vṛttikāra etadevāha......
    Avadhāna, pp. 158, 162, 128 etc.
17. *Avadhāna* Tikā, pp. 339, 340.

CHAPTER 4

DHVANI AND ITS EXISTENCE

In the history of alaṁkāra literature, the Dhvani theory propounded for the first time in the 'Dhvanyāloka' is an epoch-making work as it is a very intelligent analysis of the suggestive potentiality of the language and particularly development of a new outlook of the poets in respect of the content of their composition. Dr. K. Krishnamoorty rightly observes that the Dhvani theory had been promulgated on a day when the Sanskrit literature had already been subject to a tendency towards decadence and a morribund literary acrobatic to produce more and more crude figures of speech relating to the most appealing and essential element of poetry viz. 'Rasādi' to a insignificant position. Ānanda, by laying greater emphasis on the suggested sense and particularly the 'Rasādi' variety tried to rejuvinate the decaying genius of the days of Vālmīki and Kālidāsa and to give a new fillip to the creative impulse of the Indian poets.[1] The masterly treatment of the subject by him combined with the authoritative interpretations of Abhinavagupta is able to overcome all opposition and has the universal admiration and acceptance by later theorists.

At the very beginning we face the problem whether the Concept of Dhvani is entirely original and is propounded for the first time in the Dhvanyāloka or an ancient one. For this, it should be carefully pointed out that Ānandavardhana never considered himself as the formulator of the theory of Dhvani. Instead of claiming for himself any credit, he categorically

asserts that the idea of Dhvani as constituting the soul of poetry is an ancient one.[2] Whether there is any historical truth or not in this assertion, but it deserves to be examined. From the first Kārikā it is known that the doctrine of 'Dhvani' as the soul of poetry has been introduced by the learned persons in a definite manner before the Dhvanyāloka.

From the total absence of any reference to Dhvani in all the works on poetics right from Bharat to Rudraṭa, one can easily assert that except Ānandavardhana no writer in particular is being mentioned as the originator of this new doctrine. Though to some extent this may be true, yet the closer examination will reveal that there may be a grain of truth also in the statement of the Kārikā. In this respect we are fully enlightened by the Locanakāra and other critics, but their judgements are insufficient to get a clear-cut idea. Then the Avadhānakāra, the critic of 20th century adds some novel thoughts to this aspect and undoubtedly states that though the term Dhvani was systematically introduced by Ānandavardhana in the field of poetics for the first time yet he inherited the fundamental ideas from his predecessors.[3]

In the very beginning Avadhānakāra discusses the aims and objectives of the work 'Dhvanyāloka' which deals with the primary existence of the theory of Dhvani. He observes that by saying Kāvyasyātmā...etc. the author Ānandavardhana imitates the traditional convention of the Anubandha catustayas viz. Viṣaya (Subject), Adhikārin (qualified persons), Saṁbandha (relation) and prayojana (purpose).[4] Here the subject is the treatment of Dhvani theory, or the establishment of suggested sense. The qualified person is Sahṛdayas (connoisseurs) and its purpose is how Sahṛdayas get the knowledge about the treatment of Dhvani and lastly the relation is the critique of the wise-men deal with it. Besides these four Anubandhas, Avadhānakāra uses a fifth one i.e. Prayojanasya Prayojana (purpose of the purposes) which deals with the satisfaction of Sahṛdayas. Thus the main purpose of the author Ānandavardhana is that "Sahṛdayānām mansai ānand labhatām pratisṭhām". It means that the theory being accepted as a pleasure giving device in the mind of Sahṛdayas, and it has automatically owned self establishment. Regarding this the opinions of both Locanakāra and

Avadhānakāra are same, but the latter says specifically that the author has expressed four Anubandhas due to the immediate imitation of the great tradition.[5] Thus the above discussion of four Anubandhas clearly implies the intention of the Dhvanikāra and necessity of the Dhvani and its primary existence.

After the discussions of the intention of Dhvanikāra, objectives of his work and the primary existence of the Dhvani, Avadhānakāra tries to exhibit the historical truth of the existence of the concept of Dhvani by the vivid interpretation of both the term "Vudheiḥ and Samāmnātapūrvaḥ". In this connection Abhinavagupta said that "avicchinnena pravāheṇa trairetaduktam vināpi visiṣṭapustakeṣu vinivesana dityabhiprāya."[6] But we doubt if the vṛtti actually means to say this. In the expression of AK, Vudheiḥ (Kāvyatattvavidbhiḥ) means the great poets (men of literary taste) who flourished in a paraṁparā avicchinnapravāhaḥ, (healty traditions) who knew (i.e. recognised) the essential element of a kāvya now termed as Dhvani by Ānanda for the first time (Kavyasyātmā dhvaniriti samjnitaḥ) and duly exhibited it in their compositions (Pariśīlita).[7] The vṛtti of this kārikā line must be understood in this way, otherwise, if we follow Locanakāra's interpretation, we can't compromise the same with the vṛtti.[8] The word 'Vudheiḥ' does not mean the theorists on the essence of kāvya or writers on rhetoric. Because the traditional theorists are called Kāvyalakṣaṇavidhāyins, whose intelect could not reveal the very subtle elements of Dhvani. Then how can they be supposed to have told about dhvani as the soul of kāvya. It has not been explained or revealed before Ānanda (Anūnmīlitapūrvam), but it was only exhibited (pariśīlitaḥ), and Ānanda explored Dhvani which has been profusely present in Rāmāyaṇa etc. and discusses it for the first time to please the men of taste.[9]

Here the plural number in the term 'vudheiḥ' hints the acceptance of the Dhvani theory as the soul of poetry by many which itself proves its genuinity and establishment.[10] And the subsequent expression 'Samāmnātapūrvaḥ' in the kārikā which has been rendered all the more explicit in the vṛtti by prefixing 'paramparāyā' has also been unambiguously interpreted by Avadhānakāra.[11] Moreover, the special significance of the

upasarga 'sam' in 'Samāmnātapūrvaḥ' is also to be taken into account and 'sam' may be paraphrased as 'Samyak' which denotes 'well' or 'fully' with great interest. Really the scholars of repute would not take so much interest in teaching a doctrine if it was incredible.

From the foregoing discussion it would appear that the theory of dhvani is very much circulated in the famous circle of cultured critics, and though it was never preserved in writing, yet it was being traditionally handed down as a valuable treasure from generation to generation. In other words, the theory of dhvani was being looked upon as a precious inheritance from the past rather than as a glorious achievement of the present.

Before going to establish the existence of suggested sense called Dhvani (which is capable of being experienced within the heart of his heart by the connoisseurs), the author AV mentioned the view of those who opposed the idea of Dhvani in the very body of the first Kārikā.

He categorically discusses all the opponent views in three principal rival groups. The first represents the viewpoints of Abhāvavādins or negativists who always deny the existence of Dhvani on the grounds of its inclusion under the recognised categories like Alaṁkāra and Guṇa etc. The second group of rival theorists commonly known as Bhāktavādins who maintain that the existence of Dhvani which is identical in all its aspects with the concept of Guṇavṛtti. And the third group of rival theorists do not oppose the admission of Dhvani, but according to them it lies beyond the comprehension of words.[12]

From the above mentioned views some were apprehended by the author himself in the manner of Patanjali, the author of the Mahābhāsya and it is quite plausible that Ānanda who considered the grammarians as foremost amongst the learned men, read the Mahābhāsya and was impressed by its mode of arguments. Some views of the opponents are of course real. As for instance Manoratha who is said to have been a contemporary of Ānanda did not find anything novel in the theory of dhvani and composed a satirical verse addressing only one (not many to give the theory hoary antiquity) and advocate of Dhvani as Jada.[13] The verse of Manoratha certainly aims to Ānanda alone as the object of aspersion. The other view 'Bhāktamāhustamanye' is

imagined on the basis of earlier theories. But the expressions (a) Kecidācakṣiran, (b) Bhāktamāhu, (c) Sahṛdayahṛdayasaṁvedya meva samkhyātavantaḥ, (d) and the reference to Manoratha etc. need not necessarily mean that the theory has the fluency for a pretty long time among the vudhas (learned men) —and the opponents also formed their adverse opinions against the views of the vudhas advocating for the Dhvani theory flourishing long before Ānanda. Because Ānanda was a poet and critic of the later half of the ninth century in Kashmir. In addition to Dhvanyāloka he wrote Devīśataka, Arjunacarita, Tattvāloka etc.[14] As a scholar he certainly had an association with a learned circle when he expressed his ideas about Dhvani or before starting to write the Dhvanyāloka he was very likely to get a rebuff from the contemporaries like Manoratha. Starting confidently to write his own work with the mirth of triumph, he referred to the views of all his contemporary opponents. He refuted all these contentions one by one and finally established the separate existence of the suggested sense and a novel function of words i.e. Vyañjanā which conveys that sense.[15]

In this connection, Avadhānakāra's interpretations are worth taking and vital at this point. He illustrates the viewpoints of the opponents and establishes the Dhvani as the supreme concept in a systematic way. In his expression he brings out the importance of the word 'Jagaduḥ' which suggests the actual position of the negative theory. According to him, the author Ānandavardhana already knew that the Dhvani element existed before Bhaṭṭodbhaṭṭa and others, yet he presumed that Bhaṭṭodhaṭṭas are the Abhāvavādins. Avadhānakāra says that in kārikā the term 'Jagadhuḥ' implies the Abhāvavādins (negativits) is a matter of speculation; still use of lit lakāra does not appear to be appropriate here, only possibility rises.[16] Generally lit lakāra is used in the sense of 'Parokṣa'. But here the lit lakāra is used not in the sense of Parokṣa but in the sense of possibility. The proper meaning of the term 'Jagadhuḥ' is perhaps they have said. Thus it may be concluded that the regular unuse of Dhvani by the ancient rhetoricians supposes the possibility of the existence of Abhāvavādins.

As regards the non-existence of Dhvani theory, Avadhānakāra logically interpretes his ideas and says that there are three

types of vikalpa vākyas (alternative sentences), i.e. (i) Anvaya, (ii) Avagamaya, (iii) Abhāva, etc. and their description as follows:[17]

(i) Besides the charms of poetry, there is no distinct existence of Dhvani theory. Because Dhvani is exposed with the charmness of poetry.

(ii) Though Dhvani is confined within the charmness of poetry, get it is not the cause of the charmness because there is no distinct saundarya (charm) in Dhvani. It is also not vastvantra (not substantial essence).

(iii) If Dhvani is vastvantara, it lacks the sense of charmness

These are the three vikalpa vākyas of Abhāvavādins. According to them there is no such separate existence of Dhvani which is quite exclusive to recognised categories like Alaṁkāra and Guṇa etc.

In connection with the contentions of the opponents, AK also elaborately interpretes the line "Yasminnāsti... Svarūpamdhvaneḥ". He observes that the negativists might be replied if you admit Dhvani to be merely a variety of Guṇa or Alaṁkāra, there is no justification for raising such a hue and cry for merely giving a new appelation to something already existing in Guṇa or Alamkāra. You might call a 'ghaṭa' or 'kalasa', but that would not add anything to our knowledge. And if you succeed in discovering a new turn of expression or a new shade of meaning it would be only a new figure of speech. It is a fact that the list of figures is being continually swelled by the speculation of critics. But that does not warrant such a fanfare. The existence of a new figure, or the invention of a new structure of speech may be creditable indeed. But it exceeds all limits of decorum and modesty to claim that the discovery is of a major principle which escaped the notice of the ancient rhetoricians.[18]

Even if the ancient authors failed to notice any peculiarity which you may call Dhvani, still it is not proper, on the part of the dhvanitheorists to wax eloquently in self approbation and to raise such a fuss over their achievement.[19] For as the modes of expression (Vāg vikalpa) are infinitely varied,[20] it is humanly impossible to exhaust the list of Alamkāras and Guṇas and as

such if a new figure of speech be discovered it does not behave one to be devoid of all sense of decorum and dance frantically on that account. Through the reduplication "dhvanirdhvaniriti" indicates respect on the part of dhvani thorists, but in other way according to the opponents it also desrespects the dhvani theorists. So, Dhvani is merely a figment of the imagination, an empty talk[21] and cannot stand independently in critical test. This is the common conclusion arrived at by all the three types of vikalpavākyas of the concept of dhvani as stated above, whatever might be the minor differences among their respective approaches to the problem.

As regards the use of term 'Manoratha', AK says that Manoratha is a poet and perhaps the contemporary of AV. Here, a remarkable thing is that AK used the term 'Manmatha' instead of 'Manoratha'.[22]

Besides the above mentioned group, there is another group of rivalists called as Bhāktavādins. Before going to discuss the contention of this opponent group the commentator AK tries to interprete logically the term 'Bhāktamāhuḥ'. According to him the use of 'lat' lakāra with the word 'Bhāktamāhuḥ' is due to parokṣhbhāva and the interpretation of term 'Bhākta' as "Bhajyate labhyate moksyārtho—'nayeti bhaktihsārupyādi sambandha".[23] Here the commentator follows his predecessors to discuss the word Bhākta which deals with Gauṇavṛtti or lakṣaṇā. He also explains the five division of Lakṣaṇā and their examples,[24] only for the better understanding of the views of Bhāktavādins.

By the help of various examples of five kinds of Lakṣaṇā, he tries to show the different aspect of the term Bhakta and refers that the term Bhañjanam Bhakti denotes mukhyārtha sambandha and lastly Bhajyate labhyateamukhyārthe śradhātiśayoasmādito bhakti denotes 'tātprayojanam' etc. Thus the term bhakti suggests the mukhyārtha, and tad vādhah, tat sambandhah and tat prayojana, which are the main components of Lakṣaṇā. So this term arises as Lakṣārtha. This group of rivalists admitted the existence of Dhvani which is identical in all its aspects with the concept of Guṇavṛtti.[25]

Besides the Bhāktavādins, there is another group of opponents who could not oppose the existence of Dhvani but said

that it lies beyond the expression. Because, without Guṇa and Alamkāra, it is very difficult to say the existence of Dhvani.[26]

In this respect, AK illustrates systematically the contentions of above mentioned opponents through five points,[27] i.e., (i) There is no existence of Dhvani at all. (ii) If it exists, then it is not vastvañtara (unsubstantial in essence) for the cause of the charmness of poetry. (iii) If it exists as the different form of Guṇa and Alamkāra, it can't be the cause of the charmness of poetry. (iv) If it is vastvaṅtara (based on real facts) it is called as Bhāktatvam or appears in the form of Bhakti. (Lakṣaṇā is not a kāvyatattva). (v) Due to Bhāktatvam, it is not expressed or lies beyond the expression.

According to him the first one is known as 'pūrṇābhāva-vāda' (total non-existence), the second is 'Antarbhāvāvāda' (exist within the other), the third is 'Saundaryābhāvāda' (lack of charmness), the fourth is Bhāktavāda (identical with Gauṇa vṛtti) and the last one is 'Anirvachanīya vāda' (beyond the expression) etc.

Avadhānakāra clearly states that the above five systemetic ideas create the main problem like non-existence of Dhvani. So, he distinctly marks the central ideas of Abhāvavādins and categorise the rival groups, such as the first one deals with Bhrāntattva (illusion) due to the ideas of non-existence. The second deals with sandigdhatva (doubtful) due to lakṣaṇā vṛtti. Because they are not particular about Lakṣārtha and Dhvanyārtha. So, they are in doubt. Then the third one deals with Añjānatva, due to beyond the expression.[28]

Lastly, AK strongly comments that instead of above mentioned contentions of the opponents, AV defined the existence of Dhvani, only for the pleasure of the connoisseurs who are ever intent upon seeing it defined. The AV also clearly states that 'Manas' (mind) is a place of 'Ānanda' (pleasure). For the establishment of eternal happiness in the mind of Sahṛdayas the Dhvanikāra treated the Dhvani theory. Here the commentator marks the relation between 'Ānanda' and 'Manas' is just like Ādhārādheya bhāva saṁbandhaḥ. According to him that 'Ānanda' is just like joyness which arises from the holy places like temple etc.[29] In this respect he also discusses the significance of the word 'Vṛmaḥ' which is used only for the discussions of

several viewpoints and it is used for many. It is noteworthy to say when theory was accepted by many, it automatically owned its importance or genuinity of existence.[30] Actually, the alternative views are many and these are said by many, yet a single alternative sentence or view is enongh to define the nature of Dhvani. Thus the Dhvani is automatically established as the essence of Kāvya through these above mentioned alternative statements because it contains some substantial essence.

It is seen above that although the term Dhvani was newly introduced to the field of poetics, and although Ananda claims to have propounded the theory of Dhvani for the first time, he inherited the fundamental idea from long series of predecessors. He tries to build this new system on the pre-existent meterials. We consider him not as a mere expounder but as its true author. However, Anandavardhana does not presume himself to be its author as he repeatedly points out in his vṛtti. He says Dhvani had already been recognised as the only essential factor of poetry in the circle of those who truely learnt the science of aesthetics. Despite this assertion about the ambiguity of the concept of Dhvani Anandavardhana's contribution remains as a outstanding one. And that Dhvani is the soul of a Kāvya, or in other words the suggested meaning or suggessivity alone is the most essential element which appeals to the man of taste.

It is clear that by the strategic comments of the AK we have a brief sketch of the principal trends in the development of Sanskrit poetics as well as the establishment of Dhvani—the true essence of kāvya. He tries to assess its value by way of referring logical statement and recognises the concept of Dhvani. According to him the proper existence of dhvani (so called Kāvyatattva) is just like the existence of Brahmatatva, and that process goes through the ideas of 'bhrama-sandeha-anjñatvavādas'. So, Anandavardhana propounded this concept of dhvani only to creat pleasure in mind of those learned men whose ideas are fully polluted by the several alternative statements (Vikalpa vākyas). The commentator also refers that by the realisation of eternal pleasure through this concept of dhvani is just like the pleasure that comes after knowing the Brahmatattva. In this context, the term 'satkavikāvyopanisadbhūta' is also an appropriate

one. There is no difference between the concept of Dhvani and the concept of Brahma[33].

He also draws relationship between Dhvani and the śāstras in a high order and states as a pratipādya-Pratipādakabhāvasaṁbandha, sādhyasādhanabhāvasaṁbandha, and kārya kāraṇa bhāva saṁbandha etc.[34] Thus according to him Dhvani plays a vital role in the sphere of literary criticism and is termed true essence of the poetry.

From the above considerations, it is also clear that the Dhvani was not thrown into the field of Sanskrit literary criticism all of a sudden. It comes into existence gradually by the reinterpretation of the accepted categories of rhetoric elements in the light of the new concept that enlisted sympathy and support of all Sahṛdayas or critics of sound literary taste, and established its soundness through a well planned book namely 'Dhvanyāloka'. In this connection, the word 'sahṛdaya' is very significant as laying emphasis on the most important condition of a literary critic, namely the gift of a responsive heart, a heart which is essentially akin to that of the poet and which can share in full all that the poet has to communicate. This clearly shows the new angle of vision which is brought by the AV through the establishment of his concept of Dhvani.

In certain manuscript, the Dhvanyāloka is found designated by the alternative title sahṛdayāloka. Perhaps the explanation is to be found in the fact that AV trying to systematise the ideas of the saoṛdayas before them, who had evolved and preached the outlines of the concept of Dhvani. But this is only a juncture, for this AK clearly states that the author AV sometimes quoted the term sahṛdayas, as he was the foremost representative of the school of sahṛdayas[35]. It primarily refers to a whole class of cultured critics that preceded AV. In this reference, some modern scholars said that Sahrdaya is the proper name of Dhvani[36]. But this type of speculation is a ridiculous one. According to AK the term sahṛdaya has been used as a qualitative adjunct to refer "Connoisseurs of aesthetics"[37].

Granting, then that the outlines of the Dhvani had already been forestalled by the sahṛdayas long before the Dhvanyāloka, can we glean anything about the way they came to coin the strange expression Dhvani for signifying this most original

theory of literary appreciation ? In this context, the phrase "Sūrībhiḥ Kathitaḥ" has some significance and the AK also throws a flood of light on this point.

As gathered from the line of Ānanda the 'Sūribhiḥ' here refers to the grammarians and the Kāvyatattvavits. It means that the grammarians called dhvani and the poeticians also called Dhvani. Yet Ānanda declares that the very conception of Dhvani is based on the views of the grammarians. It is very natural that Ānanda who seeks the support of the grammarians for the sake of dignity of his Dhvani theory and would also try to associate the concept with a great antiquity. That is why he uses 'Sūrībhiḥ' to give the abrupt idea of a large group of scholars talking of dhvani or it can be very well explained as used in plural (vahuvacana) in the sense of gaurava (dignity). The term 'Kathitaḥ' is also meant to make the concept look age-long and hence dignified.

In this aspect AK refers that the terms 'Sūrībhih kathitah' is used to convince the opponent that the concept of Dhvani is not the improvisation of the authors of the socalled Dhvani school alone, but it was first formulated by the grammarians—the foremost of all learned men, though in a different context.

Lastly it can be said that the predecessors of AV preached this doctrine for the first time broadly and it was left to Ananda to work out every detail and place the theory on firm footing by elaborating it as the most perfect literary theory in his work —Dhvanyāloka. And for the better realisation of the existence of Dhvani, the AK's comment is very helpful by its systematic and logical expression. As a whole, by accumulating all the viewpoints of his predecessors, he interpretes that the concept of dhvani is just like Brahma in Indian philosophy and its existence is determined through the process of obscure ideas. Actually the viewpoints of AK regarding existence of dhvani is highly speculative.

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9. *Avadhāna*, pp. 15 & 16.
10. Atra vudhānām vahutvena dhvaneh kāvyatmatā pramāṇikiti Vudhyate. *Avadhāna*, p. 4
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Avadhāna, p. 55

CHAPTER 5

DEFINITION OF DHVANI

Having formed some idea of the concept of Dhvani the question arises about the definition of Dhvani and how Ānandavardhana illustrated it in his work 'Dhvanyāloka' which has come down to us as the most popular scheme ever worked out in the whole range of the theories of poetry in Sanskrit literature. This problem has the artistic image and is of great interest for many reasons. It leads to an understanding of poetic art as a whole; its essence, special characteristics and its purpose. Poetry begins and ends with the artistic image of Dhvani. Unless we discuss this important problem, it will be difficult to unravel the knot of diverse concepts in literary criticism in order to understand the aesthetic value. This question demands independent consideration in both his logical and concrete poetic aspects.

It may be noted that one must look for objective criteria of the value and significance of the concept of Dhvani in poetry itself in the development of world poetic art and the literary-aesthetic ideals evolved in the process of literary advance. These ideals take shape as a reflection of the essential needs of literary development. Their very appearance indicates that in literary groups, classes are striving to improve literature or various aspects of it. They are the literary forces which carry progressive literary relations and they are the standard bearers of the future contributions.

AV has defined the concept of Dhvani with all forms of consciousness, understood all the previous speculations and integrated all the diverse concepts in a perfect manner. An

attempt has been made here to give a concrete definition of Dhvani, as outlined in the 'Dhvanyāloka', with some special reference to the sources from a modern commentary 'AVADHĀNA' and in relation to the other rhetorical tenets. Since the arguments and the interpretations of AK have the intrinsic essence, profoundly dialectical and in every respect always rely on the facts and not on speculative conclusions it is where its concentration lies.

Before defining Dhvani, Ānandavardhana has presented a form of prelude like the theory of suggestion that deals with the analysis of the import words and serves as the basis for enunciation of the theory. He states that the meaning of poetry which is recognised as the soul of poetry, when it can appeal to the men of taste, has primarily two aspects, viz. the 'expressed' and the 'suggested'.[1]

Now it might be argued that the Dhvanikāra here is inconsistent for in the opening verse he has stated 'the suggested sense as the soul of poetry', but in the present he says 'the sense which causes the delight of the sahṛdayas and is termed the soul of poetry has two divisions 'vācya' and 'pratīyamānārtha', and places them in the same footing. This expression causes a confusion and it has been much objected to by Mahimbhaṭṭa and Viswanatha too.[2]

But all these criticisms are quite uncalled for. The inconsistency as noticed by Viswanatha and others is only apparent and not real. If we look carefully the interpretation of AK we find that 'vācyārtha' appears like foundation of a building. Without knowing the nature of vācyārtha, it is not possible to grasp the essence of vyaṅgyārtha which comes in the wake of the former. Another thing is that the words and sense that constitute the body of poetry should be adorned and properly selected. Thus Ānanda's stand is not vitiated by kārikā. He propounds kārikā for the first time and says that in kāvya the meaning (artha) alone is the most important factor; and the meaning being appealing to men of taste may even be designated as the very soul of kāvya. It is not convenient for Ānanda here to state that the more predominant pratīyamānārtha is the soul of kāvya as he is yet to introduce a variety of meaning called pratīyamānārtha. The kārikā second is only an adequate foreword to the

introduction of a pratīyamānārtha as distinct from the express sense commonly known and already set forth in various ways by the earlier rhetoricians. In this connection AK observes the relation between the vācyārtha and the pratīyamānārtha and proves that both are corelated with each other.[3] The vācyārtha also like "prasiddha ghaṭapaṭādivat sādhāraṇagamya". By the use of word 'prasiddha' the worldly nature of the primary sense emphasises the meaning which is generally acknowledged, discussed and well established through the figures of speech like ūpamā etc. by the rhetoricians[4]. AK observes the significance of used word 'smṛtau' and says "atra smṛtavityanena 'yah samāmnātpūrāvaḥ' iti samarthyate".[5] Thus in both the kārikā and vṛtti Ānanda shows that in poetry there may be a special meaning other than the commonly understood express sense, such an implied meaning is altogether different from the express sense and in no case liable to be confused with the later. The beauty of a suggested sense is not identical with the beauty of its components but something over and above it. This unique phenomenon can be likened to the bewitching beauty in lovely women pervading their whole physical frame and yet exceeding the symmetry or harmony of their various limbs.[6]

The suggested sense is quite distinct from the expressed sense and can in no way be equated with the latter as it is the very quintessence of poetic art of 'prasiddha sāra viśiṣṭam vastu' as AK points out.[7] According to him AV, here, likens the suggested sense to the supple grace of the limbs of a beautiful maiden. Just as 'lāvaṇya' or grace is distinct from the ornaments like necklace, bangles etc. on the one hand, and absence of defects like blindness etc. on the other, and is quite a tertium quid so also the suggested sense (Pratīyamānārtha) of a poem cannot be subsumed under the alaṁkāras like 'Upamā', Rūpaka on the one hand and guṇas like 'mādhurya', 'Ojaḥ' etc. on the other.[8]

It is clear from the lines of AK that 'lāvaṇya' or grace cannot be equated with the absence of defects of the limbs or the presence of adornments. So it must be regarded as an independent element. In the same way the pratīyamānārtha is something totally distinct from mere absence of poetic defects as also from the charm brought about by the presence of poetic figures,

simile, metaphor etc. and is like 'lāvaṇya' in relation to the body of poetry (kāvya śarīra). That the existence of this (pratīyamānārtha) can not be denied which is hinted at by the verbal form 'vibhāti' in the kārikā. Avadhānakāra also refers that the Ātman has no existence without the cognition of body. Just like this the Pratīyamānārtha has no existence without vācyārtha. Thus without vācyārtha there is no existence of pratīyamānārtha. According to the commentotor, Ānanda exhibits the intrinsic ideas through the general viewpoint only for the fulfilment of his purposes, and discusses the relation between vācyārtha and pratīyamānārtha which is necessary to define the concept of Dhvani.

The significance of the plural case ending in 'Mahākavīnām' in the expression 'vāṇīsu Mahākavīnām' is also explained by AK. According to him the pratīyamānārtha pervades all the compositions of the greatest of poets like Vyāsa, Vālmīki, Kalidasa etc. and as such is a well known element of poetic art.[9]

It is also noteworthy that AK strongly proves the equation of lāvaṇya with the pratīyamānārtha which has been objected to by Kuntaka etc. According to him the lāvaṇya should be considered as the supreme secret of poetry.[10]

By the expression 'Sahyarthaḥ' the AK clearly marks that it refers to the Pratīyamāna sense alluded to the preceding kārikā. Here the nature (Svarūpa) of the suggested sense and its difference (Vyatīreka) from the primary meaning of the words are being distinctly stated.[11]

As regards the varieties of the Pratīyamānārtha (suggested sense) AK distinctly makes his viewpoints and discusses them logically with appropriate examples which have been mentioned by the Dhvanikāra. According to him firstly Pratīyamānārtha falls into two distinct categories, i.e. (i) Laukika, and (ii) Kāvyavyavahārgocara. Laukika pratīyamānārtha is that which always enjoyed the Svaśabdavācyatā and deals with the matter of fact (vastu). It has a number of subvarieties like Vidhi (injuction) and niṣedha (Prohibition) etc. which have been stated through the ideas of matter of fact (vastu śabda). Mainly due to the strength of vācyārtha (Primary meaning) the Laukīka Pratīyamanārth is of two types, viz. (i) Vastu-mātra pratīya-

mānārtha (suggested sense based on the ideas of matter of fact), and (iii) alaṁkāra pratīyamānārtha (suggested sense based on figures of speech).

The second one kāvyavyavahāragocara pratīyamānārtha is that which deals with rasa and others like rasa. This variety of Pratīyamānārtha is called rasādi. It is the most important variety of the suggested sense. With the enthusiasm to assert it Ānanda says that every rasādi variety is the soul of poetry. It has a number of subvarieties like rasa, bhāva, rasābhāsa bhavābhāsa and bhāvapraśānti etc.[12]


As regards the alaṁkāradhvani, the commentator observes that the figures of speech which are defined in so many words have certain single ideas at their base. When such ideas are presented in a charming manner we have an alaṁkāra. If the charming idea is expressly conveyed we have a Vācyālaṁkāra and if the charming idea is suggested we have suggested alaṁkāra (alaṁkāra dhvani). The suggested alaṁkāras are also matters of fact in a sense. But while Vasṭumātrā is a bare statement of fact the suggested alaṁkāra happens to be more charming and involves some of the basic idea underlying the different Vācyālaṁkāra. For the connotation of alaṁkāra—dhvani, the commentator follows the Locanakāra and quotes the maxim 'brāhmaṇa-śramaṇa. It implies that though now he is a Buddhist ascetic he was formerly a brāhmaṇ. Like this though now alaṁkāra is appeared as a suggested one but due to former implication of Vācyālaṁkāra i.e. Upamā etc., it was titled as Alaṁkār-dhvani.[13]

In this context the AK also states that which has never enjoyed the alaṁkāratva is called as Vastodhvani. In another way it can be said that it is only 'vastuśabdavācya'. According to AK when the expressed sense does not come under alaṁkāra and deals with the vastuśabda it appears as vastudhvani which conveys the ideas of injuction (vidhi) and its just opposite—prohibition (niṣedha) etc.[14] As for rasadhvani the commentator points out that rasa is neither 'Svaśabdavācya' nor 'Lokavyavahāraviṣaya'. It is suggested through generalisation.[15] It has been discussed later.

AK proves that the Vācyārtha (primary meaning) is a strength or the foundation of the functions of suggested sense

or Dhvani.[16] Though the vācyārtha is the basic concept of the suggested sense, yet in all the above mentioned cases, the suggested sense, be it Vastu, or Alaṁkāra or Rasa is quite different from that of expressed sense. The commentator clearly refers to that though Vastu, Alaṁkāra and Rasa, can all be conveyed by suggestion. There is this much difference that while the first two can be conveyed through denotation the last one is variably suggested and never expressed.

AK gives us a synoptic table of the divisions of Pratīyamānārtha and their mutual difference. The classification is as follows:



After this classification AK exhibits their examples cited by AV and tries to establish the identification of Pratīyamānārtha (suggested sense) through the discussions of the power of words and meanings. Now a question arises why AV firstly demonstrates the suggested sense, viz. Vastumātra. For this AK points out that the intention of Dhvanikāra is to distinguish the varieties of Vastudhvani based on the strength of the functions of vācyārtha but they are different from vācyārtha. According to the commentator the Vācyavastu is 'vidhiparaka' and the Vyangya-vastu is 'niṣedhaparaka'. Both are opposite to each other. To know the suggested sense, it is essential to know the primary sense at first because the vastumātra dhvani is fully

based on vācyārtha. For better understanding he used a maxim 'Sūcīkatāha'. So, Ānanda firstly discusses it.[17] Such type of Pratīyamānārtha is found in the verse 'Bhama Dhāmmia'[18] in the form of the information that the harlot is prohibiting the pious man. Here this verse conveys the idea of an injunction (vidhi) but the scholars opine that the cleaver harlot is prohibiting the pious man from going to the bank of Godāvarī. Prohibition being just opposition of injection need not be confused with the expressed sense. So, here AK observes how the suggested sense claims a sharp distinction from the expressed sense.

AK states that 'laṇ' lakāra is used in the verb 'bham' (Skt. bhṛam) instead of 'lōt' mentioned by the Locanakāra. 'Laṇ' is used in the sense of Vidhi etc. which is implied through the meanings like Pravartana, Atiśaya and Prāptakāla etc.[19] Here, only for the encouragement of travelling and distraction of anxiety, the 'laṇ' is used in the word 'bhrameti' because the period of travelling is fixed. By calling 'Dhārmika' is suggested that the harlot is addressing a virtuous ascetic, who is in the habit of plucking flowers from the grove daily. It shows a positive relation with the word 'bharm' and simultaneously by the use of word 'viśvasta' and 'dṛptasingha' etc. It also suggested that the bank of Godāvarī has become a dangerous place by the advent of lion. Thus, the commentator strongly says that while the encouragement of travelling distinctly marks the nature of vidhi, the danger created by lion shows the nature of prohibition. This expression is made only by the power of Abhidhā (denotation).[20]

Now a question arises how the above expression is through abhidhāvṛtti. Since the functions of abhidhā are not made slowly it expressly conveys the idea. After the implication of vidhi, there is no place for niṣedha and both are opposite to each other. The commentator follows another power of meaning that is tātparya śakti and discusses how far it is applicable here. The use of word like 'Dhārmika', 'Kacchakuñjavāsinah' and 'dṛpta-singha' etc. directly convey the prohibition of 'bhramaṇa-vidhi'. In tātparyavṛtti the suggestive sense is prohibitive in character by the 'viparīta lakṣaṇā'. But here we get the prohibitive meaning by the power of words not by the

nature of opposite sense (viparītalakṣaṇa). So, by Tātparya-vṛtti there is no existence of dhvani as it is not different from vācyārtha. For better understanding the commentator quotes a verse that something compells to get fame and something appears as the obstacle of fame, but due to the significance of the former, the latter one is also expressed as well. According to him some ideas deal with vidhi, and some ideas deal with niṣedha or both are opposite to each other, but by the significance of the former the latter is also expressed not suggested.[21]

He quotes some examples, i.e. 'Gaṅgāyām ghōsah' and 'Singhō māṇavaka' etc. where we get both 'Mukhyārtha-vādha' and 'Viparīta-lakṣaṇā'. But only by the derivation we get the prohibitive sense. Thus the AK observes that the suggested sense of prohibitive nature is 'abhidhāmūlāvyanjanāgamya'. Though, we get only the prohibition of period (tatkālavādha), yet the other concepts like 'hetvaṇtara', saṁbandha, prayōjana etc. are available here.[22] So it may be conveyed through the power of Lakṣanā. According to AK, even by the power of Lakṣanā we get vastudhvani through the suggested sense of prohibitive nature. In the sense of habit, if we consider the meaning i.e. danger etc. through the sequence like vyāpti and smṛti, there is no opposition in the dignity of suggested sense.

As a whole the commentator observes that though everything is expressed through the power of abhidhā, tātparya and Lakṣaṇā vṛtti etc., yet the suggested sense of prohibitive nature is surrendered near the master of fourth room—vyanjanā, only due to 'hetuvaikalyādanāgatatyā'.[23] To know better the importance of vyanjanā vṛtti, the commentator quotes a verse which deals with the title of vyañjanā as 'sarvavalādhikāri' or 'vastu prasādhikā' etc. It implies that vyañjanā is the master of all trade, who is adorned by different concepts and pressed all the different opinions and gives a new outlook of the poetic art. Everything comes within its perview. It can be said that the vyanjanā vyāpāra is the most powerful than others because it comes from a combination of above three powers of words and ultimately enjoys the supremacy above and over of other. It deals with the true sense of suggested sense so called Dhvani[24].

As regards the vyañjanāśakti, the commentator vividly examines the ideas of Dhvanikāra and observes a new thing that

is 'cetanāśakti' (Power of consciousness). According to him without the power of consciousness, the suggested sense never fulfils the ultimate goal. Just like Ātman it also has 'cetanāvyavahāra'. It is noted that without the use of power of consciousness, the Kāvya is not considered as a first rate one. Thus it is an essential factor to enlighten the suggested sense[25].

Lastly AK gives some logical statements and proves the suggested sense in prohibitive nature by quoting line "Yatparaḥ śabdaḥ sa sabdārthaḥ''. According to him the abhidhāvṛtti can't be preserved by the unity among the expressive ideas only due to its long functions (dīrghadīrghatara-vyāpāra), so, in the beginning when the expressed sense is injunctive in force, how it will be stopped? Only by the lack of functions (vyāpāra), it can be possible to end the functions of 'śabda bridhi'. Another thing is that the expressive ideas have close dealings with functions of the powers like Abhidhā, Tātparya and Lakṣanā etc. Thus AK strongly replies that by the continuing process or by the continuing demonstration of the functions of word and its meaning, we get the niṣedha vastu dhvani (suggested sense in prohibitive nature)[26].

The second instance quoted by Dhvanikāra[27] where the position is reversed, while the explicit sense is that of prohibition the suggested idea is a positive invitation[28]. AK here points out that the verse is addressed by a woman of bad character to a stranger who is seeking accommodation for the night, there will be no difficulty in getting the suggested sense. It is nothing but a valid invitation to the stranger to get into bed with her at night since the old mother in law will be sleeping like a senseless one to notice anything. Here the expressed idea is prohibitive in nature. Because that woman is marking her sleeping place as well as her mother-in-law's place. She is also telling him that not to steal into beds, and cautioning him by making him aware of the mother-in-law's presence. In the suggested sense of injunctive nature, we find that it is an invitation for love. It is because she is expressing her idea cleverly and giving covert hints as to the time of meeting and also cautioning him to mistake the mother-in-laws' bed for his love. She is inviting the stranger for meeting and cautioning him not to create any disturbance by mistake[29].

While the explicit sense is praiseworthy in force, the suggested may be neither praiseworthy nor prohibitive as the instances[30] quoted by the Dhvanikāra. Regarding this, AK observes that in this verse a devoted wife addresses her unfaithful husband[31]. According to him that husband should proceed to his mistress is the idea directly stated. But the suggested idea is not so definite. She would not like her husband going away nor his stay for mere courtesy's sake. Here the suggested sense in the illustration does not stand in the relation of contradiction (virodha) with the expressed sense (vācyārtha) as in tne preceding two instances. Here the vidhi i.e. vraja does not suggest its negation i.e. vrajyābhāva, as in the first case by bhramaṇa, bhramaṇabhāva is suggested. Nor is there any suggestion of separate injunction as such. The suggested sense bears no definite relation with the expressed sense can neither be classed under vidhi nor under niṣedha and as such is termed anubhayarūpa.[32]

One more instance is given by Dhvanikāra[33] where the explicit sense is negative and yet the suggested sense is neither negative nor positive. Here the AK clearly observes that the external meaning is 'do not proceed further'. But the inner meaning is different as is clear from the context. It is gathered from this verse that a lover shrewdly praises the beauty of the maiden he loves. Here is no definite suggested sense.[34]

It is also possible that while the explicit idea refers to one object the suggested sense has reference to an altogether different object as explained through an instance cited by Dhvanikāra.[35] According to the commentator, this verse shows that while the expressed sense is cognised by one person the suggested sense is cognised by quite a different person so the substratum of the cognitions of these two senses is distinct. There is also another reason why the suggested sense is bound to be different from the expressed sense. AK points out that this verse is addressed to a lady by maid-in-waiting in the presence of her husband.[36] Who won't be enraged to see the lips of his beloved (thus) scarred? Now suffer for your obstinency; be prepared to receive the rebukes of your husband. But the suggested sense has more reference to the husband than the lady. The context is that in the absence of her husband a lady indulges in secret daliances with her lover asking her maid to warn her the arrival of the

husband.. The maid warns her accordingly and simultaneously suggests her husband not to make any undue suspicions about his wife at the sight of her bleeding lips since they were caused by the accidental stinging of a bee. Here AK brings out the seven varieties of suggested senses and each suggested meaning is intended for a particular person.[37]

Thus all the above discussions deal with the 'vastubheda', which gives certain direction towards the further development. Dhvanikāra refers to that variety where the suggested sense is in the form of a figure of speech (alaṁkāra) which is reducible to a particular kind of relation as existing between the expressed sense and the suggested sense. The suggestion of alaṁkāras is much more varied and complex than that of mere fact (vastu) and it has been clearly explained later on. AK observes that the alaṁkāra-dhvani is very wide and properly identified in a different manner. It has also many more varieties or branches than the vastudhvani.[38] For better understanding of suggested alaṁkāra, it is necessary to give an instance quoted by Ānanda.[39] In this example the expressed meaning is that the temples succeed better than the breasts in drawing attention of the heroes. Hence there is an expression of vyatireka-alaṁkāra. The suggested idea is that there is a point of similarity between the breasts and the temples. The breasts are as large as the temples and hence attractive. But this idea of similarity is not expressly conveyed and hence we have a suggested alaṁkāra.[40]

The third variety of Pratīyamānārtha (suggested sense) is called rasādi. AK points out that rasādi means rasa and others like rasa, i.e. bhāva, bhāsa, etc. As regards rasa-dhvani it is obvious that it is always above and over the matter of fact where emotion is delineated. Though its divisions are immitating the expressive sense of vastu and alaṁkāra etc., yet it is enlightened by vyañjanā-vyāpāra.[41] It is such a variety where the supreme importance of suggestion can be readily realised.

For understanding the term 'rasādi' the commentator presents a systematic expression on the nature of rasa and the others. According to the commentator rasa is realised in a generalised state. As he points out: "aucityanānurāgādipravṛtau sthāyi rupayā ratyādātmakacitta-vṛttirasvādyatvām rasāḥ".[42] Regarding others he observes that the 'sancāriṇaḥ' is

called as its bhāva; the improper desire (Anucita Pravṛtti) i.e. Rāvaṇa's desire for Sita, as its bhāsa; and when the 'ratyādirūpa cittavṛtti' is appeared as prāśānta, it is called as bhāvapraśānti. AK also states that rasa is neither denotative nor figurative but it is suggestive.[43]

In this aspect he also clarifies that rasa is never represented through the mention of their names (rasādi śabda).[44] Simultaneously no rasa can be delineated without the agency of suggestion like words etc. Granting for argument's sake that words do denote rasa there will be only two possibilities for such a phenomenon : (i) Rasas will have to be denoted either by the words standing for them; or (ii) by the treatment of vibhāvas etc. of the rasas concerned. The acceptance of the first alternative would mean that there will be no rasa in the absence of words signifying them. But it is a matter of common experience that rasas are never represented through the mention of their names. Only description of vibhāvas etc. leads up to the rasa. The names only serve to identify the rasa and not to menifest it. Thus rasa is an experienced one. There will no existence of rasa by mere mention of words like śṛngāra and vīra in a composition totally devoid of the delineation of vibhāvas etc. Thus it can be concluded that rasas are represented not by their proper names, but only by the delineation of vibhāvas etc. These vibhāvas and their accessories do not generate the rasa but they only suggest the rasa. It is clear that rasa is only suggested and never expressed.

This rasādi variety or rasa-dhvani which has so far been shown to possess a separate existence of its own outshining what is merely explicit occupies the most prominent place in kāvya. It may be said to be the very soul of kāvya. That is why in the days of yore sorrow of Valmīki at the sight of a pair of krauñca bird which were forcibly separated from each other for ever transformed itself into a verse.[45]

In the above statement AK observes the real enthusiasm of Dhvanikāra and says: for the establishment of that rasādi variety of suggested sense the Dhvanikāra has witnessed the thoughts of Ādikavi Vālmīki which is adorned with a great literary heritage. According to the AK the above statement contains two parts: (i) that very rasādi variety is the soul of

(ii) the sorrow of the Ādikavi Vālmīki caused by the separation of krauñca couple, took the form of a verse.[46] From these two parts, we learn that although there are other varieties of the suggested sense, the suggested sense (Pratīyamānārtha) in general (vastu, alaṁkāra and rasa) should be recognised as the soul of poetry which has been mentioned in the preceding kārikā, yet the third variety of suggested sense viz. 'rasadhvani' alone happens to be the most important because the sorrow of the bird gets transfigured in the vision of the imaginative poet and the result is śloka or song. It is that we find even Vālmiki's sympathetic heart touched, he enters into real identity with the sorrow of the bird, and has an emotional, imaginative and blissful experience. The sentiment of compassion (Karuṇa) has pity for its immediate primary impulse and the essence of Vālmīki's verse has of course to be sought in the Karuṇa rasa that is suggested therein. So of the three varieties of Dhvani mentioned above, rasadhvani is also considered to be the vital one; the other two varieties are also classed under dhvani insofar they too tend to reveal rasas and bhāvas etc. In this aspect the commentator puts his own views that the tragic emotion of poet by the pitiful sight of a pair of krauñca transformed itself into a verse just like Ātman transformed itself into own shape by the past action. He also observes that here, the term 'Śōka' be construed with krauñca and not with 'ādikavi'. Because it is impossible to get alaukika rasa through the laukika 'Śoka' (sorrow) or tragic emotion of the poet. Again he discusses the importance of term 'Śōka' and says that the personal sorrow in life is supposed to find such worldly outlets as tears and not as poem. Due to the 'Paripūrṇakuṁba cittavṛtti nishyanda svabhāvatvāt' the result is śloka or poem. Thus, every true poem is merely an expression of the poet's overflowing emotion and is a medium to transmit this emotion to the readers in succession, and it is because of this that emotion (Rasa) are truely styled as the soul of poetic composition. This idea has been admirably represented by AK in his commentary in a nutshell.[47]

In considering the significance of the episode of Vālmīki, the commentator discusses how it helps in establishing the fact that rasa is the most important element of kāvya. The reply is

that AV himself here lays bare the fact that the Rāmāyaṇa is an ideal kāvya because of rasa and that it is rich in rasa can be established by a reference to the way of its origin itself. What AV means to say is that a sorrow has been caused in the heart of Vālmīki by the pitiful wailings of the krauñca bird whose beloved had been killed and Vālmīki burst into the verse "Mā niṣāda..."[48]. It cannot be inferred if Ānanda meant that there is karuṇa rasa in the verse "Mā nisāda...". Thus the Dhvanikāra himself says in vṛtti "nihata sahacārī viraha kātara..."[49]. The AK says that from the above line it is clear that there is an intimate relation between the phenomenon of the spontaneous composition of the verse "Mā niṣāda..." and a sense of sorrow (śōka) in the heart of the poet. AV also further asserts that śōka is also the Sthāyībhāva of karuṇarasa. The verse above is the beginning of the whole Rāmāyaṇa which has karuṇa as its principal rasa. According to AK the Dhvanikāra believes that in order to delineate sentiment in poetry, the poet himself must be sensitive. The feeling to be depicted must already run through every vein of the poet. It is very desirable for the poet himself to be suffused with emotions. Thus with the help of the episode of Vālmīki, AV tries to bring home the idea that rasa is the most important element in Kāvya. In AK's estimate the śōka which has been the sources of the verse 'Mā niṣāda...' and its sentiment already became a rasa which is duly universalised. This universalised feeling of śōka causes the heart of the poet melt and gets manifested in the form of a verse in the manner of the waters flowing over the brink of a jar. AK wants to assert that in order to give vent to it in the form of a kāvya the poet must experience a sentiment in his heart. Experience of the sentiment should be so intense and sincere that the poet's experience of the sentiment should be different from the experience of an ordinary man. Upto this Avadhāna does not appear to be dfferent from AV. But like Locanakāra, his observation 'na ca muneḥ śoka' appears to run counter to the plain words of AV as ādikaveh śokah ślōkat-vamāgataḥ. But AK's words may be interpreted to mean that the Muni being a sympathetic heart, his śōka does not remain a śōka of an ordinary person. AK himself desires that rasa in its technical sense may be had only when it is suggested by the vibhāvas etc. as delineated in the kāvya which is a piece of art and hence the feeling of śōka by the Muni

caused by an worldy scene should not be considered as a rasa. Yet we may suppose that the designation of rasa is applied to the sad feeling of rasa only to show its distinction from the ordinary personal feelings of the men of nonpoetical nature. It is said not to be 'a śōka of the muni' to mean that the feeling of sorrow is not strictly personal but with all these confusing observation AK sincerely tries to tread the very path laid by his predecessors.

AK clearly observes the relation between dhvani and rasadhvani is just like Ātman and jīva-vyavahāra. In other words it can be said that the function of suggested sense exist everywhere in a kāvya as the existence of Ātman but the suggestive sense endowed with aesthetic experince i.e. rasadhvani is not always possible everywhere just like jīva-vyavahāra because the charmness of poetry is to be made by the aesthetic experience (rasa) which is subordinated by the various concepts like vācya, vācaka and racanā etc. By these three concepts, we gather the charmness of poetry. By analysing these concepts we find that vācya cāruta means arthālaṁkāra, vācakacārutā means śabdālaṁkāra, and the racanācārutā means Guṇa. We get the true nature of an ideal kāvya finding these concepts favourable towards rasa. If we simply call dhvani as the soul of poetry any type of composition is to be said kāvya; but if we say rasadhvani is the soul of poetry, it serves the true nature of an ideal kāvya. The commentator also exemplifies as 'Singhō māṇavaka'. This composition is an example of suggested sense but it has not served as true sense of kāvya as it lacks the charmness.

AK is successful in observing the close relation between the suggested sense (Pratīyamānārtha) and the aesthetic experience (rasa) by analysis of the verse 'Mā niṣāda', and adds some other details which are worthnoting. Śōka is transformed into ślōka still we find the existence of suggested sense (Pratīyamānārth) therein. Here it is supposed that the words of Vālmīki is a curse for niṣāda, i.e. the rest of your life span you will never live with your consort. And also here we get the 'vivekaśūnyatā' of niṣāda; because krauñci has been killed by niṣāda, when enjoying with her partner. AK states that here we never find use of word 'śōka', but 'ślōka' is suggested here[50] as 'karuañcahanana' serves as a vibhāva and the cry of krauñca (krauñca

krandana) as anubhāva. By the generalisation process here we get the 'śōka' as Sthāyībhāva of karuṇarasa. Thus according to him the pratīyamānaśōka is as the permanent mental state of the karuaṇrasa; but it is not again as pratyakṣaviṣaya. The Rāmayaṇa is the outward manifestation and embodiment of the poet's tragic emotion (karuṇa rasa) that arise by the pitiful cries of the krauñca bird at the sight of its consort (krauñcī) being killed by the fowler (niṣāda). Also AK explains the verse 'Mā niṣāda' in a defferent way based on pratyakṣaviṣaya and that suggested the ideas like 'bhagavat viṣayaka-bhaktibhāva' and 'ugratābhāva' etc. There is no generalisation and it does not serve the purpose of the poet also. Thus the aesthetic experience in suggestive nature has a great significance and there is no diversity between the pratīyamānārtha and rasa[51].

Now the question arises that pratīyamānārtha has three divisions, i.e vastu, alaṁkāra and rasa which are already mentioned. But in the foregoing discussion, we find that only rasa is called as the soul of poetry why others are not entitled? AK says: although we get three divisions of partīyamānārtha, yet the rasa and the bhāva play vital role among them. The bhāva is mentioned here only due to upalakṣaṇa. Thus vastu and alaṁkāradhvani is fully based on bhāva. It is not like the rasa but appears as rasa to some extent, Sometimes the generalisation of Vyabhicārībhāva happens like this. So it should not be fully discarded. Though all the three divisions serve as the expression of suggested sense yet rasa plays a vital role among them and is called the soul of poetry.

After the establishment of the suggested sense as the soul of poetry in a traditional way, the Dhvanikāra tries to prove the kāvyātmatā of suggested sense through 'Svasaṁvedana Siddha.[52] In other words it can be said that Dhvanikāra appeals to the poet's own experience (Sva-saṁvedana) on the occasion of any poetic creation. This has been clearly pointed out by AK in his commentary. According to him the muse of great poet embodying that charmful meaning (i.e. suggested) serves as a clear testimony to their unique gift of genius in abundance. Out of devine grace, no conscious effort is needed on the part of the poet to compose a first rate kāvya, the quintesence of poet's own experience. That is why great poetry is rare in world.

We can hardly come across a handful of them who really deserve the designation of mahākavīs or great poets.

AK also states that the emotional element or rasa is the only real essence (prasiddhārthavastu divyānanda-rasam padārtha-sāram) of poetic art and the production of a genius is marked by sponteneity[53]. The commentator also discusses about the 'Prativā and the pranjñā which serve a lot for the relish of the emotional content of the poem.

In the process of discussion regarding the significance of pratīyamānārtha, AK says : the difference between pratīyamā-nārth and vācyārth not only in respect of Svarūpaviṣayabheda but also assigns another reason bhinnasāmagrībhedatva which serves to demarcate the above two meanings from each other. The sāmagrī (totality of causes) on which the comprehension of the vācya sense depends is different from that which gives rise to the realisation of the pratīyamāna or vyaṅgya sense. Consequently, the generating causes of the two being different, their effects must also be different—a conclusion guarantteed by the law of causality. The comprehension of the vācya depends on śabdārthaśāsanajnāna, while that of the vyaṅgya besides the knowledge of śabda, artha and their relations (Saṁketa) requires the capacity of appreciating the hidden meaning of a poetic production which alone is its quintessence and is source of aesthetic delight on the part of true connoisseurs. In other words it can be said that while the expressed sense of a sentence can be cognised by anybody who is acquainted with the conventional meaning (Saṁketitārtha) of the words, it is only the connoisseurs alone who are able to grasp the suggested sense. Thus the mere knowledge of Grammar and lexicons is not enough to ensure right understanding of poetry.

Poetry bounds in emotive suggestion and therefore, a sound literary taste is necessitated in the critic. Just as in the field of music, mere knowledge of the mechanical principles will be of no avail unless one has an ear for music, so in the field of poetry also no amount of learning will reveal without an aesthetic sensibility[54].

Since suggestion forms such an predominant feature in all the master-pieces, the difficult task of getting at the suggested sense and sometime at the words too that are its medium

develops on the conscientious critic.[55] Here AK says: the prospective mahākavi should always select words with an eye to the nature of the suggested sense, and should not rest satisfied with the combination of words that convey no other sense besides their conventional meanings. To him (Mahākavi) the suggested sense alone is the sense par excellence, and those words alone convey the matter that are capable of suggesting it. The word 'pratyabhingye in kārikā has been derived in two different ways by AK. The kṛtya-suffix yet added to prati—abhi√jñā has been added either in the sense of 'arha' or of 'vidhāna'. The main purpose of the use of word 'Pratyabhingyā' is to denote a particular kind of knowledge consisting the identification of the words and its meanings. Thus the commentator observes that by orienting the poet's attention towards the suggested sense and words that are mainly capable for that end, AV implicitly states the predominance of the function of suggestion in a poetic composition.

It is of course true that poets do direct their attention first of all towards the expressed sense. But this does not prove that Dhvani is less important. A man anxious to see things at night, he first of all seek the help of a torch as means for attaining the object. The torch is not an end in itself. It is only a means to satisfy another end. In the same way, poets take interest in the explicit sense as a means to communicate their other ideas suggestively. It can be said that expressed ideas are means and the suggested ideas are end.[56] There AV observes that though the expressed sense is intended to be conveyed first by the poet, yet that, by no means, establishes its predominance. It is with the denotative words. The final aim of the poet is to convey the suggested sense, i.e., the end in view. And to that end he (poet) is bound by necessity to use denotative words and convey the primary or expressed sense, which together constitute the means for better explanation, he quotes an illustration: 'who is eager to have a sight of the beautiful face of his beloved' in the dark, must have to light a lamp first, but on that account, the lamp cannot claim superiority to the end in view for which it was intended. Thus, it can be gathered from the ideas of the poet, that it is the suggested sense which is predominant and the expressed sense is invariably subordinate to it.[57]

As the knowledge of a sentence depends on the knowledge of the component words, similarly the suggested sense also is grounded up on the explicit sense. AV points out that from the standpoint of the sahṛdayas, the suggested sense is prominent and superior to the expressed sense even though it is the latter and that is cognised first. For instance just as without knowing the meanings of particular terms (Padārtha), the import of a whole sentence (Vākyārtha) cannot be grasped, so also without first knowing the primary sense (vācyārtha), the suggested sense (vyaṅgyārtha) cannot be cognised. Thus vācyārtha is like the position of padārtha, while the vyaṅgyārtha is comparable with vācyārtha. AK observes that there is a relation between vācyārtha and vyaṅgyārtha as 'pratipat pratipattīrvōdha' and marks a sequence (krama) between the cognitions of the vācyārtha. Lastly, he says that the sequence of pada, padārth etc. are unknown to śabdāśāstrānubhiñjnas similarly as the sequence of vyaṅgya, vyañjaka etc. are unknown to ashṛdayas.

Now it might be argued that since the vācyārtha is cognised first by the sahṛdayas, it should be ranked superior to vyaṅgyārtha. This contention is refuted by Dhvanikāra when the several suggested senses flash forth before the steady and penetrating minds of men of taste, they will in no way be concerned with the explicit sense. When they are alive to the sparks of suggestion coming with sudden spontaniety they will be totally unaware of the explicit ideas.[58] AK says that it is true the vācyārtha is cognised first and follows the cognition of the vyaṅgyārtha. Still the sequence between the two is not noticed by the sahṛdayas in as much as their mind is keenly bent on the realisation of the vyaṅgya sense which succeeds. And this eagerness for the vyaṅgya sense is a mark, that establishes its superiority over the vācya sense. This relation between vācyārtha and vyaṅgyārth is clarified by analogy of the verbal knowledge arising out of a sentence (vākya) composed of word units (pada). The resultant knowledge of the whole sentence is dependant on and as such consequent upon the knowledge of the meanings of the individual words that precede it. Yet the sequence is distinctly noticed just like, "aṅkura-tarū-puṣpa-falavat." Thus the meaning of the individual words are not comprehended in isolation when the resultant knowledge of the complete sentence arises. Similarly

to the real connoisseurs the suggested sense following on the wake of the expressed sense, appears to be comprehended simultaneously with the latter, which also loses as it were its distinct individual character. Thus from the viewpoints of sahṛdayas the suggested sense is all important and the priority in the cognition of the expressed sense is no grant for attaching to it any superiority.[59]

Having thus established the separate existence of the suggested sense in foregoing considerations, the Dhvanikāra furnishes a definition of Dhvani-kāvya where the suggested sense alone is predominant.

"That kind of poetry wherein either the primary meaning or the word renders itself or its primary meaning became secondary (respectively) and suggests the implied meaning is designated by the learned as DHVANI or suggestion."[60]

From this above statement, we can draw a conclusion : Dhvani is a type of poetry wherein words and senses lose their primary significance in order to suggest other things. Having thus cleared the ground of the accumulated prejudices about poetry, AV embarks upon a searching study of words and their ways in poetry. Outside poetry, words are to possess two kinds of meaning. One is the well known traditional or conventional meaning, the other is a metaphorical meaning occasioned by speciality of the content. These meaning plays a part in poetry too. But they are not the only meanings in poetry. Even emotive significance cannot come under any of these two varieties of word import. There is a third kind of import over and above them and may be called as Dhvani. Suggestion as function of the words is exclusively found in poetry where the ideas are never directly expressed but only suggested. Though suggestion has thus an independent existence, it cannot function without the aid of the other two varieties of meaning. Thus, it is both dependent and independent. But suggestion in poetry is not the same as suggestion in common talk. Because in common talk there is no strikingness. It is only striking suggestion that plays an important role in poetry. and strikingness of suggestion consists in the fact that the suggested idea can never be expressed directly by the words effectively. It is only when the ordinary meaning is not sufficient by the poet to convey his meaning,

that he resorts to suggestion. Of course, he has used the same words, but he deals with them a wealth of suggested meaning.

As regards the viewpoints of Dhvanikāra, the AK says for the cognition of the suggested sense the word (Śabda) and meaning (artha) serve as the main factor. Both are the ghaṭaka (match-maker) of the suggested sense and are cojointly essential in every case of suggestion. Wherein either vācyārtha or vācakaśabda resorts itself their secondary meaning respectively and suggests the implied meaning is called as suggested—Dhvani. In this aspect he also clearly marks that when the words (śabda) principally give rise to the cognition of suggested sense it is called Avivakṣitavācya—a category of suggestion based upon lakṣaṇā (indication). And also when the expressed sense (artha) is suggestive it is known as vivakṣitānyaparavācya variety of suggestion. Thus the poetry where a word suggests a meaning by making its primary meaning subordinate to the former or the primary meaning subordinates itself to the meaning suggested by it, has been called as Dhvani kāvya.[61]

While commenting on the expression 'Kāvyaviśeṣa' AK also tries to offer some justification for the use of the idea dhvani in all the above senses on the basis of etymology. The word dhvani can be defined in different ways :—

(i) Dhvanti iti dhvani—That which suggests (Vyañjaka—śabdaḥ—both suggestive word and meaning).
(ii) Dhvanyate anena iti—The functions of suggested sense (dhvanana vyāpāram).
(iii) Dhvanyate iti—That which is suggested (dhvanyārtham, suggested content).

If we vividly examine the above derivative expressions we find that the term dhvani is applicable to śabda, artha and vyāpāra both individually and collectively. In kārikā however, the term dhvani has been employed in its collective sense as it primarily applies to kāvya here.[62]

AK also states that the definition serves to differentiate the field of dhvani from that of the figures of speech like anuprāsa, upamā etc. that merely adorn the words and senses and as such are subordinate to them, while in a dhvanikāvya it is the

suggested sense that is predominant. So it is not possible to include dhvani with in the perview of the alaṁkāra. But some times the suggested sense has given primary importance, not subordinate the expressed sense, in that case it would become Guṇibhutavyaṅgya. If there are stray examples of any of these alaṁkāras involving a more predominant suggested meaning they will be called dhvani, but dhvani itself would not be included in the scope of the alaṁkāra concerned. The relation between alaṁkāra and the Dhvani has been discussed later.

The commentator adds another sense of the term dhvani i.e. 'Vācyāvācaka saṁmisrah' on the strength of certain indication from the lines of vṛtti : tatheivānyeistanmatānusāribhih sūrībhih kāvyatattvārthadarśībhi vācyavācaka saṁmisrah śabdātmā kāvyamiti vyapadeśyo vyañjakatvasāmyād dhvaniritijuktaḥ.[63] To know the idea of vṛtti Grammarians call the sruyamāṇavarṇa as dhvani. The sruyamāṇavarṇas suggest the invisible eternal sphoṭa. But according to the alaṁkārikas the Dhvani is a separate one, where words mainly possess the suggestiveness (vyañjakatva vyāpāra). The audible sounds (srūyamāṇavarṇas) suggest sphoṭa and the suggestive kāvya suggests a different type of sense. For making the analogy have the kāvya consists of words. But in kārikā 1/13, it is observed that the artha also may be suggested. That is why AV clearly points out that in kāvya both the words and their meanings remain duly mingled up (vācyavācaka-saṁmiśrah). Hence, we conceive it in terms of some meaningful words. By this 'Saṁmiśra' we should understand the variety of suggested sense, i.e. rasa. Thus AK mentions that 'Śabdārtha Vyāpāra' (Both the function of śabda and artha) is called as the fourth sense of the term dhvani.[64] He also observes that the aggregation (samuccaya) of the three objects i.e. vācyavācakasammiśrah etc. are to be understood even without the use of the particle 'Ca' as in the verse 'gamasvam puruṣam'.[65] The expression 'vācyavācaka sammiśrah' itself means the three elements i.e. vācyārtha, vācaka śabda and sammiśrah etc. Thus AK acknowledges the fourth sense of the word dhvani for the interpretation of vyaṅgya-artha.

Thus the theory of dhvani proceeds with three fundamental postulates. In the first place, it assumes that dhvani exists apart from the primary sense. Secondly it presupposes that dhvani is

most intrinsic to poetry and thirdly it believes that dhvani cannot be explained in terms of either denotation or indication and hence a new function of words, viz. suggestion should be accepted. Of these postulates, certain critics are prepared to concede to the truth of the first two, but they raise objection regarding the acceptance of the third one as valid. Even this definition has been subjected to serve criticism by Mahimabhaṭṭa who pointed out as many as ten defects in his work Vyaktiviveka.[66] AK logically interpretes the viewpoints of Dhvanikāra and properly replies to the anti-dhvani theorists from the various standpoints as aesthetics, grammar, psychology, history of criticism and commonsense. For the establishment of the dhvani theory he always follows the argumentative style and handles this doctrine in a masterly manner. He admirably executes all the reble sources available in the history of literary criticism and gives a correct conclusion about the theory of suggestion. If we critically examine the fascinating interpretation of AK regarding the definition of dhvani i.e. yatrārtha iti.........etc.,[67] we find that the defects marked by Mahimabhaṭṭa have no authenticity and also they are not at all logically sound. Because Mahimabhaṭṭa's arguments are baseless, over-simplifying and based on metaphysical interpretations. His arguments are not helpful in progress of literary criticism. So, AK tries to make the position of the suggested sense clear and deliberately eschews all the technical and scholastic side issues. Frankly speaking, AK's first-hand interpretation about the definition of dhvani (suggested sense) is fully based on the real facts but not on mere speculation. He properly acknowledges the inner ideas of the Dhvanikāra and puts a fulstop at the endless arguments regarding the establishment of the dhvani theory in literary criticism.

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1. *Dhvanyāloka*, 1/2.
2. Prof. B.M. Chaturvedi's *Mahimabhaṭṭa* and also Viswanatha's *Sāhityadarpaṇa*, I.
3. Vācyārthamantarā vipratipannam prati dhvanervōdha yitōmaśakyatā vācyasya ca dhvanyārthāvalambatvena dhvanestatpīthaka-tvamanapanhavanīyatvam ca vyañjayannah-tatreti / Lakṣa-yituṁ lakṣaṇena vodhayitumityarthah, Bhumireva bhumika, tam apūrvamandirādau cikirṣite prathamam bhumiryathā vircyate, tathā pratiyamānārtha-dhvaneh khyāpanāya vācyārtha eva bhūmitayā prathamamupādeyah. Tāmavalambyeiva pratiyamānārtholiṅganāditi bhāvah. *Avadhāna*, p. 19
4. *Ibid.*, p. 17.
5. *Ibid.*
6. Pratiyamānam punaṛanyadeva——
lāvaṇyamivāṅganāsu // *Dhvanyāloka*, 1/4
7. *Avadhāna*, pp. 17-18.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 18.
9. Iha tu 'vāṇisumahākavinām' ityuktayā śavdasya vañjakatvam sādhayatītyāhuh'. *Avadhāna*, p. 19
10. Tathāhi vācyātirikto'rtha eva sahṛdayaślāghyah, sāratayā bhāsamānat vātaṅganāṅga-lāvaṇyavadīti. *Ibid.*
11. Sohyarth ityanena vācyavatpratīti visayārthikām kārikāgata vibhātiti kriyām vivṛṇoti... *Ibid.*
12. *Ibid.*, p. 19.
13. *Ibid.*
14. Yastu vācyāvasthāyamapi nālaṁkāratām gatah sa tāvad vidhī-niṣedharupeṇa niṣedhe-vidhirityādi rupeṇa vastudhvanirityākhyā-yate. *Ibid.*
15. Rasastu na svaśavdavācyah Nāpi lokavyavahārviṣaya, Kintu śavdārtha samarpyamāṇena——rasaniyarupah śāstriyomukhyatayā kāvyasyātmā... *Ibid.*, pp. 19-20.
16. Vācyasyh sāmarthyam dhvananavyāpārah tenākṣiptamiti *Ibid.*, p. 20

17. Vācya-to dhvanyārthasya bhedam didārśayisāḥ sūcīkatāhanyāyena prathamam vācyato vasturdhvanerbhedam darśayate——*Ibid.*
18. Bhrama dhārmika......dṛptasiṁghena *Dhvanyāloka*, 1st Uddyota, p. 52
19. *Ibid.*, p. 21.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 22.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 21,
22. *Ibid.*
23. *Ibid.*, p. 22.
24. *Ibid.*
25. *Ibid.*
26. *Ibid.*, pp. 22-23.
27. Śvaśruatra nimañjayati——sayyāyāmāvayōrmānkṣī. *Dhvanyāloka-Vṛtti*, 1/4
28. Svasyā rupalāvaṇyādinirikṣaṇena tṛusnātaralataram svasṛ pratisṛtāliṅda parisarāśrayam kañcana pānthatarṇam prati kasyāścana prōṣitabhatṛkāyā uktiriyam. *Avadhāna*, p. 23
29. *Ibid.*, p. 24.
30. Vraja mamaivaksyā——jāyantām. *Dhvanyāloka*—1st Uddyota
31. *Ibid.*
32. *Ibid.*, pp. 24-25.
33. Ayitāvatprasida...hatāśe. *Dhvanyāloka Vṛtti* 1/4
34. Svamabhilakṣeyivābhisaraṅtīm cirārthitām kāñchanakāñchanagaurī-maṅtaradhvani tamasi dṛdhabhāvanayā Paricīya Prachannakāmukasya chhaloktiriyam. *Avadhāna*, pp. 25-26
35. Kasya vā nabhavati rōṣō......sahasvedānim. *Dhvanyāloka Vṛtti* 1/4
36. *Avadhāna*, p. 26-27.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 27.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 28.
39. Vīrānām ramai......bāhalasiṅdure. *Dhvanyāloka*, p. 262 "The right of heroes does not delight in their beloved's breasts red with saffron anointment as in the temples of of enemies's elephants, pointed deep in vermillion."
40. M.M. Sharma's *Dhvani Theory in Sanskrit Poetics*, p. 60.

41. 'Rasādi' tyatradinābhāva—tadābhāsadaya lakṣyante...... vyañjanāyā pratibhatīti phalitam. *Avadhāna*, p. 28.
42. *Ibid.*
43. *Ibid.*
44. *Ibid.*, pp. 28-30.
45. Kāvyasyātmā sa evārthaśthathā cādikaveh purā
Krauṅcadvandaviyogāthah śōkaḥ ślokatvamāgatah //
Dhvanyāloka, I-5
46. *Avadhāna*, p. 31.
47. *Avadhāna*, pp. 31-32.
48. Mā niṣāda pratisthām tvamāgamaḥ śāṣvatīḥsamāḥ
Yatkrauṅcamithunādekamavadhīḥ kāmamohitam.
Rāmāyaṇa
49. See vṛtti of kārikā, 5 *Dhvanyāaloka.*
50. See AVADHĀNA, p. 32. Ist Para, and also Śōkasya aśāvdatvāt pratiya-mānatvam......etc.
Avadhāna, p. 32
51. *Ibid.*
52. *Dhvanyāloka*, 1/6.
53. *Avadhāna*, p. 34.
54. *Ibid.*, p. 36.
55. *Dhvanyāloka*, 1/8.
56. *Dhvanyāloka*, 1/9.
57. *Avadhāna*, p. 37.
58. *Dhvanyāloka*, 1/11 and 12.
59. *Avadhāna*, pp. 38-39.
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61. *Avadhāna*, p. 39.
62. *Ibid.*, p. 40.
63. *Dhvanyāloka*, Vṛtti, 1/13.
64. *Avadhāna*, pp. 55-57.
65. *Mahābhārata*, N.S.P., p. 463.
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67. *Avadhāna*, pp. 38-40.

CHAPTER 6

CORRELATION BETWEEN DHVANI AND ABHIDHĀ : DHVANI AND LAKṢAṆĀ

Eastern scholars' speculations in the field of semantics registered a high watermark. The grammarians, logicians and the mimānsists each made the quota of contributions which though sharply opposed to one another are remarkable for their wonderful consistency and logical congency. However, in this process two well known functions of language recognized by nearly all schools and noticed in the vedic language by such ancient exegetes as Jaimini and Sabara above the primary or literary meaning (abhidhā) and the transferred or metaphorical sense (lakṣaṇā or guṇavāda). But in their anxiety to differentiate poetic meaning from the conventional meaning of the scriptures and the śāstras (scientific text), Dhvani theorists claimed that there is a third potency of language, too called suggestion (Vyañjanā), which is the proper function of poetic language and the real appreciation of aesthetic delight. But they had to light a long philosophical duel with the traditionalists who maintained that the secondary function is quite sufficient to account for all meanings that the denotative capacity of words can not explain and hence that there is no need to postulate an additional activity. The Dhvani critics also had to meet the argument, of the rhetoricians (the school of Alaṁkāra) that suggestion is none other than figuration and so could be subsumed under it. In fact the theory of Dhvani is advanced as a rival to figurative poetic of the rhetoricians who had dominated the early phase of sanskrit criticism. The Dhvani theorists searched

for a principle of definition that is wider and more central than even figuration and that explained the efficiency in poetry of both figurative and non-figurative language. The basic postulate of the Dhvani theory is that suggestion is a supernumerary meaning. Utterances possess their literary meaning, but they also convey a further sense (dhvanir nāma arthāntaram). And the activity whereby the comprehension of an additional meaning is caused must be accepted as suggestion, because the denotative function of words can only yield the syntactical meaning and rests there having exhausted its function. Thus, what results after the primary operation has ceased can only be suggestion.[1] The second premise of this theory is that where the suggested meaning arises, it is necessarily always the predominant element and the literary neaning subordinates itself to it. This is the principle of subordination (Upasarjanībhāva or guṇībhāva). Such subordination is demanded by the very nature of suggestion as another meaning. For a principle of construction required by the exegetes and accepted by all schools of thought as being axiomatic is unification of meaning. A sentence has to convey a unified sense if it's very nature as a sentence is not to be upset. The Dhvani theorists meet this difficulty by making one of the meanings principal and the other subordinate. A further premise is that in as much as the extra meaning is arrived at through the agency of the expressed or the secondary meaning it is necessarily an indirect meaning; and indirection or concealed significance is the prime source of charm in poetry.

The question of an additional or unstated meaning raises some semantic problems. When can a sentence be said to convey a meaning that is not stated by its words? The most plausible answer to this is : only when there is an impasse in construction or a break down of its syntactical or logical sense. Logician says "a sentence does not seek another sense than the literal when it is satisfactory by reason of the fitness of the connection among the literal meanings of it's component words. But when the connection fails it is made up by a meaning tropically hinted at by any of the words'.[2] Thus, in the example 'Gaṅgāyāṁ Ghoṣa", there is a syntactical incongruity, it is not possible for a hamlet to stand on the stream of Gaṅgā river. So we invoke a secondary meaning "on the banks of the Gaṅgā—to

resolve the incongruity for sentence must at all costs make sense.

But suggestion does not occur at this level of metaphoric meaning (lakṣaṇā). The metaphoric function is a certain superimposed activity of the word located in the intermediate sense. Denotative meaning is directly conventional and is grasped immediately as the word is being pronounced But the secondary meaning is not so apprehended, only indicated owing to the intervention of the primary meaning and there seems to be no harm in accepting it as a suggestive function. But for the Dhvani theorists this is not the case. For suggestion they maintain certain ideas which are distinct from the secondary function. Mammata says : It cannot be denotation as there is no usage in respect of it; it is not the secondary function because of the absence of the necessary condition.[3] But how this distinction between the suggestive and secondary function is demonstrated? For this their argument is that there is a suggestion which arises out of the secondary sense and which is presupposed by it, namely motive element. And this element is not itself subject to any impediment and is not explained by the secondary function. For instance, when a man speakes of 'a hamlet on the Gaṅges' he is probably thinking of the coolness and sanctity associated with the river and that accounts for his saying 'a hamlet on the banks of the Ganges'. Because the associations of coolness and sanctity which he wants to emphasize are not carried by the land along the river but by the river itself. Here only to remove the incongruity we have to admit the secondary sense i.e. 'the banks of the Ganges'. And we cannot also conflute the two functions because the object of the apprehended secondary meaning is 'the banks of the Gange' and not 'sanctity', which is the effect element of that knowledge. Thus, by analysing this paradigm case we arrive at a conclusion that there are three stages of meanings, such as denotative, indicative and suggestive senses etc. Here the discussions have been made about the salient features of the above senses, their relationship and the functions etc. with the ideas of a modern commentator—AK.

Dhvani and Abhidhā

The power of Abhidhā (denotation) has come to exercise such

a holo in the functions of words and meanings that the Dhvanikāra cannot be dismissed with some causual remarks. He devotes much space for full consideration of the abhidhāvyāpāra in all its bearings and tries to prove that the province of abhidā and vyañjanā are distinct. He also endeavours to indicate precisely their mutual relationship in poetry. By pointing out the limitation of the denotative sense, he recognises a sense other than that of expressed sense, i.e. vyaṅgya; and the power of wards involved in the communication of said meaning—vyañjanā. It can be said that Dhvanikāra established vyañjānā function as distinct from the abhidhā (denotative function).

Though we have already discussed the nature and relation between the two functions in the preceding chapter yet we have categorically sketched their relationship and also their intrinsic value from the standpoint of their basic properties. While interpreting the apprehension of the Dhvanikāra, the AK observes that the suggested sense should never be confused or designated as the vācya sense as the vācya and the vyaṅgya senses are conveyed by two entirely different functions (vyāpāras) of the words. If the suggested sense is conveyed by a distinct fuction it will not cease to be different from the vācya even being put at the position of the usual vācya sense in case of being chiefly conveyed. He states that vācyārtha is the hetu of vyaṅgyārtha.[4] Regarding the functions of abhidhā he observes that the meaning which always conveys abhidhāśakti is known as vācyārtha, and that vācyārtha appears as the simple and conventional one. It is the first conveying sense of a word and serves as the gateway for the suggested sense. Thus the word always conveys its conventional meaning through the power of abhidhā (denotation)[5] and the suggested sense not directly proceeds to convey an additional meaning without vācyārtha.

The AK clarifies the ideas of grammarians like Bhaṭṭaprabhakara etc. who raised the question whether there is distinction between the vācyārtha vodhakabhidhāśakti and the gamyārthavodhaka abhidhā-śakti or both are same. Both are the same and enjoy the unity (akhanda) because that conventional meaning is also known as gamyārtha says the commentator. In 'Gaṅgāyām ghoṣah' the meaning like 'bhagīratharathakhātāvacchinnapravāharūpa' is called as gamyārtha because it conveys

through the word 'Gaṅgā'. But it is not like the meaning śītatvapāvanatva......etc.' After a through process with the help of abhidheyārtha we get the ākṣiptārtha (suggested sense). Here the commentator executes that vyañjanā is distinct from abhidhā because they have different scopes (viṣayabheda). Abhidhā conveyes the vācya sense which is directly related to the word and vyañjanā conveys the meaning which is related to the vācyārtha. The AK strongly points out the difference between vyañjanāvyāpāra and the vācakatva gamakatva vyāpāra (abhidhāvyāpāra).[6] He also observes that vyañjanā is different from abhidhā due to the differences of form (rūpabheda). Words alone convey the conventional meanings with the help of abhidhā śakti. But even the meaningless musical sounds may convey sense in the form of rasa, etc. with the help of vyañjanā. Here he interpretes the relation between vācakatva and avācakatva and strongly denies the views of Vyaktivivekakāra. He says that the vyaṅgya sense conveys through vyañjanā vyāpāra, and the vācyārtha conveys through the abhidhāvyāpāra.[7]

The commentator again states that the vyaṅgyārtha cannot be relegated to the position of the vācyārtha because the relation between the vācya and the vyaṅgya is not like the relation between the meaning of the parts of speech (padārtha) and the meaning of the sentence (vākyārtha) and the very analogy is not an opt one. The grammarians use the sentences as indivisible and do not conceive of words as part of the sentence. Even those who cognise the words as distinct parts of the sentence must note the fact that the meaning of the words yield completely to the total meaning of the sentence. When the meaning of the sentence is cognised, the meanings of the words cease to be cognised distinctly. But the vācya sense does not cease to be cognised even when the suggested sense is cognised. The vācya sense suggests the vyaṅgya and it is the very nature of the suggestive factor to appear along with the suggested content. The relation between the vācya and the vyaṅgya is like that between the lamp and jar.[8]

AK also marks that vyañjanā is different from abhidhā because of differences of cause (kāraṇabheda). The vācakatva śakti only depends upon vācakśabda but the vyañjakatva depends upon both śadba and artha. Thus abhidhā resides only

in śabda whereas vyañjanā resides both in śabda and artha.[9] He observes that the vyañjanā is different from abhidhā on the basis of svarūpa (nature), viṣaya (subject) and kāraṇa (cause) etc.[10] On several times he points out the the primary sense (vācyārtha) which is conveyed through abhidhāvyāpāra; it is also saṁketita prasidhārtha while the vyaṅgyārtha is conveyed through the vyañjanāvyāpāra; and it is known as akṣiptārth. The vācyārtha is the hetu (cause) or ghaṭakatattva of vyaṅgyārtha. The abhidhā is known as vācyāvagamaśakti, while the vyañjanā is known as vyaṅgyāgamaśakti. So, the vācyārtha conveys before the expression of vyaṅgyārtha but the vyaṅgyārtha conveys after the expression of vācyārtha. The vācyārtha is very conscious and particular about its nature, number etc; but the other one—suggested sense is not at all particular about its nature and number. As a sentence conveys one denotative sense but that particular sentence conveys a number of vyaṅgyārtha (suggestive senses). To conclude the suggested sense 'Dhvani' is basically different from the primary sense—Abhidhā.

Dhvani and Lakṣaṇā

Like abhidhā (denotation), Dhvani is also different from Lakśaṇā. To differentiate the vyañjanā from lakṣaṇā the Dhvanikāra describes the synonymous terms of lakṣaṇā as bhakti, guṇavṛtti, and amukhyavṛtti etc. which are mentioned by the different schools of philosophers only to show the secondary significance of words. He refutes at great length and says that dhvani is not identical with lakṣaṇā or bhakti, or guṇavṛtti.

Interpreting the opponent views of dhvani in first uddyota, AK points out the function of guṇavṛtti. It is a process where a word conveys secondary meaning in lieu of primary sense on the strength of sāmipyādisambandha. That word is known as lākṣaṇikaśabdā and due to Tatpuruṣa samāsa the guṇavṛtti is known as lakṣāṇāvyāpāra.[11] Bhakti is also like lakṣaṇā due to sārūpyādi saṁbandha. In this context he interpretes the nature of lakśaṇā and its five divisions through the instances.[12] He observes that bhakti is a name given to the secondary significance of words. It is implied to when the primary significance is not applicable in conveying an additional meaning on the strength of the sārūpyādi sambandha or in practice a particular

word is seen very often to be used in a sense other than the primary meaning up to a particular stage and one understands this secondary meaning in place of primary sense. It will be also found that the 'Upacāra', established usage in a secondary sense lies at the root of bhakti.

To differentiate Dhvani from bhakti, the Dhvanikāra states certain basic principle of both the concept. According to him, Dhvani means suggestion where new meanings are conveyed by both words and surface meanings. If one tries to co-relate dhvani with bhakti it would be fallacious. Since the provinces of the two concepts are different, such a co-relation would involve both the fallacies of 'ativyāpti' (too wide) and 'avyāpti' (too narrow). The Dhvanikāra also elaborates this relation through the instances of bhakti where there is no dhvani because there is no such special charm and everything employed in a secondary sense on the strength of established usage.[13]

As regards the differences between dhvani and bhakti, the AK carefully observes that dhvani, suggestion, is an outcome of Vyañjanāvyāpāra and the bhakti is an outcome of Lākṣaṇikaśabdārthavyāpāra.[14] Thus dhvani is never identical with bhakti and both are different in forms also. Dhvani deals with the five types of suggested senses along with rasa etc. but bhakti is not as such.[15]

The AK states that the opponents who endeavour to deny 'Dhvani' as independent one, might lack three different positions viz. (i) they might hold that bhakti and dhvani are completely identical in all their aspects; (ii) some of them might again hold that bhakti is the essential mark just as pṛthivītva is the essential and uncommon attribute of earthly objects; (iii) or it might be argued that bhakti is merely an adventitious, an accidental attribute of dhvani. The commentator executes the refutation of the Dhvanikāra about these possible contentions one by one. He clearly says that the difference between bhakti and dhvani is just like the difference between tree (taru) and fruits (phala).[16]

The AK observes the argument that bhakti is essential attribute of dhvani is baseless because it is vitiated by the two fallacies ativyāpti and avyāpti. An attribution can be regarded as a definition if it inheres in all the individual members belong-

ing to that class to be defined. Bhakti is a too wide definition, because where there is no trace of dhvani there is bhakti. The commentator clarifies that bhakti does not attribute as a definition of dhvani. If bhakti appears as the definition of dhvani, it loses it's vyabhicāratā. Here he also marks that without the prayojana, bhakti is used as the mere super imposition.[17] In this context, the AK clearly interpretes the ideas of Dhvanikāra and says that even in certain cases where the prayojana is insignificant and devoid of any charm, the poets do imply indicative or figurative (lākṣaṇika) words merely in difference to past tradition without pausing to think as to whether such a figurative use would serve in any way to enhance the beauty of the meaning.[18] Thus, it is clear in such cases that the absence of dhvani does not agree with the absence of bhakti. The bhakti is never attributed as the definition of dhvani.

For this, the commentator quotes a verse cited by the Dhvanikāra such as "parimlānam pinastana.........etc."[19] Here the term (vadati) has been used in a figurative sense since the root 'vad' in it's primary sense cannot be construed with such an inner thing as 'viśīnīpatraśayanam' as it's agent. Nor can it be argued that the poet used this lākṣaṇikaśabda (indicative words) with a view to convey some prayojana (purposes). For the prayojana, if it has any ideas that would be 'sphoṭikaraṇapratiti' and it might as well be conveyed through denotation. Thus there is only bhakti[20] and no dhvani.

The commentator again interpretes the verse 'cumbyate śatakṛtyu.........etc.' only to show the ativyāpti of bhakti. Here the term 'punarukta' is lākṣaṇika; even though there is no evidence of prayojana resorting to lakṣaṇā. The commentator marks here the vyavahāra prasiddha rudhīmulatvam bhakti.[21]

The AK points out that in rudhīmulālakṣaṇā there is no trace of dhvani at all as the prayojana which is to be suggested is desired in this variety of lakṣaṇā. For example words like 'lāvaṇya', 'kōśala' etc. are used figuratively to convey senses that are strictly different from their derivative meanings, yet it would not be proper to designate them as dhvani merely because lakṣaṇā is there. In the word 'lāvaṇya' the original meaning of is entirely abandoned as the result of long and

established usage. Etymologically it means 'saltiness' instead of 'lovely grace'. So the use of word 'lāvaṇya' too cannot be classed as dhvani.[22] The commentator points out that where there is bhakti, there is no dhvani at all.

Besides the above types of ativyāptatā of bhakti, the commentator also marks another type of ativyāptatā by skhalantivādhaka vyāpāra. Here the secondary function of words is resorted to mostly a definite purpose in view. In this context, the primary meaning is incompatible. The AK observes that if the primary sense is not incompatible or it is not 'skhaladgati' then the use of lakṣaṇā itself would be a defect.

In order to avoid the flaw of 'skhaladgatitva' we understand a word in its secondary sense. Here the 'Prayojana' has a great significance. If the secondary sense is going to 'skhaldgati', why resort to lakṣaṇā at all even at the first instance? It is a fault. It is therefore impossible that the 'Prayojana' for the sake of which one resort to lakṣaṇā can also be explained in terms of lakṣṇā. It can be explained in terms of Dhvani.[23]

The commentator observes that guṇavṛtti and bhakti always basically depend upon abhidhā or denotative sense. But it is not so with dhvani. Dhvani has vyañjakatva for it's basis not vācakatva, and there is no such essential relation between the meaning suggested and the meaning denotated. For this reason dhvani is different from bhakti.[24]

Having thus refuted the arguments of the opponents—to define dhvani by means of lakṣaṇā on the grand fallacy 'ativyāpti' the commentator interpretes that it is also vitiated on account of the fallacy of avyāpti as well. For example in cases of asmlakṣyakramavyaṅgya dhvani—a variety of vivakṣitānyaparavācya, there is no trace of lakṣaṇā at all since the primary sense (mukhyārtha) is not found to be incompatible with those cases.[25]

In view of all these considerations dhvani should be looked upon as different from bhakti; and bhakti can hence never serve as a definition of dhvani as said by some critics.

There is nothing to prevent bhakti which is co-existing with suggestion in some instances and serving as a upalakṣaṇā says AK.[26] The upalakṣaṇā is on occasional mark just as the kāka is (crow) an upalakṣaṇā of Devadatta's house. Bhakti is an

occasional mark of dhvani as it is attested by the existence of bhakti in the varieties of avivakṣitavācya dhvani. The commentator says that it does not mean only knowing the nature of bhakti, but the nature of dhvani is also known. One might say that by knowing the nature of abhidhā the nature of all alaṁkāras is as good as known, which would imply that all the treatises on alaṁkāra are a superfluous.[27] Thus the above argument is absurd.

While interpreting the third uddyota the AK discusses this question again for a more thorough analysis. He says that like abhidhā, the bhakti or guṇavṛtti are also different from vyañjakatva. He points out that guṇavṛtti is of two types—(1) upacāra and (ii) lakṣaṇā;[28] both depend on śavda and artha. But from this one should not jump to the conclusion that vyañjakatva and guṇavṛtti are identical. Thus we get the difference like svarūpabheda, viṣayabheda etc. between the indication (guṇavṛtti) and the suggestion (dhvani).

The guṇavṛtti is only a secondary function of words (amukhyavyāpāra). It is also known as 'abhidhā pucchabhutah'. To avoid the incompatibility between the word and its primary sense we turn to guṇavṛtti for assistance. But vyañjakatva is a process, not at all secondary, but primary sense is väckatva which is mukhyārtha vyāpāra. Thus, indication may be considered as nothing but secondary denotation. Here the difference is of degree. The commentator also puts forth certain instances. In 'Gaṅgāyām ghoṣah' the primary meaning 'current' is abandoned in favour of secondary meaning 'bank'. But in an instance of suggestion, the primary sense should be continued alongwith the suggested sense like lamp and jar. The AK interpretes that if the suggested sense is supposed to be conveyed by lakṣaṇā, the lakṣaṇā appears to be the principal function of the sentence because the seṅtences often convey certain meanings other than the primary sense, as the contents are desired to be conveyed by the sentence. AK clarifies this through the example 'Kuntāh praviśanti', where the meaning relating to 'kuntāh—'Puruṣāh' is indicated. Lakṣaṇā is not mukhyayāpāra here because it indicates the hetu. Thus, the commentator observes that when the meaning is cognised as mukhya, it is vācakatvam, otherwise it is guṇavṛtti. Thus the 'amukhya

vyāpāra' of word is called as guṇavṛtti while the 'mukhyavyāpāra of word is known as 'vācakatvam'.[29]

But the suggested sense is different from both mukhyavyāpāra and amukhyavyāpāra. It can only be possible through both the functions with the excellence of charmness which is suggested. It is totally different from Guṇavṛttī viṣaya. The suggested sense which has not come into existence only the application is identification of secondary words (Gauṇa śabda).

The commentator also points out another difference between the suggestion and the secondary meaning in respect of their scope (viṣayabheda). Lakṣaṇā conveys a meaning in the from of a vastu whereas vyañjanā may convey vastu, alaṁkāra and rasādi. He clearly mentions that nobody can claim to have the suggested sense 'rasādī' with lakṣaṇā.[30]

The AK interpretes the lines of the Dhvanikāra and points out that vayañjanā sometimes depends on abhidhā and lakṣaṇā also. Depending separately on both of them vyañjanā is not identical with either abhidhā or lakṣaṇā. Moreover the vyañjanā is such an element which is quite free from both of them. Because the meaningless musical sounds suggest rasas with the vyañjnā function. Before going to conclude the distinction between vyañjanā and lakṣaṅā, he marks that though in avivakṣita dhvani there is however some association of lakṣaṇā, yet in this process we may have certain secondary meaning but not the suggested sense.

It must, therefore, be taken as proved that all words have three functions in the communication of sense : (i) vācakatva (denotation), (ii) guṇavṛtti or lakṣaṇā (indication) and (iii) vyañjakatva (suggestion). And in vyañjakatva, the suggested sense predominates over the others and we get 'Dhvani'.

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3. Mammaṭa, *Kāvyaprakāśa*, II, 15.
4. *Avadhāna*, p. 242.
5. *Ibid.*, pp. 242-43.
6. *Ibid.*
7. *Ibid.*, 244-55.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 246.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 247.
10. Sutarāṁ svarūpabhedāt, viṣayabhedāt, kāraṇabhedśca, vācakatvapayato vyanjakatvam bhinnamiti siddham. *Ibid.*, p. 248.
11. *Ibid*, p. 13.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 5.
13. *Dhvanyāloka Kārikā* 1/17, 18, 19 and 20 and their Vṛtti also.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 59.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 60.
16. *Ibid.*
17. *Ibid.*, p. 61.
18. *Ibid.*
19. Parimlānam pīnastanajaghana...... *Ratnāvalī*, 11/12
20. *Avadhāna*, p. 62.
21. *Ibid.*
22. *Ibid.*, p. 64-65.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 66.
24. *Ibid.*, pp. 66-67.
25. *Ibid.*, pp. 67-68.
26. Bhaktirupalakaṇām cet......*Ibid.*, p. 69.
27. Abhidhāyā sarvālamkaraṇaṁivopalkṣaṇeṇa samasta dhvanīnām sāmānyajnānepi laṣkaṇamantarā na svarūpa nirṇaya ityaśāyah. *Ibid.*

28. *Ibid.*, p. 248.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 250.
30. *Ibid.*, pp. 250-253.

CHAPTER 7

DHVANI AND ITS KINDS

To know the wideness of the concept of Dhvani, it is necessary to discuss about it's varieties and sub-varieties which not only reflect the objective essentials but the subjective aspects also. Like any other scientific concept, Dhvani (suggestivity) has a number of varieties that reflect those phenomena in which the creative nature of suggestion is realised and the subject of poetic art is revealed in the aesthetic aspect. So, it is important to discern the varieties which give the fullest expression to its qualities and characteristics. The Dhvanikāra duly endeavours to classify Dhvani into so many kinds and finally states that it is not possible for any one to mention separately all the kinds and hence he simply indicates the direction for the divisions.[1] Thanks the later theorists like Mammaṭa, and Viswanatha, who also discussed the innumerable varieties of Dhvani.[2] Here an attempt has been made to explain only the major varieties with the special notes of the AK.

Since Dhvani can never function without the assistance of either abhidhā (denotation) or lakṣaṇā (indication), the division of Dhvani can also never keep aside the functions. The most fundamental division of Dhvani is based on these functions. Dhvani is firstly divided into two kinds—(i) Avivakṣitavācya-dhvani and (ii) the Vivaksītanyaparavācya dhvani[3]. In the former, the primary sense is not desired to be expressed at all,

on the contrary it is totally discarded and the secondary sense comes to our mind and consequently a suggested sense emerges. In other way it can be said that dhvani is based upon lakṣaṇā (indication) and that vācyartha (denotative sense) has no significance. While in the latter the primary sense is desirable, remains as it is, and suggests any one of the three types of suggested sense i.e. vastu, alaṁkāra and rasādi by virtue of being different from the ordinary statement of fact. There is no role played by lakṣaṇā (indication), dhvani proceeds directly on the basis of vācyārtha (denotative sense). The AK clearly marks that it is the most significant one on the basis of which all other subdivisions come into existence. According to him when vācyārtha (denotative sense) is not at all to be conveyed, and the suggested sense proceeds directly on the basis of guṇavṛtti (lakṣaṇā) with the substantial use of Bahuvrīhi samāṣa (i.e. yena, yatra, yato, yasya etc.), it is called as the avivakṣitavācyadhvani.[4] When there is no trace of lakṣaṇā (indication), the suggested sense proceeds directly on the basis of vācyārtha, it is called vivakṣitānyaparavācya dhvani.[5] Let us now discuss these two varieties with examples.

As for avivakṣitavācya dhvani, the Dhvanikāra quotes "Sūvarṇa puṣpām pṛthivī.........etc.[6] The term 'Sūvarṇa puṣpa' is used with a great suggestive force. The verse means that only three types of men can pluck the golden flower of this earth viz. the brave, the learned, and the samaritan. The primary sense of the term 'Sūvarṇa puṣpa' in connection with the word 'Pṛthivī' is not totally conveyed; here we have to resort to lakṣaṇā as the Earth is not a tree or creeper, nor has it any golden flower in the true sense of term. So, that the primary sense of expression 'Sūvarṇa puspam' cannot be construed with 'Pṛthivī' and as such has to be discarded altogether in favour of secondary sense. With the verb 'cinvanti' which primarily means 'to pluck' and the object for which such indicative words have been employed by the poet is to convey the idea that these three types of men alone can achieve success in this world and amass wealth. Further the Locanakāra has discussed[7] a lot but that is not sufficient for the readers. On the other hand Mahimbhaṭṭa also establishes the inference (anumāna) through this verse.[8] For this the AK points out clearly the suggestivity of

this verse and says 'Sūvarṇāni puṣpyātītitādṛśi.........'etc. He also clearly mentions that blooming of the golden flowers on the part of Earth is a rediculous and this impossibility conveys the discordant of the primary sense. Then by lakṣaṇā, we get the meaning of 'Sūvarṇa puṣpa' as sulabhasamṛdhisambhṛt" and through a process we get the intrinsic meaning of the term 'Sūryakṛtavidya sevakānām' as 'Bhāgyavatvam'. So the commentator observes that the suggested sense appears here like sukhmaśicaya sambhṛtakulataruṇī kucakudmalavat vahirgopyamāṇa. "As a whole it can be said that the impossibility of blooming gold is mukhyārtha vādhah, the expression of 'Sulabha samṛdhi.........etc." is lakṣaṇā nimitta puṣpasādṛṣya sambandhah and the "bhāgyatiśayita etc." is it's prayojanah. The existence of meaning like 'bhāgyatiśayaśalitvarupa" of the word 'puṣpa' is the suggested sense. The commentator points out the application of the four functions of words and meanings, such as abhidhā, tātparyā, lakṣaṇā and vyañjanā etc.[9]

As for vivakṣitānyaparavācya dhvani, the Dhvanikāra cites the example 'Śikhariṇī kva nu nāma.........etc.[10] Here an illicit lover covetly expresses his own heartfelt desire to his young beloved by referring to the parrot's pecking at the bimbafruit as crimson as her lips. The primary sense is not discarded like the above illustration and as such there is no lakṣaṇā. While commenting on this verse, the AK marks the three types of functions of the words i.e. abhidhā, tātparya, and vyañjanā etc. The expression of the young lover suggests the idea that he is flattering the beloved only to seduce her. So here the suggested idea is only a matter of fact; and it does not depend upon the functions of guṇavṛtti or lakṣaṇā at all. Through this example, it is clearly known that in vivakṣitānyaparavācyadhvani the primary sense is not to be discarded.[11]

Again, the avivakṣitavācyadhvani is of two types, viz. (i) the arthāntarasaṁkramitavācya and (ii) the atyantatirskṛtavācya.[12] This division is mainly based on vācyārtha (expressed sense). In avivakṣitavācya dhvani, the primary sense may either require partial modification with the new sense or gets itself completely destroyed. However, in both cases the words are used to convey a secondary meaning only with the purpose of suggesting further ideas. When such suggested ideas become the sources of a

greater appeal we have the Dhvani. Thus both the partial and the total incompatibility of primary meaning is being used only as a means towards the comprehension of the suggested sense.

For this the AK points out that in avivakṣitavācyadhvani the vācyārtha (expressed sense) has left its propriety through a process and exists as a thread in the garland. He also clearly states when the primary sense is partially discarded and the suggested sense proceeds through the secondary meaning it is known as arthāntarasaṁkramita vācya. When the primary sense is fully discarded and suggests a new sense through the secondary meaning it is known as atyantatiraskṛtavācya. Thus the nature of this division is based on the incompatibility of primary sense and the suggested sense proceeds through indication.[13]

The question arises that the author has shown the twofold division of the expressed sense (vācyārtha) only. So how can it be construed as referring to the division of the suggested sense (dhvani)? For this, the author himself replies in vṛtti that as the nature of suggested sense differs accordingly as the suggestive elements like vācya, vācaka etc., there can be no incongruity in constructing the kārikā as referring to the main division of the suggested sense[14]. The AK points out as the division of dependant is based on the division of supporting element, the division of suggested sense is also based on the divisions of primary sense (vācyārtha)[15].

The verse 'Snigdha śyāmala:........[16] is an example of the first variety, where the word 'rāma' with its primary meaning as 'Rama', the son of Daśartha, is superfluous. In fact such an apparently redundant word is used only to convey a meaning different from what it means. Here through implication the word 'rāma' means a 'Rāma' (propername) who is mature (Pariṇata) with a good number of virtues, that are conveyed to us through suggestion (i.e. the experience of being existed). So the primary meaning is not fully discarded, but it is remoulded The commentator points out that the speaker of the verse is Rāma himself, who is 'Virahavidhura'. If the proper name 'Rāma' in the expression 'rāmōsmi sarvamsahe, referred to the person bearing that name only and nothing else, then the use of such a word would have been regarded as superfluous. Here the word 'Rāma' does not merely convey the primary sense viz. Daśara-

tha's son, who is saṁjnā referred by the proper name Rāma, but characterised by such attributes as 'anirvacanīyakleśasahisṇutva' and 'Pariṇatatva' etc. However, these attributes are comprehended through suggestion. In this respect 'the AK also clearly cites that in arthāntarasaṁkramita-vācyadhvani the primary sense is not totally discarded just like in 'Gaṅgāyām ghoṣah'. It appears as a nonuse entity and thus the suggested sense proceeds through secondary meaning and the Dhvani is lakṣaṇāmūlatva[17].

The Dhvanikāra himself cited a verse "tadā jāyante guṇah ...etc.[18]". where the second word 'kamala' is used with a great suggestive force. Commenting this verse the AK states that the second 'kamala' signifies not merely a 'lotus' but a lotus possessing the attributes like saurabha (fragrance) and saukumārya (tenderness) etc[19].

The verse 'Ravisṁkrānta....[20]' is given as an example of the latter type, where the primary meaning of the word 'aṅdha' (blind) is to be totally suppressed (atyantatiraskṛta) as it is not at all applicable to a mirror as an adjective. The word 'aṅdha' means the mirror itself through implication based on its incapacity to reflect things in the manner of a blind eye. The purpose of 'implying' the mirror by the word 'aṅdha' is to suggest a lot of ideas like that of failure of the mirror to reflect things. Or it can be explained as the primary sense of 'aṅdha' will have to be relinquished since the mirror cannot become literally blind. It secondarily means 'renders dim and cloudy' which again suggested the ideas of absence of beauty and the like. Thus the primary sense is to be abandoned altogether in favour of a more suitable sense which does not comprise within its scope the primary sense of 'aṅdha'.[21]

The AK points out that the term 'atyaṅta' is an adjective of the 'tīraskṛtakriyā'. According to him Vālmikī shows the significance of Dhvani through the above mentioned verse where Ramchandra expresses the beauty of forest, Pañchavatī, in autumn season. By the extreme discordant of primary sense of words 'aṅdha', we get the suggested ideas such as 'the absence of beauty' through the secondary meaning such as 'tusāracṛtamaṇdalatvena'.... etc. Thus AK interpretes this verse in a logical manner and marks the importance of word 'aṅdha'[22].

Having thus illustrated in the foregoing pages about avivakṣitavācya dhvani, the Dhvanikāra states the vivakṣitānyaparvācya dhvani has also two types' : (i) the asaṁlakṣya kramavyaṅgya, and (ii) the saṁlakṣyakramavyaṅgya dhvani.[23] In both the cases the expressed sense has its importance per se. But the ultimate object of our cognition is the suggested sense. Both the types are considered from the standpoint of the sequence (krama) which intervenes the cognition of the vācya and vyaṅgya sense. If the sequence is slight, it is called asaṁlakṣyakramavyaṅgya variety, which comprises rasa, bhāva, rasābhāsa bhāvābhāsa, bhāvodaya, bhāvaśānti, bhāva śabalatā etc.[24]. If the intervening sequence be perceptible, it is known saṁlakṣyakrama which might take either the from of vastudhvani or alaṁkāra dhvani. In the saṁlakṣyakamarvyaṅgya there is no existence of feelings.

The AK cleary points out the relation between both avivakṣita vācya and the vivakṣitānyaparavācya. He says that only to show the difference between them, the Dhvanikāra states the kārikā 'asaṁlakṣya... etc. According to the commentator 'asaṁlakṣyeti' means "na samyak lakṣayatum śakyah kramo tathābhuta". Here the suffix 'ṇyat' is used in 'asaṁlakṣya' by the apphorism "Śakliṅg ca"[25]. In fact the variety of asaṁlakṣyakramavyaṅgya enjoys the true sense of suggested sense. Thus the division of vivakṣitānyaparavācya dhvani is acceptable to a greater extent. The commentator clarifies that the avivakṣitavācya dhvani deals with vācyabheda and the vivakṣitānyaparavācya dhvani with the vyanjanā vyāpārabheda[26]. He also states that the asaṁlakṣyakrama vyaṅgya is conveyed through the rasa, bhāva etc. and the saṁlakṣya krama is mainly expressed through the facts and the alaṁkāras etc.[27]

Regarding the as-aṁlakṣyakrama, the commentator says that it deals with rasādi etc. titled as 'akrama'. It is also different from vācyārtha, but suggests through vācyārtha and 'rasādidhvani' is known as Mukhyadhvani (supreme suggested sense). Although the suggested sense of aesthetic experience (rasādi dhvani) is already discussed in the definition chapter, yet to show the distinctive relation between alaṁkāra and rasa, the Dhvanikāra draws this division[28]. Thus the term 'asaṁlakṣya' has a great significance and serves as the true sense of suggested


sense. The asaṁlakṣyakrama will be discussed in detail along with the rasadhvani and rasavadālaṁkāra.

Knowing the nature of asaṁlakṣya kramavyaṅgya and it's varieties, it is necessary to know the saṁlakṣyakramavyaṅgya, the second variety of the vivakṣitānyaparavācya dhvani. Dhvanikāra says that it is known as 'anusvanasannibhadhvani'. This title is so significant as the sequence between the apprehension of the expressed and the suggested sense is distinctly noticiable, just as the sequence between the first sound and the vibration there of is noticable when a bell rung. The saṁlakṣyakramavyaṅgya is of two type viz. (i) the śavdaśaktīmula (forml suggestiveness) etc,[29] The AK discusses logically and uses a maxim "abhighaṭja prathamaśabdāntaram vīcitaraṅg nyāya" only to show the sequence of the meaning, He points out the significance of word 'api', which determines the two fold varieties of saṁlakṣyakramadhvani[30]. When Dhavni is based on the capacity of words, it is known as the śabdaśkti mūlādhvani[31]. Here the śabdaśakti means the peculiar capacity of the words to convey more than one conventional meanings at a time. Dhvani is based on the significance of meaning without any functions of word, it is known as arthaśaktīmulā or arthaśaktyūdbhava dhvani. The commentator also states that the arthaśaktyōdbhav dhvani is expressed by the two processes—viz. (i) arthato vyaṅgyartha prakāśa, and (ii) tadṛsavyaṅgyāt vyaṅgyāntara prakāśa[32].

Dhvani has two varieties, viz. (i) asaṁlakṣakṛamavyaṅgya dhvani and (ii) saṁlakṣyakramavyaṅgya dhvani. The asaṁlakṣyakramavyaṅgya deals with rasādi etc. and has different varieties. The saṁlakṣyakramavyaṅgya is two types viz. (l) Śabdaśaktyudbhava and (ii) arthaśaktyudbhava.[33] Besides, the Dhvanikāra informs us that there is another type of dhvani, where both śabda and artha together suggest the additional meaning. It is known as śabdārthaśaktyudbhava dhvani.[34] The Dhvanikāra mentions this third one after the discussion of the above two varieties of śaṁlakṣyakramavyaṅgyadhvani. The commentator briefly interpretes the idea of Dhvanikārā through an instance and says that it is an inferrior type.[35]

The Dhvanikāra again states that in arthaśaktyudbhaba dhvani, a meaning suggests a further meaning. The meaning

KINDS OF DHVANI



1. Vastu from Vastu
2. Alaṁkāra from Vastu
3. Vastu from Alaṁkāra
4. Alaṁkāra from Alaṁkāra

which is thus responsible for giving rise to the suggested content is said to be of two types : (i) Praudhoktimātranispannaśarīra, and (ii) Svataḥsambhavi. The first one is the mature poetical expression' and the second one is 'common to the ordinary speech'. Besides, the vṛtti line of Dhvanikāra also refers another type of dhvani that is 'kavi-nibadhavaktṛpraudhokti mātra nispannaśarīra.[36] The AK says that after a great discussion, the Dhvanikāra informs us the division of arthaśaktyudbhabadhvani. He points out that the vṛttikāra asserts the third variety by the significance of the word used in kārikā.[37] He also briefly discusses the above mentioned varieties with various examples. Here, it can be said that the first two varieties are based on ideas or vastu, and the third one is based on alaṁkāra. Thus by the standpoint of the vastu, and the ālaṁkāra, the arthaśaktyūdbhava dhvani is of four types : (i) Vastu, (ii) Alaṁkara from vastu; (iii) Vastu from Alaṁkāra, and (iv) Alaṁkāra from Alaṁkāra etc.

Lastly the AK gives a review of the above noted varieties of Dhvani in a nutshell. The first variety avivakṣitavācya dhvani is two types, and the second one vivakṣitānyaparavācya dhvani contains sixteen types. Thus the above division is made from the standpoint of vyaṅgya and vyañjaka etc. The AK not only classifies the varieties of dhvani distinctly, but also discusses the interaction of all the categories. He sums up the various divisions of dhvani as shown by the Dhvanikāra in a systematic manner. All the categories of suggested sense are dialectically interconnected and penetrate one another can be concluded here. Each category has a certain stability of content, and although each reflects reality approximately, yet it cannot embrace all of its wealth, while each reflects the most essential features of suggested phenomenon. Therefore, all the kinds of Dhvani serve a great deal for the enhancement of suggested sense.

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2. Mammaṭa's *Kāvyaprakāśa* and Vishwanātha's *Sāhityadarpaṇa*.
3. Asti dhvaniḥ 'sa casvavivakṣitavācyo vivakṣitānyapara vācyaśceti dvibidhāh sāmānyena.
   Dhvanyāloka, Vṛtti, 1/16
4. Bhaktavadmudāharaṇamukhena vibhedayitum prathamam dhvanirbheda dvayamacaste sa ceti / Prasidhau' sau dhvaniḥ. Avivakṣitavācyo gauṇikṛto vācyārtho yena yatra vā yasya vā iti vividhavigraheṇa Vyanjaka—kāvya—vyañjana—vyaṅgyārthaparatvam vodhyam.
   Avadhāna, pp. 57-58
5. *Ibid.*, pp. 58-59.
6. Suvarṇapuṣpam pṛthivīm cinvanti puruṣāstrayaḥ / Sūraśca kṛtavidyaśca yaśca Jānāti sevitum //
   Dhvanyāloka, Vṛtti, 1/16
7. *Locana* of Abhinavagupta and *Dhvanyāloka* of B. Bhattacharya, pp. 203-205.
8. Prof. B.M. Chaturvedi's *Mahimabhaṭṭa.*
9. *Avaahāna*, p. 58.
10. Śikhariṇī kva nu nāma...viṁbaphalam—śukaśāvakaḥ.
    Dhvanyāloka, Vṛtti 1/16
11. *Avadhāna*, pp. 58-59.
12. Arthāntare samkramitamatyantam vā tiraskṛtam / Avivakṣitavācyasya dhvanervācyam dvidhāmatam //
    Dhvanyāloka, 2/1
13. *Avadhāna*, pp. 71-72.
14. Tathāvidhabhyām ca tābhyām vyaṅgyasyeiva viśeṣa iti vyaṅgya prakāśanaparasya dhvanerevāyam prakāraḥ /
    Dhvanyāloka, Vṛtti 2/1
15. Nanu vācyādveividhye dhvaneḥ katham dveibidhyāmitiyatraha—tathā vidhabhyāmiti / Ceti hetau.
    Tathā ca vācyasyārthantarasaṁkramitatyanta—tirsṛktatvabhyāmeva dhvaneḥ pārthakyam / Āśrayabhedaśyasritabheda prayojakatvāditi phalitam /
    Avadhāna, p. 72

16. Snigdhaśyāmalakāntiliptaviyat——
he devi dhīrā bhava // *Dhvanyāloka, Vṛtti* 2/1
17. *Avadhāna*, pp. 72-74.
18. Tadā jāyanti guṇāḥ——bhavanti kamalani kamalani——
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20. Ravisamkrāṅtasaubhāgya——na prakāśate.
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21. K. Krishnamurty's *Dhvanyāloka* and it's critics, p. 183.
22. *Avadhāna*, pp. 75-76.
23. Asaṁlakṣyakramoddyotah krameṇa dyotitah parah /
Vivakṣitavidheyasyā dhvaneratāvidha matah.
Dhvanyāloka, 2/2
24. Rasabhāvatadābhāsa——bhāsamāno vyavasthitah //
Dhvanyāloka, 2/3 and its *Vṛtti*
25. *Avadhāna*, pp. 76-77.
26. Avivakṣitavācyadhvanu vyaṅgysyabhedo vācyabhedāprayoktah iha tu vyañjanā-vyāpārabhedāprayokto—'bhipretārtha bheda iti rahasyam / *Ibid.*, p. 77
27. *Ibid.*
28. *Ibid.*
29. Krameṇa prativatyatmā yo'nusvanasannibhah.
Śabdārthaśaktīmūlatvāt so'pi dvedhā vyavasthitah //
Dhvanyāloka, 2/21 and its *Vṛtti* also
30. *Avadhāna*, p. 113.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 114.
32. *Ibid.*, pp. 124-125.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 113.
34. Śabdārthaśaktya vāksipto..... ālamkṛtirdhvaneh.
Dhvanyāloka, 2/24 and vide it's *Vṛtti*
35. *Avadhāna*, p. 127.
36. *Dhvanyāloka*, 2/25 and its *Vṛtti*.
37. *Avadhāna*, p. 129.

CHAPTER 8

POSITION OF RASA, RASADHVANI AND RASAVADĀLAMKĀRA

If we look to the history of Sanskrit poetics, we find that the Dhvanikāra is regarded as the greatest exponent of a new school of literary criticism viz. Dhvani school as different from the traditional school of poetics; but in reality he is the staunchest advocate of the rasa theory. He includes Bharata's doctrine of rasa within the purview of the comprehensive scheme of suggestion and thus gives it a new shape. Rasa is said to be the soul of dhvani and it enlightened the suggestion in a higher degree. So Ānanda's all the treatments in Dhvanyāloka are said to be conditioned by his attitude towards rasa. Rasa is regarded as the key-stone of the arch of dhvani according to AV. The soundness of his theory of dhvani is fully based on the soundness of the theory of rasa. It is clearly observed that Bharata is completely silent as regards the function needed for conveying the rasa that is the supreme essence of poetry, while the Dhvanyāloka establishes rasa as dhvani par excellence and distinguished from other two categories—vastu and alaṁkāra etc. In the present section we have discussed the remarks of AV about rasa with the special interpretation of AK.

Proceeding to interpret the ideas of the Dhvanikāra about the realisation of rasa, the AK says that rasa is realised in a generalised form in a unperturbed blissful state with the properiey of vibhāvas etc. Here the commentator uses the terms like 'aucityeṅānurāgādipravṛttau', 'cittavṛtti' and 'āsvādya' etc. for

the proper recognition of rasa. By the use of term 'cittavṛtti' (basic mental state), he refers that rasa is realised by only human beings. And also term 'āsvādya' (tasted) implies that the man of taste must move only in the world as it is created by the kāvya around him. Regarding 'aucitya' (propriety), he says that propriety demands the behaviour of a particular character in strict conformity with his status. Actually the use of 'aucity' here is only for the proper development of vibhāvas etc. Thus according to him realisation of rasa means a simple consciousness of the sthāyībhāva of an universal form. This realisation leads to a state of bliss in which the self takes rest within itself.[1]

In this aspect, the AV also discusses about bhāva, rasābhāsa, bhāvapraśānti etc. which illuminate the theory of rasa. According to him 'sancāriṇa' etc. are called as bhāva, the improper work etc. like desire of Rāvaṇa towards Sītā is called as rasābhāsa, and when the ratyādicittavṛtti becomes motionless due to any cause, it is called as bhāvapraśānti.[2]

The AK nicely interpretes the nature of rasa and observes that rasa is neither expressed nor indicated but suggested. He also says that the realisation of rasa is possible by the continuing study of poetry. And the heart of the Sahṛdaya should be purified. He points out that rasa is generalised through the tanmayībhāva. In other words, the man of taste gets identified at a stage with the poetical character and experiences the same feelings as that of the latter on account of similarity of the heart. Here one can be enjoyed as eternal pleasure which is different from worldly pleasure.[3]

The AK clearly marks that rasa can never be represented through the mention of their names rasādiśabda. It is not expressed through abhidhāvyāpāra. The rasa is always suggested. So, it is called the third variety of dhvani—'rasadhvani', which differs from alaṁkāra and vastu dhvani.[4]

The commentator observes that the realisation of rasa is different from other forms of knowledge. Here the vibhāvas etc. which serves as the basis of the cognition of the sthāyī (permanent) are not the things of the ordinary world. They are extraordinary (lokottara), and give rise to rasa in the realm of poetry. The realisation of rasa is called as carvaṇā (chewing), āsvādana (tasting) etc. The AK gives much more importance on 'rasāhās-

vādyante' instead of 'rasāh pratīyante'.[5] Thus, according to him the realisation of rasa means the realisation of self by itself.[6]

While discussing the varieties of dhvani, the AK says that rasa belongs to a class of dhvani called asamlakṣakrama. In this aspect, the commentator observes that rasa is suggested with the primary sense (vācyārtha). Rasa, bhāva etc. are called 'akrama'. It must be admitted that there is some sequence in their occurence, but it is too slight to be noticed. So, rasa differs from the other class of dhvani. Here AK nicely interprets that rasa is the very soul of dhvani.[7]

In this context, AK also discusses the nature of vyabhicārībhāva and its conditions. According to him vyabhicārībhāva has three types of conditions viz., 'udaya', 'sthiti' and 'apāya' etc.[8]

As a whole the AK observes that rasādi etc. constitute the soul of all poetic and predominant over all other elements. Whenever Śabdālamkāra, arthālamkāra, guṇa, vācyārtha, vācakā-śabda and rīti etc. become subservient to rasa, that poetic art is known as dhvani. In fact rasa serves as the soul of poetry. Thus rasa proceeds towards the highest end in view, viz. the suggestion (dhvani).[9]

For the proper delineation of rasa, the commentator observes the importance of aucitya (propriety). Breach of this rule makes his composition devoid of rasa and leaves them in region of doṣa. Hence, the most important function of the poet to give due preference to the propriety which keeps harmony between rasa and suggested sense.[10]

The AK also points out clearly that one aṅgirasa should be delineated in a work, either it is poetry or drama or prose work. He also discusses the relationship between aṅgarasa and aṅgirasa systematically.[11]

As regards the importance of rasa, the commentator interprets the lines of the Dhvanikāra and says that nobody can go against the rasa theory because it has a close relationship with our great epics like Rāmāyaṇa etc. In the Rāmāyaṇa, we have the exquisite example of Vālmiki's elaboration of the karuṇa rasa (sentiment of compassion) as the chief sentiment to which others become subordinate. The commentator also observes the delineation of rasa in prabandha (prose works). According to

AK the concept of rasa is established with relation to great epic, just like iron becomes gold with relation to mercury.[12]

Besides the AK observes that rasa serves a vital role in sphere of dhvani and suggested with the expression of vācyārtha. It is self-existent, and 'ānandasvarūpa'. The 'tanmayatā' serves a great deal in the realisation of rasa is relished through a process of generalisation. In this context AK nicely executes the viewpoints of Bharata and gives a concrete definition to the concept of rasa. According to him 'sarve'pi rasanāt rasah'. It is also 'āsvādasvarūpa'. He also discusses a lot about the śāntarasa; because it is conceived as a cittavṛtti in the form of an excess joy due to loss of desire. Again he observes that the śṛṅgāra rasa is most appealing and most important as it is invariably within the experience of all persons.

In this aspect, the AK points out that 'hṛdaya-samvāda' is a pre-requisite for the realisation of rasa. Therefore, it can be said that rasa is the important poetic element and others are subordinate to it, in every work of literature. The feeling excited by a true poetry is supernatural (alaukika) and entirely different from an ordinary feeling. It is an aesthetic pleasure (camatkāra) and we cannot express it by any term but only can feel it if we have fortunately the taste to appreciate it.

What is purely suggested, may be a thought or subject matter (vastu), or a figure (alamkāra), or a sentiment (rasa). The sentiment is now the most important factor in a drama or in a poetry but its appreciation cannot be inferred. The post experiences of the emotion leave their remnants in the soul of a man; these are excited by the appearance of such factors in a drama or a poetry but they appear neither as external nor personal but as universal and he enjoys his own share in it.

RASADHVANI AND RASAVADĀLAMKĀRA

It has already been observed that in dhvani rasa is predominantly suggested and plays a vital role in the history of literary criticism. But to know the relative position of rasa and alamkāra, Dhvanikāra feels it necessary to clarify the actual ideas of rasavat and other such alamkāras that involve rasa and bhāva, He has not totally discarded the ideas of his predeces-

sors but he gives certain new light to enlighten those alamkāras which are found suitable to his own scheme. An attempt is being made here to clarify the viewpoints of the Dhvanikāra with the reference of Avadhāna commentary.

AK points out that where the rasa has the significance and all other elements of poetic excellence serve only one purpose of provoking the rasa it is known as rasadhvani. But where rasa is given as a secondary position, we have rasavadālaṁkāra.[13] Here rasa assumes the subordinate role of ancillaries (aṅgas). According to AK, the proposed scheme rasavadālamkāra has two distinguished varieties, viz. pure (śuddhā) and mixed (samkīrṇa). He also discusses these varieties through the instances. The verse 'kim hāsyena na me...etc.' is illustrated for the first. Here this stanza is intended to be in praise of a king of extraordinary courage. So, Cātu (sweet flattery) is the main subject. And here the sentiment karuṇa appears as a secondary one. Since karuṇa rasa is delineated here exclusively without the mixture of any other rasa, we get that suddhā rasa as an alamkāra.[14]

For the mixed variety, the commentator nicely interprets the verse "Kṣiptōhastāvalagnah prasabhamabhithato...etc". Here the main object is to sing the great glory of Śiva who triumphed over demon Tripurā. And the state of woman in love excited by jealousy is also vividly brought out by means of śleṣa. But it is only subordinate to the ideas of praise which deals with the main subject of description. The karuṇa rasa is also portrayed here due to 'kātaratābhāva' of woman and appears as an 'aṅga' of the main subject. In the circumstances, it would be regarded a defect on the part of the poet to describe contradictory sentiments such as love and pathos simultaneously. But both of term here appear as a secondary to the main subject and the defect is avoided.[15]

In this respect the commentator says that when rasa appears as an aṅga, it is termed as rasavadālamkāra and when rasa appears as an aṅgīn it becomes as alamkārya and happens to be the chief content of a poem. It can never be an alamkāra. The commentator here shows a difference between alamkāra and alamkārya. According to him alamkāra means 'Śōbhāyakatattva' beautifier. It can be called an alamkāra only when it serves as

a beautifier of something else. But when rasa itself happens to be predominant, it is dhvanikāvya and the figures of speech like upamā etc. will serve to beautify it.[16]

The commentator further points out clearly that when rasa itself is primarily expressed (vākyārthībhūta), it is termed as alamkāra. Alamkāra is a beautifying element of poetry just like ornaments enhancing the beauty of body (dehinaḥ katakādivat)[17] whereas rasādi is known as the soul (Ātman) of poetry. The Ātman is never called as the beautifying element of Ātman. So, the vākyārthībhūta rasādi never be recognised as alamkāra. In this aspect the figures of speech like upamā etc. ultimately serve to render more effective aesthetic charm which is the soul, and they can be properly regarded as alamkāra. For the significance of alamkaras like upamā etc. the commentator nicely marks that though alamkāra is a beautifying element of poetry, yet it can never enhance the beauty of a dead body. But it can enhance the beauty of a yatiśarīra (body of an ascetic). So, an alamkara can be properly called when it is introduced with a view to enhancing the ultimate aesthetic relish. According to the commentator this type of adornment is a significant one and has the title as 'Mahāmalaṁkṛta'.[18]

For the difference between rasadhvani and rasavadālaṁkāra, the AK points out that where the rasādi etc. happen as vākyārthībhūta, they are not considered as rasavadālamkara, but as rasadhvani. That dhvani is known as the soul of poetry and the figures of speech like upamā etc. serve more effectively to enhance the aesthetic charm of it. But whenever the other rasādi (rasādi bhinna) etc. become vākyārthībhūta, we would be constrained to consider it as rasavadālamkāra. In this context, the commentator has followed the views of Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin and says that the categories of rasavadālamkāra such as 'prayas' 'urjjvas' and 'samāhita' etc. are acceptable.[19]

If the above considerations are made the distinct sphere of dhvani, almkāras like upamā and rasavadāalmkāra will be clearly marked. But if it is said that all the passages containing aesthetical behaviour came under rasavadālamkāra, the other figures like upamā etc. have no importance or very little, where inanimate objects like rivers etc. are primarily described (vākyārthībhūta), there can be some possibility of rasavadālmkāra by the

application of living objects. So by the existence of both inanimate and living organism, there is no exclusive sphere left for figures ef speech like upamā, etc.[20]

Again, the AK interprets that if the position of rasavdālamkāra is denied despite the application of human elements in the sphere where inanimate objects are primarily described, we must have to admit that most of the poetic creations are devoid of the capacity of aesthetic relish; it would have to be regarded as nīrasa. Where there is rasavadālamkāra there is rasa, and where there is no existence of rasavadālamkāra, there is no rasa.[21] So, the description of inanimate objects without rasavādalamākāra is considered as nīrasa. Practically it is not correct. For this he interprets the verse "taraṅg-bhrubhaṅgā kṣubhitavihaga..." etc.[22] and marks that though the subjects of description happen to be insensible objects, the attribute of emotional behaviour to them is obvious. If we get rasavadālamkāra by the description of emotional behaviour of men, then what is the scope for the application of figures of speech like upamā, etc. Under the circumstances there is no scope for them as there is no such description of inanimate object, without the attribute of emotional behaviour. Thus every object in this world, even an inanimate one like moon ultimately comes to be looked upon as an associate of sentiment at least in the capacity of vibhāva. Regarding this the commentator says that the vibhāvatva is found in both 'cetana' (sensible) and 'acetana' (insensible) objects.[23] Lastly he points out strongly that whenever rasa exists as an aṅga it is known as rasavadālamkāra and when it exists as an aṅgīn and serves as alamkārya, it is known as rasadhvani.[24]

REFERENCES

1. Tathā hi aucityenānurāgādipravṛttau sathāyirupayā ratyādyātmakacittavṛtterāsvādyatvam rasaḥ. *Avadhāna*, p. 28.
2. Sancāriṇaścha tathātvam bhāvah. Rāvaṇāde sītādevivānu cittapravṛttau tadābhāsah. Ratyādirūpacittavṛtte kutaścit kāraṇāt praśāntau rasādipraśamah. *Avadhāna*, p. 28
3. *Ibid*, p. 28.
4. Tathā ca rasādilakṣaṇe bhedo vastvālamkāravannābhidheyatvamanuvartate, kintu vyañjanāya pratībhātiti phalitam. *Ibid.*
5. *Ibid.* p. 31.
6. *Ibid.*, Upodghāta, pp. 5-6.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 77.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 78.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 79.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 273.
11. *Ibid.*, pp. 219, 220-221.
12. *Ibid.*, pp. 190, 210.
13. *Ibid.*, pp. 79-80.
14. *Ibid.*, pp. 80-81.
15. *Ibid.*, pp. 82-83.
16. *Ibid.*, pp. 83-84.
17. *Ibid.*
18. *Ibid.*, p. 84.
19. *Ibid.*
20. *Ibid.*, p. 85.
21. *Ibid.*
22. *Ibid.*, p. 86.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 88.
24. Sutrāmalaṅkāiya eva dhvaniḥ kāvyastpātmā,...*Ibid.*

CHAPTER 9

ROLE OF GUṆA AND ALAMKĀRA IN DHVANI

The aesthethic evaluation of the concept of Dhvani is imperative to expose its proper aesthetic functions and to find out the place of guṇa and alaṁkāra which serve as it's constituents (aṅgas). In Dhvanyāloka both the concepts are studied with special reference to dhvani and the Dhvanikāra clearly marks the place and true role of them in poetic composition. According to him both the concepts assign a place sub-odinate to dhvani and appear as aṅga (part and parcel). We have discussed here the place and role of guṅa and alamkāra with the viewpoints of AK.

DHVANI AND GUNA

As regrads the concept of guṇa the commentator interpretes the ideas of the Dhvanikāra and says that guṇas are the exclusive attributes of rasa, the principal essence of poetry. Unlike the qualities of 'heroism' in a man serve to indicate the greatness of his soul, so guṇa (qualities) like mādhurya etc. assist one in recognising the presence of rasa in poetry.[1] Observing the difference between guṇa and alamkāra, the learned commentator says that alamkāra depends upon both word and meaning and serves to highten the emotional effect and can be removed without causing any aesthetic deficiency. But guṇa cannot be removed without killing the very soul of kāvya. While guṇas are indispensable for the very existence of kāvya, the alamkāras are merely meant for extenal beauty.

As for the recognition of 'Mādhurya', he says that every creature even God has to have ultimate satisfacation with '*rati*' also, known as '*mādhura*' which happens to be 'mādhurya' by coming in touch with rasa. 'Mādhurya' guṇa is said to be practically present in kāvya suggesting śṛngāra rasa. Hence we cannot recognise Mādhurya without any reference to rasa; only a account of the softness of the sounds which may be experienced also in case of the Ojah guṇa. The AK's observation is highly appreciable when he gives the statement that Mādhurya is intimately related with the psychological state of melting heart[3].

Again, the AK clearly states that vipralambha śṛṅgāra and karuṇa rasa possess the quality of Mādhurya in a higher degree as by the realisation of heart is more softened (dravībhūta) than in the śṛngāra rasa. The Mādhurya shines more prominently in the case of vipralambha (love in separation) and karuṇa (compassion)[4].

The commentator observes that raudra, vīra, and abbhuta cause a great 'dīpti' (ujjalatā)[5] in the heart of the readers. Or it can be which 'dīpti' is caused by the emotions like raudra etc and this 'dīpti' is primarily denoted by ojah. According to AK dīpti is an attribute of emotions, used to signify both śabda and 'artha' while ojah is found only in words where they are involved in lengthy compounds. When ojah is found in meaning, the long compounds may even be absent and the style may be every lucid. Thus, words and meanings capable of suggesting such rasas are said to have the quality of ojah.[6] The commentator nicely interpretes the ideas of Dhvanikāra in the verse 'yo yah śāstram... ' and marks that ojah does not invariably depend on long compounds of a composition but it solely depends on the corresponding presence of rasas. In this context, the commentator points out the similarity and dissimilarity between mādhurya and ojah[7].

As for prasād (perspecuity) he states that it is common to all the rasas and is not the exclusive property of any particular sentiment. The words must be such that the readers may not have any difficulty to grasp their sense immediately without any contemplation. So, also the meaning must not be obscured and have a universal appeal[8]. Thus the 'prasād' renders the realisation of aesthetic emotion quickly and is devoid of any impedi-

ment. The commentator clearly observes that the Dhvani theorists deal with three guṇas, namely, mādhurya, ojah, and prasād. Therefore, it is learnt that guṇas are used as the suggestive of rasa and act as the part of dhvani.

DHVANI AND ALAMKĀRA

To show the relation between dhvani and alamkāra, the AK observes that AV, who has great esteem for his predecessors like Bhāmaha, Udbhaṭṭa etc., does not altogether discard the conception of alamkāra. But offers some modification to make these alamkāras more suitable to his own scheme. He tries to prove that the provinces of both dhvani and alamkāra are different, and he endeavours to indicate precisely their mutual relationship in poetry. It may be summed up that the relation of dhvani and alamkāra is the same as that of the aṅgin (soul) towards it's various aṅgas or limbs.

While discussing the importance of pratīyamānārtha (suggested sense), the AK says that alamkāras are meant for only external embellishment, but not for the intrinsic excellency.[9] They appear only as the part and parcel of the poetic art and do not convey any essence of it.[10] He points out that alamkāras are śabdārthamātrabhūṣaka (embellishment of words and it's meanings) like ornaments used for charm of body. They are not alamkārya. But when alamkāras are depicted with the intention of suggeting rasa they occupy a very vital position. And we have dhvani where alamkāras are suggested and the suggestion is exclusively important. Here the suggested sense, dhvani is considered as alamkārya and the primary senses are subordinate to the suggested senses[11].

For difference between both concepts he nicely interpretes the significance of the adjunct 'upasarjanīkṛtasvārthau'; where the suggested sense is more predominant than expressed sense. Then alamkāra would legitimately come within the purview of dhvani as it deals only with sabda and artha not with the suggestion which comes out of 'viśeṣaśabdārtha vyāpāra[12]:'

In this aspect he marks that the relation between alamkāra and dhvani is like 'aṅgāṅgībhāva', and 'avayavāvayavibhāva sambandha' respectively, therefore, the difference there is the

difference between the master and the servant (svāmibhṛtyavat).[13] It is called as avyava or aṅga and but never termed as avyavī or angin separately. So alamkāra can never be considered as 'dhvani padavācya'. It is 'dhvani avyavanistha'. He interpretes that dhvani is vyāpaka (comprehensive) and aṅgīn (soul) while alamkāra is vyapya and aṅgo (pare).[14] Alamkāra can enter into relation with suggestion in two ways, either in the role of suggestor or in the role of being objects of suggestion.[15]

The commentator marks that a alamkāra always presupposes an object more important than itself which is embellished by it. But alamkāra which occurs as the principal suggested content of a varietly of dhvani can never be sub-ordinate. It is the principal object which deserves to be embellished by other so called alamkāra. Yet it is called as alamkāra due to brāhmaṇaśramaṇanyāya.[16] As for the importance of alamkāradhvani, the commentator interpretes the lines of the Dhvanikāra and says that alamkāras have been used by the ancient rhetoricians as the kāvyaśarīrabhūṣyatva not as bhūṣyatva. So, dhvani as the essence of poetry accumulates the alamkāra element etc. within it.[17]

In the foregoing chapter we have already discussed the role of alamkāra and rasa. The importance of discussion about rasavadālmkāra is only to change our ideas about the nature of all figures of speech. Rasa happens to be the soul of Dhvani, but the use of alamkāras will be justified only to assist in the communication of rasa. Thus alamkāra is the means and the end is rasa. When the figures of speech help in realisation of rasa in the minds of the reader, they serve their function very well and appear as the suggester or the objects of suggestion but never considered as the suggested sense or dhvani.

In the interpretation of arthaśaktyudbhava dhvani, the AK observes that alamkāra has certain suggested content. When the suggested alamkāra is more predominant, on account of a greater appeal we have a case of dhvani.[18] As a whole the commentator observes that rhetoricians have undoubtedly given a one sided emphasis in their consideration of alamkāras by emphasizing exclusively the beauty of expressed figures; still it should be noted that all the alamkāras play a vital part in suggestion either of an idea or another alamkāra.[19] Thus a clear grasp of the

concept of alamkāras implies an acceptance of the doctrine of dhvani.

REFERENCES

1. *Avadhāna*, pp. 89, 171.
2. *Ibid.*
3. *Ibid.*, p. 89 and see also pp. 172-74.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 90, Ist para.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 91.
6. *Ibid.*
7. *Ibid.*, pp. 91-92 and 172-73.
8. *Ibid.*, pp. 93-94.
9. Tat pratīyamānam vastu aṅganāsu lāvaṇyamiva prasiddhavayavebhyo guṇalaṁkāradibhyo mukhavāhurupādidibhyśca visesādhyākatayā vibhinnām bhātīti samāsārtha.
   Avadhāna, p. 18
10. Nanu tarhi guṇā-laṁkārādiyo'pi dhvanisamānasammānabhāja iti na kevalam kāvyātmatā dhvanirityāsaṁyāha...... ....tasya dhvaneraṅgābhutāh aṅgino' angāniva śobhāsaṁpādakāh na tu tanmayāh................
    Avadhāna, p. 41
11. *Avadhāna*, pp. 42, 88.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 54.
13. *Ibid.*
14. *Ibid.*, pp. 54-55.
15. *Ibid.*, pp. 89, 98-99.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 19.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 144.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 132.
19. *Ibid.*, pp. 268-74.

CHAPTER 10

PADASAMGHATANĀ

The Saṁghaṭanā (composition) is an important factor in the suggestive of Rasa. If we analyse the term samghaṭanā from the standpoint of grammar we find that 'sam' upasarga, 'ghaṭa' dhātu, and suffix 'lyuṭ'. Here we find "nimitārthe saptamī" and it is "bhāvārthaka pratyaya"[1]. So, the term samghaṭanā serves a great deal for the suggestive of rasa and here it comes incidentally without any special efforts. The alakṣyakramavyaṅgya dhvani is to be referred for instance in saṁghṭanā[2].

AK gives a clear idea about the samghatanā and its function in the sphere of suggested sense. Before going to a detailed expression he states the derivative meaning of the term samghaṭanā and says that the samghaṭanā means composition—either composition of letters or the composition of parts of speech. In other words, by the composition of letters we get 'pada' (parts of speech) and by the composition of 'pada' we get sentence (vākya). Thus according to him the samghaṭanā means the systematic arrangements of words for a certain purposes[3].

As regards this, Dhvanikāra states that some earlier rhetoricians have figured the padasaṁghatanā. According to them it is arrangement of words with or without compounds (samāsa) and is of three types, viz. (i) composition without any compounds (ii) composition with medium sized compounds, and (iii) composition with long compounds.[4]

Conceding with this classification AV adds some new material, and executes that the samghaṭanās are grounded in qualities

(guṇas) like mādhurya etc. and suggested the rasa. He also includes propriety (aucitya) of the speaker and the contents of the speech (vaktrovācya) which determines it[5].

AK also observes that though the discussions of samghṭanā comes under the syllabus yet it is different from 'asamāsādi' type of samghṭanā. Here the aucitya of rasa plays a major role in all the composition whether verse or prose. So AK nicely interprets the viewpoints of Dhvanikāra and says that 'asamāsādi' etc. are the three abjectives of samghaṭanā. It is only due to 'vyabhicāritātvāt' in rasavatkāvya.[6] The observation of the AK clarifies all the doubts about padasamghṭanā and its functions.

About the mutual relation between guṇa and samghaṭanā, the Dhvanikāra gives three alternative viewpoints[7], viz. (i) Guṇa and samghaṭanā are identical, (ii) Both are different and (iii) Guṇa is found in the substratum of samghaṭanā etc.

Regarding this, AK states that the samghaṭanā is grounded in the substratum of guṇa only due to "dharmadharmībhāvatva and āśraya āśrayībhāvatva[8]". He clearly explains the significance of the term "guṇānāśritya tisthanti" and says that the above mentioned three alternative ideas are possible only by 'anvayabheda'[9]. But actually there is no difference between them because the samghaṭanā is guṇādhārabhūta'. He has also mentioned that three vikalpas as "guṇasamghaṭanāyo'-aikyam, guṇādhārasamghaṭanā, and samghṭanānusāriṇo guṇa etc."[10]

From the above alternative ideas Dhvanikāra tries to prove that whatever is the view held, the relation of guṇa to rasa and that of samghaṭanā to rasa must be held as distinct. In other words it can be said that samghaṭanā and guṇa are notion of the same rank as suggester of rasa. In this aspect AK explains a lot and gives an interesting conclusion. According to him if we keep in mind the above alternatives, it creates more confusion regarding samghaṭanā and Guṇa. It is due to the fact that all the vikalpa statements are based on Guṇa. There is no such fixed rule governing the samghaṭanā. So, samghaṭanā always needs the nelp of Guṇa as guṇa is 'niyatatva'[11]. So, here all the alternative viewpoints have come into existence only by the significance of guṇa but not by samghaṭanā. It may be presumed that samghaṭanā is not a suggester of rasa[12].

To avoid this superfluous idea, AK clearly expresses that Dhvanikāra's concern is perhaps not to set forth a theory of samghaṭanā, but to show that the views of samghaṭanā which is not justifiable. To say the least the conclusion is unwarranted. The Dhvanikāra's main purpose is dealing with sanghaṭanā and shows how it can be a suggester of rasa and how this relation of samghaṭanā to rasa should be differentiated from the relation of guṇa to rasa. He has the idea to oppose earlier views and to establish samghaṭanā as the suggester of rasa. The AK clearly executes the ideas of Dhvanikāra and states that "rasavat kāvyeṣu vyabhicāritatvāni anabadyāni spaṣta manyat[14]." Thus according to him samghaṭanā and guṇa is a separate thing and the samghaṭanā and rasa is also separate one. So one should not be confused about their relation and functions.

In the explanation of relationship between guṇa and rasa, and samghaṭanā and rasa, the commentator observes that the latter one is variable whereas the former is constant or unchanging. About the concept of guṇa the AK says "aṅgināhu pradhānam tamartham rasarūpam vastum ye abalambante āśrayatayā ghrṇāhti, te guṇāh Sū arām guṇa rasāśraya iti paryavasita mūltaram".[15] These lines clearly show that there is no exception to the rule that only particular guṇa should be used to suggest particular rasa. For instance, Mādhurya and prasād may suggest only karuṇa and vipralaṁbha śṛṅgāra.[16] Ojha should be suggested in raudra, adbhuta and the like not karuṇa and the like[17]. But there is no such rule governing the samghaṭanā. Each and every samghaṭanā may suggest any rasa. Even in śṛṅgāra lengthy compound may be used, and raudra may be suggested without the use of compounds.[18]

Thus, guṇa is neither identical with samghaṭanā, nor grounded in samghaṭanā as their substratum. Its expression should be held distinct. Because guṇas are grounded in rasa as already pointed out. As there is a close relation between guṇa and rasa, there is no such relation between guṇas and samghaṭanās. On the otherhand it can be said that a composition may have guṇas only when it possesses rasa irrespective of the presence or absence of compounds. A sentence having long compounds also would not be said to have ojha if there is no rasa. Hence the provinces of guṇa and samghaṭanā are diverse[19].

For the solution of this arising problem, Dhvanikāra himself states that neither guṇas nor rasas directly determine the employment of samghaṭanās. According to him aucitya or propriety of speaker and the contents of speech is the nature of samghaṭanā. Logically the AK explains the idea of Dhvanikāra and firmly points out that the samghaṭanā must be occurred irrespective of presence or absence of compounds and it should be the suggestive of rasa. Because the propriety of using a certain type of samghaṭanā is determined by the type of rasa.[20] However, this appropriate type of samghaṭanā is also determined by the theme (viṣaya) and it acquires a new type of charm. Thus the poet may use any samghaṭanā in kāvya where the rasa is not largely suggested. The AK also gives some importance in viṣaya, aucitya, and rasa-aucitya.[21] He storngly admires that samghaṭanās suggests rasa not directly but through the aucitya of the speaker as well as its ideas. So, when the poet is under the influence of rasas or when the characters he (poet) depicts are supposed to be under the influence of rasa, he has to select only particular types of samghaṭanā. This comes incidentally without any special efforts.[22] Even the commentator also explains about the use of samghaṭanā in the prose work.[23]

Besides the AK discusses a lot regarding the Samghaṭanā at the suggester of rasa and gives a concrete solution to the arising problem. In his explanation, he states that in karuṇa and vipralaṁbha sṛngāra the composition should not have samāsa. The realisation of these two rasas consist with a very delicate condition of the mindof the sahṛdayas because they may be disturbed by the presence of long compounds. Even also in raudra the long compound is not essential. Thus the lengthy compounds are the different agents of the rasa. We will have only two types asamās and Madhyamasamāsa of samghaṭanā in such composiions, specially in karuṇa and vipralambha sṛngāra. Simultaneously asamāsa samghaṭanā cannot be suggested as karuṇa rasa. It must need the help of prasāda guṇa.[24] Like this all the samghaṭanās become the suggester of rasa by the support of Guṇas.[25]

Briefly it can be concluded that samghaṭanā is the suggester of rasa, grounded in the substratum of guṇa and determined by the aucitya of the speaker and the ideas of it. Samghaṭanās suggest rasa by way of preparing a proper psychological atmo-

sphere for the relish of rasa. This very criterion is followed also in case of considering mere letters as suggestive of rasa.

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1. Tripathi, Ramsagar (ed.) *Dhvanyāloka*, uddyota 3 and 4, p. 51.
2. 'Pāthakramāgata Samghaṭanām vivṛṅoti'... and also vide vṛtti line of Dhvanyāloka.
Avadhāna, p. 168
3. Padasya varṇaghatitātvāt vākyam ca padaghaṭitatvād uttarottaram padādināmupanyāso yujyata iti vodhyam saṅghaṭanā sandarbhayōśca kramopyevam bodhyaḥ.
Avadhāna, p, 163
4. "Asamāsa-samāsena madhyamena ca bhūṣita
Tathā dīrgha samāseti tridhā samghaṭenōdita"
Dhvanyāloka, 111/5
5. "Guṇānāmāśritya tisthantī mādhuryādin vyanakṭisa
Rasa staniyame heturaucityam vaktrovācyayoh.
Dhvanyāloka, 111/6
6. *Avadhāna*, pp. 168-69.
7. *Dhvanyāloka*, Vṛtti, 111/6.
8. Dharmadharmibhāvavadāśrayaśrayibhāvatve samghaṭanā guṇādhāra bhutābodhyate. *Avadhāna*, p. 168
9. Tathā ca guṇānāśritya tiṣthantityato'anvayabhedamavadhārya tridhā vikalpamavadtārayati. *Avadhāna*, p. 168.
10. *Avadhāna*, p. 169.
11. *Ibid.*
12. *Ibid.*, p. 173.
13. *Avadhāna*, p. 169.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 171.
15. Anavarata nayanajāla......................tapayati.
Dhvanyāloka, Vṛtti 111/6.
16. Yo yen śāstram vibharti..............
Dhvanyāloka, Vṛtti 111/6.

17. *Avadhāna*, pp. 170, 171, 172.
18. *Ibid.*, pp. 174, 175, 176.
19. *Avadhāna*, pp. 177-78.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 180.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 178.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 179.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 179.
24. *Ibid.*

CHAPTER 11

SAMLAKṢYAKRAMAVYAṄGYA-DHVANI

As it has already been discussed that the samlakṣyakramavyaṅgy dhvani is a variety of vivakṣitānyaparavācya dhvani, which follows in the wake of the primary sense like the resonance of an echo and it may arise through words (śabda) and meaning (artha); but that is not elaborately discussed under the kinds of dhvani. According to Dhvanikāra, it is known as Anusvāna-sannibhadhvani. In this context, the commentator Mishra clearly interpretes the ideas of the Dhvanikāra and points out the basic nature of saṁlakṣyakramadhvani and it's division also. He says the suggested sense which is distinctly noticeable in the wake of expressed sense just as the sequence[1] between the first sound and it's noticeable vibration is known as Samlakṣyakrama dhvani. This type of dhvani is based on 'Anudhvaniparamparā. It is two types, viz. (i) the suggested sense which is based on the capacity of words and (ii) the suggested sense which is based on the significance of meaning without the functions of words etc. While interpreting the Śabdaśakti-mūlā dhvani, he also points out a distinction between the dhvani and ślesā. He observes that in the function of śabadaśakti the apprehension of an unexpressed poetic figure came into existence and that is called as śabdaśaktyūdbhava-dhvani. In other words while cognised differently, it is known as śleṣa (pun of words) and when the word is not cognised, it is known as śabdaśktyudbhava dhvani[1]. Thus it can be said that in śleṣa, two or more senses are realised; but that is not in śabdaśaktimūlā

dhvani. For this, the commentator explains the verse "yena dhvastamanubhāvena valijitkaya......etc." and marks that this verse is an example of Śleṣālamkāra only due to lack of the matter of fact (vastusvarūpa). By quoting the verse "Tasya vināpi hāreṇa............etc. the commentator also observes that in śabdaśaktimulādhvani the alamkāra is suggested; but never expressly stated. In this respect the commentator interpretes the significance of the qualifying adjunct 'ākṣipta' (suggested). So, in ślesa the alamkāras are explicitly stated. But this is not in case of śabdaśaktimūlādhvani where the poetic figure must be suggested.[4]

Regarding the scope of abhidhā in Śabdaśaktimūlādhvani, the commentator observes that when the suggested sense came into existence by the śuddhābhidhāmulāvyañjanāvyāpāra, it is known as dhvani by many[5]. By commenting on the line 'atrāṅtare kusuma...mahākā" he observes three types of meaning as much as the contextual, the non contextual and the suggested sense etc.[6] But in the history of literary criticism he find that there is a difference of opinion regarding the status of the non-contextual meaning. According to the later critics like Mammata and Viswanatha the aprākaraṇika sense is also suggested[7]. Even Mahimabhaṭṭa puts the Śabdaśaktimula on par with Sleṣa. In his firm opinion there cannot be a homonymous word in the true sense of the term and as such question of having two Abhidheyārtha from the same word does not arise. Under such circumstances the question of having the Aprakaraṇika sense as Abhidheya is remoter still. His argument is like the same word can't convey two meanings in the manner of a lamp which may not reveal two objects at a time. The word will convey only one meaning as required by the context. The repetition of the word is determined by some factor and as such the second meaning is anumeya[8]. In reply to this contention of Mahima it may be pointed out that what is supposed to be the adhidheyārtha by Mahimabhaṭṭa and which depends on the factors like samyoga, viprayoga etc. So, Abhidheyārtha should not be taken as anumeya. AV considers both the contextual and non-contextual meanings as abhidheya.[9] While interpreting the ideas of Dhvanikāra, the AK follows the tactful manner and says that only to

eradicate the 'sambaddhatā doṣa' the Dhvanikāra uses both the meanings.[10] In this context, the commentator also points out the difference between the dhvanyālamkāra and vācyālamkāra with the appropriate examples.

As regards the arthaśahtyudbhava dhvani, the commentator says that there is no need of such unchallangeable words. The peculiar meaning is itself competent to give rise to the suggested content. For this, he interpretes the verse 'Evam vādin devārsau ...'etc. where the 'lajja' (shyness) is conveyed by the capacity of the peculier meaning. Here the expressed sense is vivakṣita and the same leads us to a suggested sense through noticeable stages (samlaksya-krama). Commenting on the above verse, the commentator marks that a vyabhicārībhāva has suggested here. Ordinarily we have the suggestion of rasa from the vibhāva, anubhāva and sañcaribhāva. But here we have the vyabhicāribhāva itself as the suggested content. Thus, here we find the 'lājja dhvani'.[12] Again, to show the difference between the Asamlaksyakramavyaṅgya and the samlaksyakramavyaṅgya, the AK clearly points out that where the realisation of rasa happens quickly either fully or partially with the help of vibhāva, anubhāva etc. that is alakṣyakramavyaṅgyadhvani. But where the realisation of rasa becomes in late with the help of vyabhicāribhāva, it is samlaksyakramavyaṅgyadhvani. So, there is no confusion about the samlaksyakramavyaṅgyadhvani which deals with the vyabhicārībhāva.[13]

The AK also interpretes the varieties of arthaśahtudbhava dhvani with the appropriate examples.[14] Besides the above discussions he observes that the ubhayaśktudbhava dhvani is not a nikṛsṭārtha dhvani (inferior one).

The commentator also states that the poetic figures like 'upamā', 'rupaka' etc. are usually found as expressed, but they can also be suggested.[15] He also discusses about the āksepa dhvani and says that the impossibility of describing the innumerable qualities of 'Hayagrīva' is suggested from the apparent assertion.[16] About Arthāntara-nyāsa dhvani the commentator observes that the particular word 'Phala' in the example "Daivāyatte tu phala......" suggests the figures of speech arthāntaranyāsa, while the verse as a whole suggests the universal proposition.[17]

Besides, the commentator nicely interpretes the Vyatireka-dhvani, utpreksādhvani, Ślesadhvani, Yathasamkhyadhvani[18] etc. He also discusses the importance of suggested poetic figure and says that alamkāras are turned into the very essence of poetic art if they are conveyed through the functions of suggestion.[19] It can be said that the Samlakṣyakramavyaṅgya dhvani is fully based on the alamkāra and vastu, which we have already discussed in the foregoing chapters. By this type of dhvani we are not instantaneously overwhelmed with any feelings or ideas. Here, we can only pass on from the expressly conveyed idea to the suggested idea through a noticeable sequence.

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2. *Ibid.*, pp. 114-15.
3. *Ibid.*, pp. 115-16.
4. *Ibid.*, pp. 119-20.
5. *Ibid.*, pp. 120-21. *Avadhāna*, pp. 119-120
6. M.M. Sharma's *Dhvani Theory in Sanskrit Poetics.*
7. Chaturvedi, B.M., *Mahimabhaṭṭa.*
8. Sharma, M.M., *Dhvani Theory in Sanskrit Poetics.*
9. *Avadhāna*, p. 121.
10. Evamalaṁkāradhvanimudāharaṇamukhena pradarsyā vācyālaṁkārāt tasya pārthakyam darśayati........... *Ibid.*, pp. 121-124.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 125.
12. *Ibid.*
13. *Ibid.*, pp. 126-130.
14. *Ibid.*, pp. 132-33.

15. Tena calaṁkāreṇa vivaksitānām hayagrīvaguṇānām lobottartvarūpaviśesa pratipattaye vācyalaṁkāropakrama iti akṣepo vyajyate........... *Ibid.*, p. 138.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 138.
17. *Ibid.*
18. *Ibid.*, p. 144.

CHAPTER 12

CERTAIN UNREVEALED ASPECTS OF DHVANI THEORY

Certain significant and vital aspects which make the Dhvani theory more comprehension are being discussed here as interpreted by AK.

(A) *IMPORTANCE OF USE OF 'ITI' IN THE LINE "KĀVYASYĀTMĀ DHVANIRITI.."*

As regards the line 'kāvyasyātmā dhvaniriti......, and the position of enclitic 'iti' after dhvaniḥ instead of kāvyasyātmā, AK makes the following significant comments. Here the enclitic 'iti' is used only to convey the corresponding meaning and stands merely for the word itself viz. dhvani. Although he admits that by the use of 'iti', there is a poetic defect 'prakrama bhaṅga kāvyadosa' (inversion of the order of words), yet it is not so harmful. When the word dhvani is followed by enclitic 'iti', it comes selfconnotative.[1] Thus the word 'iti' is a samjñāvodhaka. For this he exhibits an example 'Nahusa iti rājā'. Here the term 'iti' has a permanent relation with the word 'Nahusa, and conveys the meaning of 'Nahusa' as a king. He also finds out a relation between the word 'dhvani' and 'iti' just like the relation between 'yat' and 'tat'. Thus here there is no confusion about the use of enclitic 'iti'.

(B) *DHVANI AND DOṢA*

Interpreting the lines of the Dhvanikāra, AK observes poetic brbmishes (kāvya doṣa). Though the earlier rhetoricians have

carefully discussed the various defects, yet AV speaks about 'dosas' only concerning rasa. The ideas of early rhetoricians are only metaphysical, syntactical, and metrical etc. whereas AK's views on doṣa are fully based on the propriety of Rasa. The AK observes that the greatest defect in poetry is thus Rasabhaṅga[2].

The AK also interpretes the twofold classification of poetic defects: (i) Nitya dosa, and (ii) anityadosa[3]. Thus the second one comprises such defects as śṛtiduṣṭatva, apratītatva etc., while the rest like cyutasamskāra, kliṣṭatva etc. would be classed as belonging to first one. The AK marks that according to this classification śṛtiduṣṭatva would not be a defect in the case of emotions like raudra, vīra, and bhayānka etc. where it would be regarded as a positive excellence, as it does the effect of aesthetic relish. But in the case of śṛṅgāra, the use of cacophonical letters has to be deliberately eschewed. He says that only due to 'bhāve Kṭa' in the term 'śṛtiduṣṭa' it refers as a defect, otherwise it expresses as duṣṭadāya. Here the AK strongly states that in sṛṅgāra rasa, the unparliamentary languages as usually used by villager should be avoided. So, 'śṛtiduṣṭatva' is not universal defect, as it does not mark the beauty of soul (rasa) in every case but it mars the beauty of śṛṅgāra.

As for 'anityadosa' he states that by the defect śṛtiduṣṭa only vācyārtha becomes a defect one, but not the subject of śṛṅgāra, which existed as an aṅgabhūta. And this defect does not proceed towards vyaṅgyārtha which deals with śṛṅgāra. But vyaṅgya primarily suggests the establishment of śṛṅāgra. Thus it is known as anityadosa. He also says that 'nityadosa' is just opposite to 'anityadosa'. When both vācyārtha and 'aṅgarasādi' lead the defect of śṛtidusta, it is known as 'nityadosa'. It is not a cesṭapatti. Thus, the defect śṛtidusta is counted as a variety of nityadosa for the listener it would remain harsh irrespective of any consideration of the nature of the emotion as well as expressed sense[4].

Besides, the commentator marks the Dhvanikāra's useful division of doṣa. The Dhvanikāra avoids and broadly classifies all dosas under two heads viz. (i) avyutpattikṛta, and (ii) aśaktikṛta. A blemish may be committed either for lack of proper illustration or for poetic imagination. The AK points out that

the proper illustration is termed as 'vyutpati', and the proper poetic imagination as 'śakti'. And between them 'sakti' is more worthtaking. He interpretes that though the description of eroticism of Jagadamvā (Devi śṛṅgāra-varnanām) in Kalidasa's *Kumārasaṁbhava* has no propriety at all, yet due to poetic imagination there is no defect. Thus the description of beautiful element is the main objective here. The 'racanācāturīrūpa Kaviśaktiranaucityādi-dosa' is a basic defect of poetry, is just like 'vinayamādhuri' of vyaktidoṣa and 'guṇamādhuri' of saundarya etc. So the wants of proper illustration and poetic imagination are the main classification of dosa.[5] Lastly it can be said that by this the Dhvanikāra indirectly shows the intrinsic relation between rasa and śakti.

It is indeed a great achievement of AK that he illustrates the poetic blemishes in a different manner.

(C) *DHVANI AND VṚTTI*

The AK points out that the concept of vṛtti also gets reoriented by the acceptance of dhvani. According to him vṛtti is mainly based on Śabdatattva and arthatattva. It is just like 'kāvyamāttṛkā'. Both the types of vṛttis (kāśikā and upanāgarikā etc.) have emerged by the use of vācya vācaka etc. and the principles of conducting such usages is none other than the aucitya of rasa. Thus, the AK observes a relation between vṛtti and rasa that is just like 'dharmdharmīvyavahāra saṅgatah'; not like 'jiva śarīra-vyavahāra'. He says that rasa is expressed through the excellency of vācyavācaka etc. like whiteness is expressed through the excellency of body. Thus, the value of vṛtti is envisaged only by following the concept of Dhvani.[6]

(D) *DHVANI AND RĪTI*

The AK observes that the Dhvanikāra pays compliment to the rīti theorists because they are the first to have some new idea about the truth of poetry. According to them alamkāras are only used for the external embellishment of poetry and the life pertaining principles are something different. So, they tried a lot to grasp the essence of poetry, but they could not succeed. Though they could not really realise the importance of dhvani, yet they have advanced far enough in that direction. The AK

points out that the rīti theorists were differing in their viewpoints and could not distinguish the concept of dhvani.[7] He also marks that due to lack of proper knowledge regarding the concept of poetry, the non-realisation of dhvani is prove dand the rīti etc. came into limelight as the essence of poetry. Thus dhvani suggestion is considered as the supreme concept and rīti etc. are as its substituents.

(E) *CITRA KĀVYA*

In the context of classification of poetry from the standpoint of dhvani, the AK observes a third grade poetry, where the element of suggestion has no role. In other words, the composition which has no delineation of any rasa, simply has the charm of the vācya sense and vācak word, and does not has any capacity to convey the suggested sense, is called as citrakāvya (pictorial poetry). Though it abounds in 'guṇalamkārālamkṛtaśbdārtha', and lacks 'Sahṛdahṛdayāllhādakarikāvyattatva (rasa), yet it is not considered as 'akāvya' (not a poetry). It is just like 'yamakacakravandhādiviśiṭakāvya' and appears as a statue or pointed picture (pratikṛtarūpa), because there is no 'jiva', rasa in it. Still it comes to be classed under poetry as it imitates the other two classes of poetry—dhvani and guṇībhūtavyaṅgya.[8]

It is of two types, viz. (i) Śabdacitra (ii) arthacitra. Both are employed for each other's sake without any regard for dhvani.[9]

The question arises how can a composition exclude suggestion of rasa ? The commentator replies that rasa cannot be totally absent from any sepecimen of poetry. The Kavi-Vivakṣā (intention of the poet) is the only deciding factor. When we find the delineation of suggestive rasa inspite of kavivivakṣā, we treat them as a citrakāvya. He draws a similarity between the poet and the cook. Sometimes, it is possible that the poet's creation appears as a repulsive one just like the rough preparation of a best cook. And also he observes that a composition which deals with vācya sense and vācakaśabda must has certain suggestion of rasa just like the existence of flavour of syrup, though it is a mixture of curd, molasses, and black pepper etc[10].

Thus strictly speaking, rasa cannot be totally absent from any specimen of poetry.

(F) *GUṆĪBHŪTA-VYAṄGYA KĀVYA*

When the suggestion becomes a secondary element, it is known as guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya kāvya. The AK says which poetry loses its suggestive significance in the excellency of expressed sense, is called as guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya kāvya. It is also considered as second rate poetry[11]. In the verse 'lāvaṇyasindhūra-pareiva...etc., he nicely interpretes the nature of guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya. Here, the suggested beauty of the various parts of her (nāyikā) body is subordinate to the figuratively expressed idea that she is a varitable ocean of beauty.[12]

To show the difference between dhvani and guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya, the AK says that the main objective of dhvani kāvya is suggestivity of ideas but guṇibhūtavyaṅgya is totally based on the excellency of vācyārtha. Their ways are also different. A guṇībhūtavyaṅgya-kāvya is never called as dhvani kāvya as it is vācyanistha and the excellency of vācyārtha conveys through the abhidhā vyāpāra. But in dhvani, the vyañjanā vyāpāra is a significant one.[13] Though guṇībhūtavyaṅgya has been given the second place in the classification of poetry, it should not be always second rate appeal. Many passages in poetry which are seen to delight the readers by their grace, but they come under the province of guṇībhūtavyaṅgya[14] as here alamkāra plays a vital role but not the rasa.

The commentator also observes that guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya involves different kinds of figures of speech dealing with both vastu and alamkāra.[15] Here the suggested sense is not properly conveyed (aspasṭa). So it is not dhvani and it is rather known as guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya.

Under this class of poetry, the Dhvanikāra includes 'kākuvicāra', (suggestion through ironic tone) where the suggested sense is subordinate to expressed sense. Here the AK observes that the meaning is suggested by the words directly through the assistance of kāku. And the kāku always concerns with abhidhāvyāpāra not with suggestion. But the denotative sense is conveyed only alongwith the suggestive sense and it is called guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya. Thus in every gūṇibhūta-vyaṅgya, the

suggested sense should be subordinate to the denotated sense.[16]

(G) *DHVANI AND ANUMĀNA*

The AK observes that the Dhvanikāra tries a lot to prove the importance of vyañjakatva from the standpoint of philosophical system. This is based on two points : (i) relation between word and meaning, and (ii) vyañjakatva does not consider the well known conventional significance of words 'niyata' and it is quite constant with regard to what is suggested. So, the vyañjakatva is different from the vācakatva from the standpoint of deśa (place), kāla (time), prakaraṇa (topic), sāmagrī (subject-materials) ond vyāpāra (function) etc. The vyañjanā is distinctly suggested (sphōtayati) not conventionally expressed.[17]

He marks that though both the vyañjakatva-vyāpāra and vyañjaka-śabda is not definite (aniyata), yet it appears as niyata (definite) in suggested sense (vyaṅgyārtha). Here there is no question of avastutva.[18]

The commentator also observes ,the liṅgatvanyāya in vyañjakatva when he simply touches the concept of anumiti. 'Anumiti' inference) is based on desire of a person. So, the knowledge of liṅgatva came into existence as aniyata (not definite) by the help of dhūmādi (fire) etc. When the subject matter is established, it becomes niyata (definite). Like this, firstly, vyañjakatva is aniyata, in the shape of vācaka-śabda etc. and when they convey the suggested sense, it assumes the niyatabhāvaḥ (quite constant).[19]

AK quotes Jaimini etc. and says that though the relation of śabda and artha are different from the standpoints of their derivation and pronunciation, yet there is a nityasambandha (permanent relation) between them. But due to special significance, the mīmāmsakas must accept the vyañjanāvyāpāra as a title (upādhi). If they will deny, there will be no existence of difference between classical and vedic sentences because both the word and meaning has nityasambandha. Thus, according to mīmāmsakas there must be a suggested sense. Here the commentator nicely interpretes an instance that moon has the worldly coldness but when it is seen by the departed love-sick lover, it becomes the cause of great sorrow.[20] When the suggested sense is apprehended, its validity is arrived at with

the help of 'anumāna'. Hence, the vyaṅgyārtha once again becomes anumeya. For this, he says that even the validity of vācya sense is arrived at with the help of anumāna yet we suppose the vācya sense to be had by a varbal function. Similarly the suggested sense also should be held to be within the purview of a verbal function even when it's validity is established with anumāna. Moreover, the suggested sense which we relish in the kāvya is, in fact, never put to any taste of validity.[21]

It may be noted here that the verbal testimony is regarded as identical with reference to by the vaiśesikas because they arrive at the validity of knowledge derived from the statement of anumāna. For this, AK says that their view is duly criticised by the mimāmsakas. The weakness of the vaiśesikas' stand is pointed out by AK logically. He observes that the sense of word is not inferred, only the validity of the sense is inferred.

Again the AK broadly points out the significance of vyañjakatva and says that the meaning which is intended to be conveyed may itself be either vācya or vyaṅgya. These two meanings are, indeed, conveyed not through an inference but through a natural or artificial relation. Hence, anumāna is also a case of vyañjanā. But vyañjanā cannot be included in the scope of anumāna as it has a wider scope. The AK distinguishes the scope of vyañjanā very clearly. He observes that in certain cases, suggestion is added by inference or in some cases by casuality. In this manner suggestion may be found to have wider scope than inference.

He also marks that the knowledge of universal concomitance is instrumental (sahakārī) for inference. If such instrumental factors differ the functions also differ. Thus, the difference in the thought procedure involaed in vyanjanā and anumāna respectively, results in the distinction of the two. Besides vyanjanā is distinct from anumāna from the stand of sentiment as in case of the suggestion of sentiments, vyanjanā does not admit of any reasoning or anumāna. Thus anumāna is quite distinct from vyanjanā.

That anumāna is different from vyanjanā on the basis of proper application of words and their meanings, he says the expression of meaning is 'karmabhūtaḥ' and the use of words its

causes. There is no question of anumeya (inference). Thus, both śabdavivakṣā and śabdavyavahāra play the vital role. The vyanjakatva always deals with the proper knowledge, but not with the inferencial knowledge.[22]

The AK argues that if vyanjanā comes under anumāna, then what is the necessity of dhvani-vyavahāra. Due to pratyakṣānumāna, abhidhā comes under guṇavṛtti and vyañjanā is a special symptom of word and meaning.[23]

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5. *Ibid.*, pp. 175-76.
6. *Ibid.*, pp. 235-36, 304-305.
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CHAPTER 13

THE SUMMING UP

The nature assumes a new form in the spring after shedding its withered leaves similarly an old work may present itself as surprisingly a new in the words of a man of genius. The Avadhāna commentary of Tarkavachaspati, a modern interpretation of the familiar work, the 'Dhvanyaloka', has rendered a unique service to the cause of Sanskrit scholarship. The AK has presented the dhvani theory in a new garb with its irresistible charms of novelty. He has rediscovered the hidden resources lying in the unplumed depths and executed them admirably. The Dhvani theory owes much to the profound erudition, unrivalled scholarship and astonishing philosophical and literary acumen of Tarkavachaspati for its wide reputation as the msot dependable and acceptable norms of literary judgement in the succeeding ages. While the Dhvanikāra, AV, formulates the theory of suggestion, Abhinavagupta places it on a sound footing; the AK makes it acceptable by almost all. Thus the 'AVADHĀNA' of Tarkavachaspati should not be considered as mere commentary on the' Dhvanyāloka', it is rather another complete text intended to communicate more explicitly what remains implied or unstated by the new theorist. It is rather a critique than an exposition. As a commentator he is fully loyal to the Dhvanikāra. As a very worthy and faithful interpreter, he does not incorporate extravagant ideas into the theory. On the other hand, he contributes much to the interpretation and exposition of the text in a simple and graceful style to move the theory

understandable to all. Thus, this study is a worthtaking and reflects the basic trends in Sanskrit literary criticism,

In the preceding chapters we have given a detailed survey of the origin of Dhvani theory, its existence, definition and significance etc. starting from the early state of speculation on Sanskrit poetics till now with a special reference to the Avadhāna commentary. We have also sketched the authoritative interpretations of AK which indicate the nature of several problems hurled against the theory and its ultimate solution for the subsequent development of the doctrine in the history of Sanskrite poetics. Specific estimate of the commentator and the importance of his remarks have also been indicated in the course of the foregoing peges. However, all the discussions have been made about the theory of suggestion with the viewpoints of the AK, the twentieth century critics in the history of Alaṁkāra literature.

Thus this contribution serves as a bridge to eradicate the communication gap between the Dhvanikāra and the reader. It enhances the value of the theory of suggestion in the world of aesthetical ideas and initiates a new epoch. An humble attempt has been made in these pages to evaluate some of the concepts of Sanskrit poetics and establishment of the Dhvani which constitutes the essence of poetry. The AK by laying greatest emphasis on the concentrative interpretation of the suggested sense of the Dhvanikāra, creates an epoch in the Indian poetics. He supplied a very stimulating and thought provoking work, that covers all the difficult problems and their solutions on the theory of Dhvani and as a whole it enjoys as a brilliant masterpiece. It can be said that this work includes interesting details and contains ample guidance for those who desire to reach a correct conclusion about the theories of Sanskrit poetry and the Dhvani theory which enjoys as the soul (Ātman) of poetry as ever.

It is also necessary at the outset to know the commentator's inner ideas and his contributions to the theory of Dhvani. When the Locana of Abhinavagupta became more difficult to grasp and also a subject of criticism by the later critics, at that time Avadhāna commentary came into existence by the great inspiration of Bihar-Utakal Sanskrit Samiti. Though

it is a commentary on the Dhvanyāloka, yet it appears as an original text book which gives a fulfledged idea about the concept of Dhvani. Tarkavachaspati is much more than a mere commentator explaining the difficulties of text; he is an original thinker representing the whole theory in more comprehensive form. He is one of those few great Sanskrit scholars, who remoulded and re-interpreted the older ideas in thought and life, and whose influence on the mind of learners continued to have its effect centuries after their death. A philosopher and a poet a savant and a saint, a mystic and a critic of art and literature, he deserves to be ranked beside the learned pundits in the history of Sanskrit literature. Endowed with many sided genius his approach to the theory of Dhvani is refreshing and brilliant. While his commentary evaluates the remarks of AV, it also simplifies and illustrates them and adds and supplements it explains and also becomes substantial as Dhvanyāloka. It appears to be quite successful one which rejuvinates the dying stream of the suggested sense once more and reveals the truth of the poetic art. It is a scholar's work and Tarkavāchaspati's exposition of Dhvanyāloka has a great importance. The name of the commentary itself is also very significant. It is the 'Avadhāna'—the veritable concentration itself; it is not merely an element of concentration it furnishes the concentration itself by which alone the Dhvanyāloka can be acknowledged in its proper perspective. The AK himself says that though a substance is enlightened by Āloka (light) and clearly visible by Locana (eye), yet the thorough knowledge of that substance can't be observed without Avadhāna (concentration or concentrative knowledge). So, he entitled his work as 'AVADHĀNA' which hints the basic idea of the Dhvanyāloka of AV[1].

By reassessing the viewpoints of the divergent schools of tradition, the commentator has supplied a authoritative work which mainly deals with the most difficult problem i.e. doctrine of vyañjanā and the rasadhvani which is the soul of poetry. In the light of the counter arguments, the commentator reinterpretes the Dhvanyāloka by denying most of the accusations brought against the teachings of Dhvanyāloka. He also helps us considerably in deciding about correct readings of the text and it's ideas. So, this work includes a correct analysis of subject

matter and contains ample guidance for those who desire to reach on a correct conclusion about the theories of Sanskrit poetry. It is also noteworthy that the fourth uddyōta in particular might be almost unintelligible without Avadhāna.

Thus for a proper understanding of the Dhvanyāloka, for a knowledge of the discussion that has ensued immediately afterwards and for the sake of the new ideas adduced in support of the theory, a study of Tarkavachaspati's Avadhāna is indispensable. An attempt has been made to outline the new points made out by Tarkavāchaspati.

In the very beginning of this study commentator gives an analogy in explaining the idea that suggestion or dhvani is the soul of poetry. He says the book Dhvanyāloka consists four uddyōtas emulating vedānta-darśana which also contains four adhyayas (chapters). To facilitate the study the author presents vedānta darśana in glosses (vṛttis) after the original kārikās similarly in Dhvanyālokakāra there are (vṛttis)—Āloka, after the original Dhvanikārikās.

The concept of Dhvani is also self existed and self enlightened like Ātman. The commentator says that Vedantists get eternal pleasure by the fulfilment of their queries i.e. regarding the soul of kāvya and the commentator cites 'Rasa vei saḥ', rasamevāyam lavdhānandi bhavati and athāto brahma jiñgyāsā etc. Both the concept Ātman and Dhvani came into existence by the self realisation and deal with the kāvyopaniṣhadbhūta sāravastu.

As Ātman comes to be associated with life only when found in a special kind of body, so also Dhvani requires the status of poetry only when encased in the body of beautiful sounds and meanings adorned with Guṇas and Alaṁkāras. The concept of soul is relative to that of the body but poetry includes not only Dhvani but also beautiful expressions conveying picturesque ideas.

For the establishment of the suggested sense, the commentator observes that there is a relation between vācyārtha (expressed sense) and vyaṅgyārtha (suggested sense) as the relation between the body and life. It is termed as itaratarabhāva saṁbandha. So vaṅgyārtha is a certain special entity as the life. About Guṇavṛtti (lakṣaṇā), the commentator states that the kāvya

believes tts supreme reality in Guṇavṛtti as the Brahman is subtratum of all which is possible through the world of perception. By the maxim 'tvaktaruṇyaya', he affirms the realtion between Guṇavṛtti and Dhvani as the relation between visaya and Paramātman. It can be considered that the Dhvani and Guṇavṛtti is closely related. Like Ātman, Dhvani is kārya, jñyāpya and free of all the upādhis. The AK says that innumerable varieties of Dhvani are varieties of Brahman. So, Brahman has dual varieties i.e. upahita and anupahita, saguṇa etc. Similarly Dhvani also has certain varieties i.e. mukhya and anyataramūlayka, vyañjanamūlakabhāvāśraya, sudhaguṇābhāvanyatar abheda etc. As Brahman deals with the three fold functions i.e. Jāgrata etc. the Dhvani also has three fuuctions of words and meaning that is Abhidhā, Lakṣaṇā and Vyañjanā. Like the three fold nature of the Brahman (sat, cit, and Ānanda), the dhvani is also of three types i.e. vastu, alaṁkāra and rasa etc. The Dhvani is also like Brahman through the divisions of bhuma, abhuma etc. Like Brahman, Dhvani is all pervading, eternal, subtle, undecaying and is source of all things. It is the absolute concept of the poetic art. The commentator tries a lot to make similarity between the concept of Dhvani and Brahman by the process of vedantic thoughts. He strongly observes that the realisation of the soul of kāvya is resembling like the realisation of supreme Brahman as the kāvyātmā is not an abstract unity, but only reality. In other words it can be said that kāvyattva maintains the reality of the kāvya, poetic art as the Brahmatattva or Ātmatattva maintains the reality of the world. Thus like Brahman, the kāvyatattva, Dhvani is a form of sat, cit, and Ānanda.[2] Like Brahman dhvani is the sole representative of paramārthika sat (real existent). It appears as a cognition or knowledge, but it is not a cogniser or intelligent. It is self-luminous. And also like the Brahman, it has been characterised as a bliss without the fruition of happiness. Thus the concept of dhvani is a supreme concept in the poetic art.

Another remarkable observation of the commentator is that there is no difference between Dhvanikārikā and Ālokavṛtti. Like Brahman, the Dhvani is self luminious and now a question arises, how far it is correct? But for this problem he states that for better study of kārikā Dhvanikāra has briefly made the expositions of the kārikā called vṛtti.

To get the basic knolwedge of the concept of Dhvani AK illustrates derivative expression of the term 'Dhvani'. Even a layman can easily understand the word 'Dhvani' and what it means. He says: Dhvanyate vyajyate iti vyutpattivalāt dhvaniśabdo vastvalaṁkāra rasāniva, dhvanyate'nyeti vyutapatyā vyañjanāvyāpāram, dhvanyate'treti vyutpatyā svayam ca sāmarthayātvevāyam saṁdarbhah etc[4]. The above statement not only deals with the meaning and functions of the suggested sense but also the wideness of it.

Besides the AK also interpretes the implication of suggested sense in the vedic mantras[5] and indicates the power and functions of words and meaning also. He observes the relation between vācaka, lākṣaṇika, and vyañjaka śabda. He declares that Dhvanyāloka is an authoritative work in the field of Sanskrit literary criticism.[6]

Regarding the concept of rasa, he immitates the Locanakāra's thoughts and represents the idea in a fascinating manner. He strongly says that rasa is an aesthetic experience arising within the mind of the spectator or reader. It is unique (alaukika) in every way. Rasa is neither a product, nor an inferred piece of knowledge, it must be regarded as suggested. AV included Bharata's doctrine of rasa within the purview of the comprehensive scheme of suggestion and thus gave it a new shape. Bharata is completely silent as regards the function needed for conveying the rasa that is the central theme in poetry. On the other hand Dhvanyāloka establishes rasa as dhvani par excellence which is distinguished from two other categories i.e. vastu, alaṁakāra etc. According to AV rasa is the key stone of the arch of Dhvani. The sandness of the theory of Dhvani entirely depends upon the sandness of rasa and his procedure of explaining every element of poetry in relation to rasa. The AK analyses the relation between dhvani and rasa which is quintessence of poetic art.

The AK observes that vibhāvas etc. which serve as the basis of cognition of sthāyībhāva (permanent state) are not the things of ordinary world. They are extraordinary and the realisation of rasa is called 'carvaṇā' (chewing), āsvādana (tasting) or bhōga (relish) etc. He also refers that rasa should not be understood through literary sense, but through a process

of realisation. Regarding rasadhvani it is the excess of relish resulting from a rumination over the permanent state, which appears to the cognigent prominently on account of the connection of the vibhāvas etc. As a whole rasāsvāda is on par with the Brahmāsvāda[7] as when there is the experience of the absolute there can be no further coming back to the realm of worldly experience. But in case of the realisation of rasa there is the coming back of the subject to the realm of worldly experience even after the experience of the eternal bliss which is an aspect of the absolute itself. Thus aesthetic experience in its final stage belongs to such a level in which all objectivity merges in the subconscious and the subject, the self shines in its ānanda (pleasure) aspect.

Further the apparent contradictions in the text Dhvanyāloka as well as in Locana are all resolved in the Avadhāna. Even the criticisms of Mahimabhaṭṭa are also strongly condemned by the commentator. He admirably interprets all contradictory statements of both the Dhvanikāra and Locanakāra and offers a better explanation to the readers. He quotes several lines from the epics, Mahābhāṣyas and other rhetoric and literary works.

The AK points out that the delight alone constitutes the distinguishing mark of poetry. He says that vedas issue command like mastras and the Itihāsa is good counsel as friends. But poetry differs from them and is unique in its capacity to instruct one delight like one's sweetheart. Thus pleasure alone is the highest and most significant functions of literature. That delight is nothing but enjoyment of rasa. Rasas, in their turn, can be successfully delineated in poetry only by following the consideration of aucitya relating to vibhāvas etc. He states that aucitya is intrinsically related with rasadhvani.

From the overall study of this commentary it seems that every aspect of Dhvani theory is touched by AK. Most of the interpretations deal with philosophical dialectics. Each and every viewpoint has certain valuable bearings with a profound grasp of the subject. It is this which makes the *Avadhāna* rise above the ordinary run of commentaries. In addition to offering aid in matter of clearly construing the text, AK interpretes all

the points thoroughly gathering together all relevant materials for the reader left by the Dhvanikāra as well as Locanakāra. If we estimate it's merits only in context of theories on poetry we categorise it among the first grade text-book as it fully meets the needs of readers. The AK is equally conscious of the sweeping change which has come about in the basic and artistic structure of a creative work. AK always rides on the crest of his argument with ease and grace. Being a commentary it covers all the branches of learning and appears as a original text-book. Thus there is no fear of losing the way while going through *Avadhāna*. The topic is handled in such a masterly manner that it easily enters into the mind of reader. The work includes all the aspects of theories on poetry and contains guidelines for those who desire to reach a definite conclusion. It is both informative and authoritative. It is hoped that Tarkavāchaspati's first hand interpretation of Dhvanyāloka will mark a new epoch in the history of Sanskrit poetics. He has rendered a great service to the world of Sanskrit learnings. His contribution is not readymade one, but it comes through a process of the real, intellectual creative and collective thinkings which helps a lot in the development of progressive Dhvani consciousness. It is an outstanding work in the nature of literary criticism. Finally it can be said that Tarkavāchaspati's Avadhāna is a supreme manifestation of the incredible sharing of the poetic spirit that studies itself, concept of Dhvani, and the whole literary criticism around it.

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Sources received from his son Pūndit Narasimha Mishra at Birabalabhadrapur, Orissa.

INDEX

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